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Abstract 
This thesis examines the migration patterns shown in the Soviet Union and its successor 
countries during the late- and post-Soviet periods. I begin by constructing a comprehensive 
dataset regarding the net migration of major ethnic groups before and after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and then investigate how migration, ethnic diversity, and conflict at the end of the 
Soviet period affected one another.  
The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic state where members of its diverse ethnic groups 
showed distinctive migration patterns. However, the quantitative research from the ethnic 
viewpoint had been limited, mainly because there was no systemic data of the migration 
patterns of different ethnic groups. The first main chapter of my thesis (Chapter 2), therefore, 
attempts to construct a dataset of the regional net migration of major ethnic groups. It shows 
that many members of ethnic groups were dispersed outside of their national territories during 
the late-Soviet period (ethnic mixing), but the “return” of these groups to their national 
territories became evident after the dissolution (ethnic unmixing). Then, in the next chapter 
(Chapter 3), I proceed to quantitative analyses of the determinants of migration emphasising 
the role of ethnic factors. The results from OLS and Heckman selection estimations support the 
idea that ethnicity had a large influence on shaping the migration patterns in both the late- and 
post-Soviet periods, though the direction of influence was the opposite. Lastly, in Chapter 4, I 
examine whether this migration patterns contributed to changing ethnic diversity in the 
sending and receiving regions and then to ethnic conflict and violence in these regions, 
concluding that both were the case.  
The results of this thesis are expected not only to help better understanding the Soviet 
and post-Soviet migration with the enhanced dataset, but also to become a valuable addition to 
the discourse on the current and historical waves of globalisation and its backlash, given the 
relevance of the Soviet case.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In this thesis, I focus on the usefulness of the Soviet and post-Soviet history in exploring the 
relationship between migration and ethnicity. Quantitative analyses have been rare in the 
literature when it comes to the ethnic aspect of the Soviet and post-Soviet migration, mainly due 
to the limited data availability. The biggest contribution of this thesis is to construct a dataset as 
to the regional net migration of major ethnic groups (Chapter 2), enabling to investigate the 
effect of ethnic factors on the migration patterns in the late- and post-Soviet periods (Chapter 3). 
This dataset is also used to uncover the mechanism through which regional ethnic diversity was 
shaped, and to show that the increase in the diversity due to migration was important in 
explaining the ethnic conflicts which had occurred at the end of the Soviet era (Chapter 4). 
Before moving on to the main chapters of this thesis, it seems essential to present why the 
Soviet Union is relevant to the study of migration and ethnic diversity.  
The USSR was home to over 100 ethnic groups, or nationalities1, who had been given 
complex status between autonomy and subjection. Notwithstanding the Marxist ideology of 
internationalism, Lenin and Stalin committed to national self-determination. Soviet authorities 
regarded the term “nationality (Natsional'nost', in Russian)” equivalent to ethnicity on which 
they based the establishment of territorial units2. The 15 largest ethnic groups were given 
autonomy over their own union republics and 20 groups over their ASSRs (See Figure 1-1 and 
Table 1-1). Many ethnic minorities (Poles, Germans, Jews, Koreans, etc.), as well as the above-
mentioned “titular nationalities”, were provided with a certain extent of autonomy including 
mother-tongue education, national units in political parties, national quotas in colleges, and so 
on3.  In addition to this ethno-territorialism, individual level nationhood was institutionalised by 
                                                             
1 I used the basic category of ethnic group as recorded by the Soviet official statistical agencies, regardless of 
the status and size of each ethno-cultural entities. For more discussions on terminology, Tishkov, V. Ethnicity, 
nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The mind aflame (Oslo, 1997). pp. viii - x 
2 Suny. G., ‘Nationalist and ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union’, World Policy Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 (1989), p. 506  
3 Slezkine, Y., ‘The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic 
particularism’, Slavic review, vol. 53 no. 2 (1994), p.422 
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ethnic nationality’s being a fundamental unit of social accounting and a key element of one’s 
legal status. In effect, nationality was not only identified in censuses and other social surveys 
but also recorded in almost all bureaucratic documents such as propiska4. Regarding the 
nationhood formation in the Soviet Union, Brubaker argues as follows: 
It was thus through an irony of history … that nationality became and remained a basic institutional 
building block of the avowedly internationalist, supranationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state, 
with the land partitioned into a set of bounded national territories, the polity composed in part of a 
set of formally sovereign national republics, and the citizenry divided into a set of legally codified 
nationalities5. 
  
                                                             
4 Propiska is a residency permit designed to control migration. Brubaker, R., ‘Nationhood and the national 
question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account’, Theory and Society, vol. 23 
no. 1 (1994), p.53 
5 Ibid., p.54 
Figure 1-1. The map of the USSR, union republics and ASSRs 
Source: Encyclopæ dia Britannica (retrieved from www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union) 
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Table 1-1. List of union republics in the USSR 
Union Republics Year joined 
Month/year 
independent 
Area 
(thousand km) 
Population 
in 1989 
(thousands) 
Share of  
titular group 
(%) 
Russia 1922 12/1991 17,075 147,022 81.5        
Ukraine  1922 07/1990 604 51,452 72.7 
Belorussia 1922 07/1990 208 10,152 77.9 
Moldavia  1940 08/1991 34 4,335 64.5  
Latvia  1940 05/1990 65 2,667 52.0 
Lithuania  1940 03/1991 65 3,675 79.6 
Estonia  1940 08/1991 45 1,566 61.5 
Georgia 1922 04/1991 70 5,401 70.1 
Azerbaijan  1922 08/1991 87 7,021 82.7 
Armenia 1922 09/1991 30 3,305 93.3 
Kazakhstan  1936 12/1991 2,717 16,464 39.7 
Uzbekistan  1924 08/1991 447 19,810 71.4 
Kirghizia  1936 08/1991 198 4,258 52.4 
Turkmenia 1924 10/1991 488 3,523 72.0 
Tajikistan 1929 09/1991 143 5,093 62.3 
Source: Encyclopæ dia Britannica (retrieved from www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union), 1989 USSR 
census 
 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union had never deviated from the goal of ultimate merger 
(sliyanie) of all nationalities into one Soviet people6. While patriotic rituals and internationalist 
education were promoted to build a Soviet identity7, population redistribution policy was also 
implemented to neutralise national consciousness based on land8. The titular nationalities had 
not been confined to their own autonomous territories but kept being sent, or encouraged to 
move, towards less developed and less densely-populated regions under the slogan of balanced 
regional development and “ethnic equalisation9”. The authorities first used coercion, especially 
                                                             
6 Huttenbach, H., ‘Introduction: Towards a Unitary Soviet State: Managing a multinational society, 1917-1985’, 
in Huttenbach, H. (ed.) Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR (London ,1990), p.5 
7 Collias, K., ‘Making Soviet citizens: Patriotic and internationalist education in the formation of a Soviet state 
identity’, in Huttenbach, Soviet Nationality Policies, pp.75-77. 
8 Schwartz, L. ‘Regional population redistribution and national homelands in the USSR’, in Huttenbach, Soviet 
Nationality Policies, p.149 
9 Ethnic equalisation refers to the set of nationality policies which aim to promote the socioeconomic levels of 
ethnic minorities. Jones, E. and F. Grupp, ‘Modernisation and Ethnic Equalisation in the USSR’, Soviet Studies 
vol. 36 no. 2 (1984), p.159    
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in the Stalinist era, but later tried to induce migration which they thought was desirable through 
incentivising mechanisms, such as offering higher wages and longer vacation to the workers 
settled in the northern and eastern part of Russia10.  
At the verge of the historic regime shift in 1991, the seemingly contradictory nationality 
and migration policies of the Soviet Union had created a unique setting where many members of 
ethnic groups who preserved their national identities found themselves in the places which did 
not use to be their “home11”. The number of Soviet people living outside their titular national 
territory in 1989 was 73 million, among which 25 million were ethnic Russians, and 12 million 
were non-Russians in Russian SFSR12. Also, ethnic mixing did seem to occur as the average of 
union republic level ethnic fractionalisation indices (FRAC) went up from 0.37 in 1939 to 0.40 in 
198913.  
Then there occurred a sudden breakup. The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought 
dramatic changes to the status and thus the migration patterns of the members of its diverse 
ethnic groups. While the restrictions on migration were mostly lifted, non-indigenous people 
suddenly became diaspora in the lands where they had used to have no legal barrier to reside. 
They faced up to the nationalist policies of independent former Soviet Union (FSU) republics, as 
the demand for independence was translated into discriminative policies against non-titular 
ethnic groups during the state-building process in the 1990s14. These formed both a push factor 
driving the non-indigenous groups away from their living places and a pull factor attracting 
titular groups to their own national region. Naturally, those who were spread across the Soviet 
                                                             
10 Gibson, J., ‘Interregional migration in the USSR, 1981–1985 and 1971–1975’, The Canadian Geographer/Le 
Géographe canadien, vol. 35 no. 2 (1991), p. 147-8 
11 I will use the term “home” to refer to the national territory of a member of an ethnic group, even though he 
or she had never lived there. Therefore, the term “return” (to their home) will be often used rather symbolic.  
12 Brubaker, ‘Nationhood (1994)’, p.57 
13 Calculated by author using census data. FRAC indicates the probability that two randomly chosen persons 
are in the different ethnic groups. The average of regional FRACs and the FRAC of the whole USSR should be 
different. See Section II, Chapter 4 for detail.  
14 For example, most Central Asian FSU states explicitly discriminated Russian-speaking population in 
employment or education. The details will be discussed later. Korobkov, A., ‘State and nation building policies 
and the new trends in migration in the former Soviet Union’, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East 
European Studies no.1702 (2003) 
15 
 
territory began to return to their national homeland, resulting in ethnic unmixing15. The ethnic 
unmixing not only involved the return migration of titular ethnic groups to the independent 
union republics but also was prompted by the emigration of ethnic minorities to where their 
ancestors had come from, even if this was outside the Soviet Union (e.g. Jews to Israel, ethnic 
Germans to Germany)16.  
Having mentioned the uniqueness of the late- and post-Soviet space, it was not the only 
place where different ethnic groups move and live together. According to the recent report of 
the United Nations, there are 258 million international migrant stock in 2017, accounting for 3.4 
per cent of the total world population17. If one considers high-income countries only, the share 
of immigrants goes up to 13.2 per cent18. The case of high diversity caused by mass migration 
can also be found at the turn of the twentieth century, when around 55 million Europeans 
moved to the New World in less than 65 years19. The Soviet case is just one example of the 
people mixing with those from different ethnic and cultural background, though it was the 
result of internal rather than international migration, and was often initiated involuntarily.  
The ethnic unmixing after the dissolution also resembles the backlash which has been 
observed cyclically at the end of the major waves of globalisation. The recent rise of the 
worldwide blood-and-soil type nationalism can be interpreted as an organisational resistance to 
the all-time high immigration and ethnic diversity levels20. Again, globalisation in the early 
twentieth century faced a similar policy backlash, represented in the US by Immigration Act in 
1917 or Emergency Quota Act in 1921, both of which aimed to restrict the influx of 
                                                             
15 Ethnic unmixing is the process where migration decreases ethnic or national heterogeneity in the receiving 
regions. Brubaker, R., ‘Migrations of ethnic unmixing in the "New Europe"’, International migration review vol. 
32 no.4 (1998), p.1059 
16 Heitman, S., ‘Soviet emigration since 1985’, Nationalities Papers vol. 22 no.1 (1994), pp. 247-261 
17 UNDESA, Population Division, International Migration Report 2017 (ST/ESA/SER.A/404) (New York, 2017) 
18 World Bank Data (retrieved from data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS?view=chart)  
19 Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact 
(Oxford, 1998) 
20 The Economist, 19 November 2016 (retrieved from www.economist.com/international/2016/11/19/league-
of-nationalists) 
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immigrants21. Nationalist policies are by nature discriminative against non-indigenous people 
and likely to prevent further immigration or drive out the present immigrants. This may result 
in ethnic unmixing, which was observed during the post-Soviet period.  
 Therefore, exploring the Soviet and post-Soviet migration and ethnic diversity not only 
enhances the understanding of the changes in demographics during the transition period but 
also has meaningful implications on the current discourse regarding the globalisation backlash. 
As I mentioned above, however, they had not been paid systemic attention yet despite its 
relevance. The biggest challenge is the absence of acceptable statistics or estimates of the size of 
migration at an ethnic level during the post-Soviet transition period. Granted, there have been 
some attempts to look into the migration of Soviet citizens during the transition period, which I 
will briefly summarise later in this introductory chapter. Many of them provide the migration 
trend, sometimes down to regional level statistics, using government publications or collecting 
partial and anecdotal evidence, but there are at least three important aspects that have been 
neglected in the previous works.  
Firstly, there has been no consistent dataset constructed that spans both pre- and post-
collapse periods. The available data is concentrated on the post-Soviet period, and existing late-
Soviet studies have not extended their datasets to the post-Soviet period. As a result, it was hard 
to directly compare the different characteristics between pre- and post-collapse migration 
patterns and their determinants, which might shed light on how institutional changes shape 
migration movements. Secondly, the Soviet and post-Soviet migration literature tends to focus 
on Russia22. There has been less concern about non-Russian Republics or FSU states, especially 
when it comes to regional level study. Inter-republic migration, however, accounts for over 95% 
during the Soviet period and around 80% even after the independence of the republics23. 
                                                             
21 Williamson, J., ‘Globalization, labor markets and policy backlash in the past’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives vol. 12 no. 4 (1998), p.63 
22 More prominent publications tend to deal with Russia only. See Previous Literature section for details. 
23 Rosstat, Demograficheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii: Statisticheskiy sbornik (Demographic Yearbook of Russia: 
Statistical Handbook), Table 7.1, (Moscow, 2002), pp.314-5 
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Therefore it is crucial to look at the migration of non-Russian states to have an accurate 
understanding of the whole picture. Lastly but perhaps most importantly, little attention has 
been paid to ethnic aspects of the migration movements. As mentioned above, many different 
ethnic groups had their residence in the USSR and each of these ethnic groups has shown 
distinctive migration patterns during the period of study. Therefore, it is also essential to see 
how the migration patterns are affected by ethnicity, and this thesis will be contributing 
particularly to this point.  
The interesting migration phenomenon in the Soviet transition period, combined with the 
room for improvement in the previous literature, leads me to the questions about its causes and 
consequences. To answer these questions, I first construct a new dataset of the net migration of 
different ethnic groups in the Soviet regions24, then conduct a series of quantitative analyses as 
to the determinants of net migration and the effect of migration on ethnic diversity and violence 
in the regions. The results from the main analyses will be summarised at the end of this 
introductory chapter, after discussing the history of nationality and migration policies of the 
Soviet Union in more detail and reviewing the previous literature which quantitatively looks 
into the post-Soviet migration. 
  
                                                             
24 The regional level data provide net migration in the administrative divisions of oblasts/krays/ASSRs. For 
details, see Section III, Chapter 2.  
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Historical Context 
Soviet Period 
According to the 1989 USSR Census, the number of ethnic groups settling in the USSR was 128, 
among which 55 had populations of more than 100,000 and 22 had more than 1 million. The 
ethnic fractionalisation index of the USSR in 1989 was 0.71125, which is far higher than the US 
(0.491) and the world average (0.480)26. Presence of many ethnic groups and high ethnic 
diversity seem somewhat inconsistent with the characteristics of a socialist country which had 
pursued the supranational unitary Soviet state27. This is due to the Soviet authorities’ 
contradictory nationality policies as discussed in the very beginning of this chapter, which will 
be elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
Right after the Bolshevik Revolution, there was political contestation between 
nationalists and internationalists over the right of nations to self-determination, while the 
support of the Congress leaned towards Lenin, one of the nation-builders28. Leninists believed 
that allowing for self-determination and cultural/linguistic freedom was an essential step to 
overcome the oppression under the old tsarist regime and move toward a true egalitarian 
socialist state29. In 1917, Lenin renounced the use of any form of force to keep the empire as a 
whole and was committed to supporting for the right of separation from Russia of all nations 
and nationalities who had been suppressed by tsarism30. This was also viewed as a compromise 
between Marxist ideal and the reality of weak state facing the nationalist and separatist 
movements. For example, Bolshevik leaders felt threatened by the big victory of Ukrainian 
                                                             
25 This figure goes down when regional concentration is considered. See Section II, Chapter 4, for details.   
26 Fearon, J., ‘Ethnic and cultural diversity by country’, Journal of economic growth vol. 8 no. 2 (2003), pp. 212, 
215  
27 Huttenbach, ‘A Unitary Soviet State’, p.4; There was no ethnic group classified as Soviets, unlike other 
socialist states. For example, Yugoslavian census includes “Yugoslav” as an ethnic group besides Croatian, 
Serbian and Slovenian. Wachtel, A., Making a nation, breaking a nation: Literature and cultural politics in 
Yugoslavia, (Stanford, 1998), pp.10-14 
28 Martin, T., The affirmative action empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. (New 
York, 2001), pp.2-3; Slezkine, ‘Ethnic Particularism’, pp.421 
29 Suny, R., The revenge of the past: Nationalism, revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 
1993), P.86 
30 Ibid., pp. 87-88 
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Socialist Revolutionaries over the Russian party in 1919 Constituent Assembly election of 
Ukraine31. Though Lenin had still hoped to reach the eventual merging of nations under Socialist 
ideology and preserve unitary Soviet state, the concessions to national principle eventually led 
to the consolidation of ethnicity, not its disappearance. Unlike the US, Ronald Suny argued, the 
Soviet Union was not a melting pot but an incubator of new nations32. 
In the course of promoting self-determination of all nationalities, the policy of nativisation 
(Korenizatisiya in Russian) was adopted, which had four aspects, namely national territories, 
national language, national elites and national cultures33. The most conspicuous result derived 
from nativisation was the territorial delimitation based on ethnicity. As shown in Figure 1-1, 15 
of over 100 different ethnic groups had their own union republics (e.g. Russian SFSR, Armenian 
SSR, Kazakh SSR, etc.) and 20 had their autonomous republics (Tatars ASSR, Yakut ASSR, etc.). 
There were also lower division autonomous territories such as autonomous oblasts and 
autonomous okrugs. The union republics even had the right to secede which is backed by the 
Article 17 in the 1936 Constitution or Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution, though this right was 
just perfunctory as there was no detailed procedure of secession.  
The titular groups were given a high degree of autonomy in their territory in terms of 
language education, appointment of high public officials, and preservation of national culture. 
For example, Latvian and Ukrainian governments adopted the law promoting equality of 
languages in courts and administration, and Belorussia used four different languages in its signs, 
local governments and schools34. The share of natives in political party membership was very 
high, even when their share in the population is low. For example, when Georgians accounted 
for 25% of the population of Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, 43% of the city soviet, 75% of the city 
executive committee, 91% of the praesidium of the executive committee were Georgians35. Also, 
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native operas, film studios, academies of science, etc. were also preserved and fostered by those 
national elites36. Regarding this, Tishkov argued as follows: 
…it is precisely the Bolsheviks who constructed, institutionalized and sponsored ethnic nations in 
the country. It is also because of them that all major non-Russian ethnic groups used to have and 
possess today a growing level of ethno-territorial autonomy with their own constitutions, state 
symbols, languages, legitimate governments and strong representation in federal power 
structures37.  
However, it would be incorrect to say that the Soviet leaders wanted to preserve all the 
national identities to the point that the “Soviet” identity is entirely abandoned. After all, the 
nativisation was only regarded as the key stage on the way to the ultimate Marxist and 
internationalist utopia. The ‘oppressed nations’, who were given the right to autonomy, were 
also bound to struggle for the international integration of all workers38. A central theme in the 
early-Soviet nationality question was dialectic: thesis - flowering of nation (rastsvet), antithesis -
drawing together (sblizheniye), synthesis - ultimate merger (sliyanie) into one Soviet people39. In 
order to achieve the final goal of Sovietisation, the authorities have adopted nationality policies 
at various stages, namely ethnocide/expulsion, assimilation, and resettlement40. 
The actions of ethnocide and expulsion41 had been widely taken in the 1930s and 40s 
under the Stalinist regime. Victimised nationalities include Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Crimean Tatars, 
Kalmyks, Karachays, Circassians, Chinese, Koreans and Japanese42. This mass killing of ethnic 
minorities often occurred as a part of the forced removal of undesired nations under the 
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e.g. to Central Asia or Siberia. Therefore, the definitions of expulsion and resettlement overlap to some 
extent.   
42 Ibid., p.35 
21 
 
programme called ‘Operation Deportation’43. Taking the example of Crimean Tatars, over 
190,000 were targeted to be deported from the Crimean ASSR to Central Asia and Siberia in 
1944.  NKVD (the progenitor of the KGB) troops came to operate the deportation and summarily 
shot, on the spot, thousands Crimean Tatars, who were deemed guilty of collaboration with the 
Germans when the Nazis occupied Crimea during the Second World War44. 7,900 Crimean 
Tatars, around 4% of their population, were killed during this deportation process45. The similar 
tragedy had hit other distrusted nations in the closing days of the Second World War.  
A less extreme, yet still destructive, form of nationality policy was assimilation. The first 
aspect of assimilation is linguistic Russification. Despite native languages being promoted under 
the slogan of nativisation, instruction in Russian was also compulsory, and essential as a means 
of upward mobility46. In March 1938, Central Committee of the Communist party passed a 
resolution, “On the obligatory study of Russian language in the schools of the national republics 
and oblasts”, which required secondary students to be fluent in Russian grammar and syntax47. 
Linguistic integration was promoted effectively, as it is observed in the Soviet censuses that the 
number of people who claim that their first language is Russian kept rising in non-Russian 
union republics and ASSRs48. 
In addition to linguistic Russification, patriotic and internationalist education 
(patrioticheskoe i internatsional’noe vospitanie) was presented to build a supranational Soviet 
identity49. Mandatory patriotic education was provided to young citizens in a variety of forms, 
such as in-school learning, union-wide excursion to historic places, interethnic sports 
competitions, or ceremonial rituals, through various institutional structures, including the 
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Soviet Armed Forces, Communist Youth League (Komsomol), or Soviet schools50. This education 
includes the regular participation in the rites and rituals commemorating heroes who fought in 
the Second World War. These heroes are not necessarily Russian, and multi-ethnic heroes often 
symbolise the interethnic cooperation in the course of reaching the framework of the Soviet 
socialist ideal51. These rituals are thought to serve the integration policy of the state and to 
overcome interethnic conflicts52. 
Finally, the Soviet authorities implemented population redistribution policies, which are 
classified as resettlement earlier, to achieve the ultimate merger of its various ethnic groups. 
Expulsion, not accompanying genocide, has an aspect of resettlement to mix nationalities who 
were accused of threatening Soviet power. Internal deportation counts up to 5.9 million 
between 1919 and 195353. This includes around 1.8 million rich kulaks but also targeted ten 
ethnic groups such as Koreans, Volga Germans, Chechens, and Meskhetian Turks54. 
Internal migration, even after the Stalin’s death, remained as a tool to ration people to the 
places following the authority’s policy objectives55. The Soviet leaders had attempted to 
transplant its population in less favourable regions under slogans of ethnic mixture and 
balanced regional development56. Throughout the Soviet era since 1932, the regime required 
citizens to register at the local branch of Ministry of Interior’s Registration Office and have the 
proof of permanent residence on their passport (propiska in Russian)57. The authorities limited 
the number of residence permits each area or city, and distributed university graduates to other 
regions and industries. The workers could choose to stay there or leave after some fixed-term 
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contract. The evidence suggests that Soviet leaders perceived the role of economic factors in 
incentivising labour movement and attempted to redistribute its population into less developed 
regions using wages and other forms of monetary and non-monetary compensation58. 
There were special northern and eastern benefits such as higher pension and longer 
vacations. Oil refining and natural gas processing industries in Western Siberia, for example, 
attracted people from the European part of the USSR59. Large railway projects, development of 
iron ore and coal mines, construction of ports in the Far East also attracted migrants. Those who 
are from ethnic peripheries in Transcaucasia and Central Asia were most responsive to the 
economic benefits of moving to Siberia and the Far East. As the goal of Soviet leadership in 
implementing nationality policy includes “ethnic equalisation”, which aims to reduce the gap in 
living standards among different ethnic groups60, it was natural that the less affluent members 
of titular groups in Southern republics and non-titular ethnic minorities were encouraged to 
migrate to the regions described above. This resulted in ethnic unmixing in the 1970s and 80s, 
when the new industries in Siberian and Far Eastern regions were being established.   
To sum up, the contradictory nationality and migration policies of the Soviet Union, 
aiming both the preservation of nationalities and promotion of unitary state, result in a large 
number of people who kept their national identity being dispersed from their perceived 
national homeland. The status of these people changed dramatically when the Soviet Union 
collapsed.  
 
Post-Soviet Transition Period 
The dissolution of the USSR created 15 newly independent states at the end of 1991. 
While the break-up of this 74-year-old socialist empire was relatively peaceful61, the late 80s 
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and early 90s saw massive nationalist and secessionist demonstrations demanding the 
independence of their national republics62. Since these nationalist movements were essentially 
enabling national elites to gain political and economic power after the independence, the closed 
system of privileges favouring titular ethnic groups was created63. The exclusive rights of titular 
nations were given priority while the rights of individuals or other population groups were 
disregarded64.   
The extent to which each of FSU states strengthened the power of its own titular group 
differed. Korobkov (2003) classified the non-Russian FSU states into three groups, according to 
their attitudes toward nationalist elites and non-titular ethnic groups65. The first group is Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus, which provided full citizenship to all the persons who had resided within 
their borders for a certain period and did not distinguish their residents by ethnicity in formal 
policies. Second group is Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where ethnic 
orientation was emphasised, and titular national groups were favoured. Although citizenship 
rights were also given to all permanent residents in these states, some policies favouring the 
titular groups were adopted. For example, Kazakhstan passed a law requiring all who pursed 
government employment to be proficient in Kazakh, and Lithuania treated “traditional 
Lithuanian churches and religious organisations” specially66.  Third group is Estonia, Lativia and 
other states in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, which implemented discriminatory policy 
toward minorities explicitly. Non-titular groups were not granted citizenship rights 
automatically, and restrictions were imposed on political and economic activities of non-titular 
groups.  For example, in Estonia, the constitution claims that certain “categories property in 
Estonia… are reserved for ownership by Estonian citizens”, when only 80.1 percent of the whole 
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population of Estonia held citizenship67.  
The changing status of non-indigenous groups, who spread across the independent FSU 
states, brought about changes in migration patterns as well. The post-Soviet migration of the 
members of FSU ethnic groups is usually divided into two broad categories in the literature: 
first, the (return) migration of the titular nationalities to their national territories, including 
return of ethnic Russians to Russia, and second, the emigration of ethnic minorities who had 
their national states outside the USSR/FSU, notably Jews and Germans. 
Most notable is the return migration of ethnic Russians to Russian Federation amongst 
the post-Soviet inter-republic movements. The number of ethnic Russians in non-Russian states 
reached 25.3 million in 1989 census68. The extent of the return migration of ethnic Russians 
who had suddenly become diaspora was large, even though it was not as extensive as some 
contemporary commentators had anticipated69. According to Timothy Heleniak, Russia added 
3.3 million to its population through migration from other Soviet successor states in the decade 
after 1989, with 2.9 million (88.4%) among them being ethnic Russians70. Furthermore, it is 
shown that net migration of ethnic Russians in the non-Russian FSU states was negative, i.e. out-
migration exceeds in-migration, without a single exception71.  
Ethnic Russians were not the only titular nationality that migrated to its national republic. 
All countries except Estonia and Georgia showed the positive net migration of their titular 
nationalities. Return migration was most active in the Slavic states, e.g. Ukraine and Belarus, and 
some Central Asian countries, e.g. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, until 199972. 
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The emigration of Soviet ethnic minorities out of the FSU states consists of an important 
stream of late- and post-Soviet migration patterns. It began a little before the dissolution of the 
USSR, with the partly liberalised emigration policy under the auspice of Gorbachev 
administration. The main recipients of these Soviet emigrants were the countries where their 
ancestors come from, namely Israel and Germany, which often provided them with citizenship 
rights. The US had also been the main receiving country before it imposed immigration quotas 
against the Soviet Union in 199073. In total, there was a potential emigrant pool of over 6 million, 
as big as the size of ethnic minorities who had external homelands, as shown in Table 1-2. 
The emigration of these ethnic groups was greatly influenced by the policy of the 
authority in the Soviet era. Exit visas were granted to the applicants only when the Soviet 
leadership’s interest in demonstrating its respect for human rights and international laws was 
strong, as was in the 1970s74. For example, the number of annual visas granted to Jews averaged 
24,669 in the 70s, before dropping to 3,507 in 1981-8775. After emigration was liberalised, the 
efforts of destination governments to attract or deter an influx of immigrants played a 
significant role in shaping migration trends.  
                                                             
73 Tolts, M., ‘Post-Soviet Aliyah and Jewish Demographic Transformation’. the 15th World Congress of Jewish 
Studies (2009), p.4 
74 Siegel, D., The great immigration: Russian Jews in Israel. (Providence, 1998), p.4 
75 Dominitz, Y., ‘Israel's Immigration Policy and the Dropout Phenomenon’, in Lewin-Epstein, N., et al. (ed.), 
Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement (1997), p.119 
27 
 
Table 1-2. The population of ethnic minorities with external homelands, 1989 
Nationality Population Main residence 
Germans 2,038,603 Kazakh SSR (47.0), RSFSR (41.3) 
Jews 1,378,344 RSFSR (38.9), Ukrainian SSR (35.2) 
Poles 1,126,334 
Byelorussian SSR (37.1), Lithuanian SSR (22.9), Ukrainian SSR 
(19.5) 
Koreans 438,650 Uzbek SSR (41.8), RSFRS (24.4), Kazakh SSR  (23.6) 
Bulgarians 372,941 Ukrainian SSR(62.7), Moldavian SSR(23.7) 
Greeks 358,068 Georgian SSR (28.0), Ukrainian SSR(27.5), RSFSR (25.6) 
Turks 207,512 Uzbek SSR (51.2), Kazakh SSR (23.9) 
Hungarians 171,420 Ukrainian SSR (95.2) 
Romanians 146,071 Ukrainian SSR (92.3) 
Finns 67,359 RSFSR (69.9), Estonian SSR (24.7) 
Total 6,305,302 - 
Note: In parenthesis is the distribution of the ethnic group in Soviet republics. (i.e. 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑅
). 
Source: 1989 Soviet Census 
 
 In sum, the members of ethnic groups who were residing outside of their national 
republics tended to go back to their internal or external home states after the dissolution. The 
focus of this thesis will be on the determinants of this “return” migration, examining whether 
ethnic factors were crucial in migration decision and destination choice in the transition period.  
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Previous literature 
In this section, I will review the previous literature to which this thesis contributes. There are 
three different streams of such literature, seeking to find 1) overall trend of post-Soviet migration, 
2) determinants of migration, and 3) the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict.  
 
Overall Trend of Post-Soviet Migration 
Many scholars have attempted to analyse the overall trend of post-Soviet migration patterns. 
Research in the early 1990s provided preliminary data on the size of ethnic migrations and their 
causes, as well as expectations of future trends.  
The main source of data on ethnic composition of the Soviet population is all-nation 
census which was conducted roughly once a decade since the foundation of the USSR. Due to the 
presence of the all-nation census in 1979 and 1989, the years around the intercensal period 
became the focal point of the demography and migration literature. Anderson and Silver (1989) 
give an overview of the change in ethnic composition and the effect of migration on that 
phenomenon76. They calculated net migration as the difference between total population 
growth and natural increase77 and pointed out that the inter-republic migration had a large 
influence on the change in ethnic composition78. One of the major drivers of the internal 
relocation of the Soviet population was the returning migrants fleeing from ethnic conflicts79.  
Brubaker (1992) is another author who has focused on inter-republic movements, with 
an interest in the relationship between titular and non-titular nationalities80. After overviewing 
the out-migration patterns in the transition period, he pays particular attention to the 
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citizenship issue among immigrants from one FSU state to another. Taking Russian immigrants 
in Baltic countries as an example, he concludes that the citizenship would not be granted 
automatically to the FSU migrants81. His conclusion regarding Russian diaspora in non-Russian 
states and their citizenship struggles would turn out to be one facet of “ethnic unmixing” in his 
later work in 1998. Contrary to the common belief that migration is often connected to 
“heterogenization” of society, the case in post-Soviet migrations was an example of movement 
towards ethnic affinity, involving many ethnic migrants going back to their internal or external 
home states82. The politics around the citizenship grants formed a push factor of Russian 
emigration from other successor countries. 
Robertson (1996) reviews qualitative evidence but also provides specific figures proving 
the hypothesis of ethnic migration to the home states in the early 1990s83. All 14 non-Russian 
titular nationalities are recorded to have positive net migration from Russia to their respective 
newly independent home states in 1991, and ethnic Russians who had lived there left for 
Russia84. In 1992, the same trend continued in most FSU states except the war-torn regions of 
Transcaucasia (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Estonia85. He reached the similar 
conclusion to previous works, that the preferential policies toward the majority, i.e. titular 
nationalities, not only drove out minorities but also attracted co-ethnics from other states86. 
Some of these earlier works have a specific concern about the Post-soviet emigration of 
peoples to foreign countries other than ex-republics. Heitman (1991)87 and Shevtsova (1992)88 
are among the most frequently cited articles providing emigration statistics in the transition 
period and, more interestingly, predictions of the future trend. Germans, Jews and Armenians 
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were the three most active nationalities moving out of the FSU to the West, whose number of 
emigrants drastically increased after 1987 when the government began to expand the number 
of exit visa grants. Heitman further points out that potential ethnic migrants among Poles, 
Bulgarians, Koreans and Turks, who would in the future consist of a fourth wave of emigration89. 
Shevtosova, who was more careful in reviewing evidence both for and against the prediction of 
massive emigration, seems to agree with the possible increase in the number of emigrants for 
several years90. She, however, also predicted the decline of the trend in the near future quoting 
Russians’ willingness to return to the country once the political situation had stabilised91.  
The actual scope of emigration was much smaller than many contemporaries expected. 
While Shevtsova predicted 1 - 1.5 million annual emigrants from Russian Federation in the mid-
1990s, which she thought very conservative by herself, the actual annual outflows to foreign 
countries was always below 500,000 after 1993, even including the number of emigrants to FSU 
states – outflows to other foreign countries were only 100,000 on average during the entire 
1990s92. Amongst the many possible deterrents to the occurrence of the mass migration out of 
the FSU states, limits on visa for the former Soviet citizens in receiving countries (US or 
Germany) and less rosy prospects of host economies (e.g. Israel) might have been most 
significant93.  
Recent studies look at the phenomenon with a more complete set of statistics. The most 
intensive and detailed research was done by Timothy Heleniak (1997a, b, 2003, 2008, 2012). 
His studies are noteworthy in that they tried to estimate the magnitude of ethnic movements, 
though these were limited to the country level. There is also a group of research which attempts 
to review the overall trend of post-Soviet migration, including Azrael and Payin (1996), 
Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia (2004), Tishkov et al. (2005), Mansoor and Quillin (2006), and 
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two edited books, Munz and Ohliger (2003) and Buckley and Rubles (2008)94.  
The above-mentioned authors used various sources to measure the migration flows in the 
transition period, but there are three major drawbacks. Firstly, the dataset constructed did not 
span both pre- and post-collapse periods. The data is mostly concentrated on the post-Soviet 
period, and late-Soviet studies did not extend their dataset to the post-Soviet period. As a result, 
it was hard to compare the different characteristics between pre- and post-collapse migration 
patterns and their determinants. Secondly, the Soviet and post-Soviet migration literature tends 
to focus on Russia. There has been less concern about non-Russian Republics or FSU states, 
especially when it comes to regional level study. Inter-republic migration accounts for over 95% 
during the Soviet period and around 80% even after the independence of the republics95. 
Therefore it is crucial to look at the migration of non-Russian states to have an accurate 
understanding of the whole picture. Lastly, little attention has been paid to ethnic aspects of the 
migration movements. As mentioned above, many different ethnic groups had their residence in 
the USSR and each of these ethnic groups has shown distinctive migration patterns during the 
period of concern. Therefore, it is also essential to see how ethnicity and migration are 
interrelated, and this thesis will be contributing particularly to this point.  
 
The Determinants of Migration 
The determinants of migration decisions and destination choice are an important subject in the 
migration literature. Economic differentials between sending and receiving regions are often 
seen as the most important factor driving people to move. Potential migrants will decide to 
move when the destinations can offer better economic opportunities, notably higher wages, 
higher chance of employment, and cheaper living costs etc., than where they currently live. The 
importance of economic factor in determining migration patterns does not seem to need further 
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explanation. The expected lifetime income in the potential destination has been emphasised 
from the studies as early as Ravenstein (1885)96 to the most recent migration literature, as 
surveyed in Constant and Zimmerman (2013)97. The effect of income differential on migration 
has been intensively tested for many regions and periods (UK: Hatton 1995, Hatton and 
Williamson 2005; US: Borjas 1987, Clark et al. 2007; OECD; Mayda 2010, Belot and Hatton 2012, 
Ortega and Peri 2013 and many others).  
Apparently, however, money is not the only matter of concern for the migrants. Previous 
migrant stock also plays a significant role in determining migration decision. The migrant 
network not only provides information about the destination and reduces the opportunity cost 
of migration, but also contributes to the improvement of immigrant outcomes in the host 
country. In addition, some authors have started to pay attention to the impact of ethnic affinity 
on migrants’ motivation and assimilation as a specific case of the network effects. In terms of 
explaining migration, it is argued that individuals have an incentive to live in the region or 
country where their co-ethnics are present, and governments can also benefit from ethnic 
homogeneity. 
The view that identity is one of the main determinants of labour market performance 
and earnings has become increasingly popular among economists since the 2000s98. The 
seminal works of Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) define identity as a person’s sense of self, 
which is affected by gender, race, ethnicity, culture, religion, or any group/organisation one 
belongs to, etc.99 They argue that a rational individual would seek to achieve their ideal self and 
may sacrifice monetary compensation for the sake of enhancing the sense of identity. The 
impact of ethnicity, which is an aspect of one’s identity, should be better observed among 
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immigrants, as ethnic identity usually comes up to the surface when a person migrates to a 
society dominated by other ethnic groups. Therefore, migration decisions and destination 
choice can be dependent on ethnicity regardless of its impact on earnings.  
Furthermore, earnings themselves can be affected by identity. Many scholars have 
concluded that the ethnicity of immigrants and labour market outcomes in the destination are 
closely related (Constant and Zimmermann 2008, 2013, Bisin et al. 2011, Hatton and Leigh 2011, 
Patacchini and Zenou 2012).  For instance, Bisin et al. (2011), studying the impact of ethnic 
identity on labour market outcomes of non-EU migrants in Europe, argue that there is clear 
evidence of the disadvantage of being an ethnic minority in terms of wage assimilation100. 
Hatton and Leigh (2011) also emphasise the role of ethnic communities in improving the new 
co-ethnic immigrants’ earnings101.  Patacchini and Zenou (2012) find the evidence in the UK 
labour market that the residential proximity to the same ethnic group enhances the probability 
of successful job-seeking of an individual102. All these studies support the idea that the ethnic 
identity is one of the most important factors affecting migrants’ economic performance and 
therefore will affect the decision making and destination selection process of potential migrants 
in the first place.   
There is a handful of research which supports the direct role of ethnicity in the migration 
decision. Most of them have reached this conclusion analysing the internal migration of US 
ethnic minorities (Kritz and Nogle 1994, Gurak and Kritz 2000, Frey and Liaw 2005, etc.). Kritz 
and Nogle maintain that the larger the number of compatriots residing in a region, the less likely 
is out-migration to occur due to social capital in the immigrant community103. Similarly, Frey 
and Liaw (2005) suggest the reasons for ethnic sorting, such as kinship ties, social support 
                                                             
100 Bisin, A et al., ‘Ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of immigrants in Europe’, Economic Policy vol. 
26 no. 65 (2011), pp.57-92. 
101 Hatton, T., and Leigh, A., ‘Immigrants assimilate as communities, not just as individuals’, Journal of 
Population Economics vol. 24 no. 2 (2011), pp.389-419 
102 Patacchini, E., and Zenou, Y. ‘Ethnic networks and employment outcomes’, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics vol. 42 no. 6 (2012), pp.938-949. 
103 Kritz, M., and Nogle, J., ‘Nativity concentration and internal migration among the foreign-born’, 
Demography vol. 31 no. 3 (1994), pp.509-524. 
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network, and access to informal employment opportunities104. They also find that the internal 
migration of Hispanics, Asians, and African Americans is affected by the concentration of each 
ethnic group in a state, retaining potential out-migrants and attracting new migrants105.  
As to the post-Soviet context, the literature gives some qualitative evaluation on the 
motivations of interstate migration in the post-Soviet space. Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 
(2004) attribute ethnic relocation in the earlier period to political and ethnic factors, such as the 
attempts of FSU state leaders to form nation-states on the basis of ethnic definitions of 
nationality, policies favouring titular nationalities over ethnic minorities, the loss of status and 
privileges by the Russian-speaking elites and increasing cultural and linguistic differentiation 
among ethnic groups106. Pilkington (1998) also agrees that interethnic relationship and 
discrimination against Russian were the main reasons for migration of ethnic Russians from 
other FSU states, after interviewing 83 such migrants107. However, the migration since the late 
1990s is argued to have become more and more affected by socioeconomic drivers, with the 
continuing role of Russia as a magnet for migration due to the increasing gap between Russian 
and other FSU economies108. Heleniak gave a similar explanation on the causes of post-Soviet 
migration, mainly attributing it to economic disparities among the FSU states and the role of 
government109.  
There also has been some quantitative research about the reasons of inter-regional 
migration in Russian Federation, namely Brown (1997), Andrienko and Guriev (2004), Gerber 
(2006), and Guriev and Vakulenko (2015). These, however, did not deal with the ethnic aspect 
except that some of them have ethnic fractionalisation as one of the control variables. Brown 
                                                             
104 Frey, W., and Liaw, K., ‘Migration within the United States: Role of Race-Ethnicity’, Brookings-Wharton 
papers on urban affairs (2005), p.208 
105 While their main specification reports positive and significant coefficients of concentration of ethnicity 
variables, they also argue that its explanatory power may decrease depending on the immigrants’ education 
and skill level, i.e. the more the immigrants are educated, the more they want to assimilate into the native 
society. Ibid., p.245 
106 Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia, ‘Changes in Migration’, p.482 
107 Pilkington, H., Migration, displacement, and identity in post-Soviet Russia (London, 1998), p.128 
108 Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia, ‘Changes in Migration’, p.488 
109 Heleniak, ‘Overview (2008)’, p.59 
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(1997) and other authors examining the earlier period of transition did not find the decisive 
effects of labour market conditions on migration movements between regions110. Andrienko and 
Guriev (2004) find the results expected by neo-classical migration theory, by using enhanced 
region-to-region flow data from 1992 to 1999 and direct measures of economic opportunity for 
the first time in the literature. Gerber (2006)111 and Guriev and Vakulenko (2015)112 drew a 
similar conclusion with different method and datasets, and the latter reveals interesting 
findings on the non-monotonic relationship between income and migration. That is, the higher 
income in sending country positively influences emigration flows only when they are poor, 
because of the existence of liquidity constraint. They include in their specification a structural 
break to find the non-monotonic relationship around an income threshold. 
These articles do not deal with the ethnic aspect of post-Soviet migration and tend to 
focus on Russia only. The quantitative research which attempts to deal with the ethnic factor in 
the inter-FSU state migration is rare, and to my knowledge, there is just one paper as such: 
Locher (2002)113. She used Heleniak’s dataset on net migration of ethnic groups between 1989 
and 1999 to filter out their main determinants. She tried to examine the relative contributions 
of economic factors and ethnic sorting to 80 migration movements between 1989 and 99. 
Locher found the evidence of the significant influence of both ethnic sorting and economic 
factors on emigration and immigration of ethnic groups, resulting from Heckman full-
information maximum likelihood estimation with explanatory variables of the size of ethnic 
groups, GDP per capita, EBRD transition indicators114, institutional quality, and so on. 
                                                             
110 Brown, A., ‘The economic determinants of internal migration flows in Russia during transition’, William 
Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no. 89 (1997)  
111 Gerber, T., ‘Regional Economic Performance and Net Migration Rates in Russia, 1993–2002’. International 
Migration Review vol. 40 no. 3 (2006), pp.661-697 
112 Guriev, S., and Vakulenko, E., ‘Breaking out of poverty traps: Internal migration and interregional 
convergence in Russia’, Journal of Comparative Economics vol. 43, no. 3 (2015), pp. 633-649. 
113 Locher, L., ‘Migration in the Soviet successor states’, Applied Economics Quarterly vol. 48 no. 1 (2002), pp.67-
84 
114 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) measures the degree of transition in post-
communist countries by the weighted average of financial market reform, market liberalisation and 
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However, as the author herself recognised, the sample size was too small and the dataset 
was not complete. The fact that only data she had were those of net migration at the country 
level, unable to decompose it into in- and out-migration, weakened her interpretation. Locher 
justified her use of net migration data by arguing that the migration of an ethnic group is usually 
one direction and should not be different much from gross migration, but this is not necessarily 
true if one reviews the official statistics of ethnic migration available for the late 1990s115. This 
issue might have been addressed if she had used regional level data. Also, she did not include 
many control variables which may have influenced the migration patterns. There are readily 
available data of regional characteristics which migration literature has conventionally pointed 
out as key determinants, so having them in the specifications would have improved the quality 
of her research significantly. Though Locher’s work was a sole quantitative analysis directly 
related to the topic I am concerned with, it left many points of improvement.  
 
Ethnic diversity and development 
There has been an extensive discussion in the literature as to the impact of ethnic diversity on 
economic and social outcomes. On the one hand, it is argued that the more fragmented society is 
prone to rent-seeking behaviour, competition over limited resources and resulting conflict, 
therefore subject to poor economic performance. On the other hand, however, the adverse effect 
of ethnic fractionalisation may not be very large if the society has good institutions, such as 
democracy, that can deal with the coordination problem and make the most of 
complementarities between different members. For example, Collier (2000) found that the 
ethnic diversity hampers economic growth only in non-democratic countries116, and many other 
studies also recognise the different implications of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity depending 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
privatisation.  
115 For example, the net-migration of Belarusians or Kazakhs in Russia tends to fluctuate from 1997 to 2004 
thus gross in- or out-migration had very different nature from net-value.  
116 Collier, P., ‘Ethnicity, politics and economic performance’, Economics & Politics vol. 12 no. 3 (2000), pp.225-
245. 
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on the institutional settings of affected societies. In fact, there has been another stream of 
research that emphasises the positive effect of more diversity in an organisation or a society.  
Ever since Easterly and Levine (1997)117 attributed the poor economic performance of 
African countries to the low quality of their institutions which can be largely explained by ethnic 
fragmentation in the continent, the role of ethnicity has been regarded as one of the most 
important determinants of economic development. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)118 provide a 
survey of the literature dealing with the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic 
performance, concluding that ethnically heterogeneous societies have been disadvantaged in 
terms of economic growth depending on the quality of institutions. 
Poor policy management and political instability can be two channels through which 
ethnic diversity exacerbates economic performance. The development literature has paid 
attention to the role of ethnic diversity in forming counterproductive institutions. The conflict of 
preferences due to the heterogeneity of a society often facilitates rent-seeking behaviour by 
different ethnic groups and diverts the resources from productive investment119. Also, the 
fragmented preferences will make it hard to reach agreement about the provision of public 
goods such as education and infrastructure, which again lower the level of output120. A more 
obvious channel is social unrest and civil wars among the ethnic groups residing in a region or a 
country. An ethnically polarised society may be prone to ethnic violence, riots and even military 
conflicts, as it is more difficult to coordinate the distribution of scarce resources121. These can 
affect the welfare of people directly or indirectly involved in the military conflicts, and lead to 
the destruction of physical capital and future economic prospect. The fiscal burden on the 
government dealing with the conflicts should not be negligible.  
                                                             
117 Easterly, W., and Levine, R., ’Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics vol. 112 no. 4 (1997), pp.1203-1250 
118 Alesina, A., and La Ferrara, E., ‘Ethnic diversity and economic performance’, Journal of Economic Literature 
vol.43 no. 3 (2005), pp.762-800 
119 Montalvo, J., and Reynal-Querol, M., ’Ethnic diversity and economic development’, Journal of Development 
Economics vol. 76 no. 2, p.308 
120 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s tragedy’, p.1216 
121 Vanhanen, T., ‘Domestic ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism: A comparative analysis’, Journal of Peace 
Research vol. 36 no. 1 (1999), p.58 
38 
 
There is also the view that diversity can be a good stimulus to the economy under 
certain circumstances. Lazear (2000)122 and Collier (2000)123 argued that the government, or 
better political institutions, can mitigate the adverse effect of ethnic diversity and benefit from 
complementarities and spillovers arising from different skills, experiences and ideas by 
coordinating communication. In line with this, Alesina and La Farrera (2005) also mentioned 
that the economic performance might not be hampered by ethnic fractionalisation in rich 
countries124. This claim has been supported by some recent empirical works such as Bellini et al. 
(2013)125 and Alesina et al. (2016)126. Although the empirical evidence for the adverse effect of 
diversity still dominates the literature127, it is not deniable that the government can work to 
increase the heterogeneity of the country at some stage of its economic development to gain 
from it. If done correctly, positive outcomes can be derived from the diverse societal members, 
namely the diffusion of new ideas, complementarities between different skill levels and mutual 
learning128. Putnam (2007) also argues that the influx of new members fosters the interethnic 
tolerance and social solidarity in the long run and thus makes conflicts less likely to occur129.  
 To the best of my knowledge, there is no research exclusively focusing on the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and development of the Soviet Union or its successor 
countries. Given the ethnically fragmented nature of the Soviet republics, it should not be 
neglected in the literature. It is particularly relevant to look at the effect of diversity on ethnic 
conflicts and riots occurred in the late-Soviet period.  
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Summary of the main findings 
Chapter 2.  Migrations of Ethnic Mixing and Unmixing  
Improving upon the previous literature, my thesis first reviews the existing method and sources 
for measuring/estimating the migration flows during the transition period and constructs a 
database of regional migration by ethnicity. Data construction in this chapter is one of the core 
contributions of my thesis as it has never been done systematically in previous research.  
I use the last two censuses of the USSR (1979 and 89) and the censuses conducted in the 
FSU states in the years around 2000 to track the ethnic composition changes at regional (oblast) 
levels. By taking away estimated ethnic level natural increase from population change, I could 
derive regional net migration levels and rates of major ethnic groups. The data constructed in 
the first chapter confirm the conclusion drawn from some incomplete or anecdotal evidence 
discussed in the previous works and provide new evidence of ethnic movements. To be specific, 
the literature argues that ethnic Russians out-migrated from non-Russian FSU states during the 
transition period and this proved to be the case by the net migration data of ethnic Russians 
constructed in this chapter. It is also confirmed that some ethnic minorities, notably Jews, began 
to leave the USSR even before the dissolution. In addition, there were some original findings in 
this chapter, which show that the non-Russian titular ethnic groups, for example, Ukrainians, 
Kazakhs, and many others, also have shown strong tendency to return to their own titular states. 
This chapter suggests specific figures of the level and rates of net migration at the regional and 
ethnic level, and some of the ethnic groups show net migration rates which are far higher than 
those shown in Europe during the “age of mass migration”.  
In the tables and maps providing descriptive statistics of ethnic migration, it is clearly 
observed that the trends shifted from ethnic mixing in the late-Soviet period to ethnic unmixing 
in the post-Soviet period. For example, Kazakhs or Ukrainians in Russian SFSR started to move 
to Kazakhstan or Ukraine, respectively, after independence. Return migration occurred despite 
the relatively weak Kazak or Ukrainian economic performance compared to the Russian 
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Federation. Similar patterns are observed from the migration of other titular nationalities in the 
given period. This means that migrants are likely to have considered the share of their own 
ethnic groups in the destinations when deciding to move, especially after dissolution.  
These findings shed light on the motivation of the potential migrants in the transition 
period. Besides economic differentials, migrants tend to consider the presence of their co-
ethnics in the sources and destinations inferring from the dataset constructed in this section.   
This idea needs to be tested to be accepted as a general conclusion, and this task will continue in 
the next chapter, analysing the determinants of regional net migration of ethnic groups 
quantitatively. Beyond this, the newly constructed dataset is also expected to be used for 
various quantitative analyses in the future. 
 
Chapter 3. Ethnicity as a determinant of migration  
One of the main aims of my thesis is to find the drivers of the ethnic migration during the 
transition period. The third chapter analyses aggregate data to figure out the universal 
determinants of migration movements in the late- and post-Soviet periods. As discussed in the 
literature review and the summary of the second chapter, economic motivations are not the 
only driver of the migration patterns in the Soviet and post-Soviet space. It has been attributed 
to other factors, namely, policies of sending and receiving countries, ethnic conflicts, and 
voluntary/involuntary ethnic sorting.  
Using the newly constructed dataset in the previous chapter, I conduct OLS and 
Heckman 2-step estimations on the pre- and post-dissolution samples separately. I regress the 
regional net migration rates on the share of each ethnic group, wage growth, employment share, 
and conflict dummy being the main explanatory variables. I also include the control variables 
which are related to living standards in the sources and destinations, such as housing space, 
education, transport, crime rates, etc., in order to see if the migration patterns were affected by 
other factors. In addition to a simple OLS estimation, the Heckman 2-step selection model is 
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specified following the justification of Locher in correcting selection problem130. The estimation 
includes eight major ethnic groups, namely ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, 
Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Jews and Germans. I do regressions first on the post-Soviet sample 
and then compare the results with the pre-collapse sample.  
The role of ethnic share turns out to be positive and significant in the post-Soviet period, 
but this result is a complete reverse of what had happened during the late-Soviet period, where 
the coefficients of the ethnic share are negative. This result confirms that the trend of ethnic 
mixing which occurred in the Soviet period was reversed after its dissolution and the following 
abolition of migration restrictions. Economic variables notably wage growth, employment 
shares and food consumption, also affected migration patterns significantly in both periods, and 
the presence of civil wars have significant coefficients in some cases but not consistently.  
 I then check the robustness of the results by including other control variables like 
temperature range, average house size, the number of students, passenger distance by bus, 
share of the urban population, the number of medical personnel and crime rates. The 
significance and sign of ethnic share were not sensitive to the changes in the specifications. In 
addition, variables related to the living standards of residents had little influence on migration 
patterns during the Soviet period, possibly due to the lack of autonomy in choosing destinations. 
However, the post-Soviet specifications show that living conditions began to have a stronger 
impact on migration decision.  
An additional exercise with the post-Soviet sample on the relationship between the 
duration of stay and migration show that the regions with high new immigrant shares have 
higher net migration rates. This result can be interpreted as evidence that the returnees to 
home republics were mostly those who recently had moved to other regions for some benefits 
but returned when those benefits disappeared.  
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Chapter 4. Migration, Ethnic Fractionalization and Violence in the Soviet Union 
The fourth chapter examines the extent to which the migration affected regional ethnic diversity 
and violent incidents. I use conventional ethnic fractionalisation (FRAC) and polarisation 
(POLAR) indices to measure how diverse the Soviet oblasts were, showing that there was a 
trend of increasing ethnic diversity in most parts of the USSR. Then I move on to investigate 
how the increasing ethnic diversity connects to the frequency and size of violent incidents 
which occurred at the end of the Soviet period.  
In the first section of this chapter, I review the trend of regional ethnic diversity in the 
USSR from 1959 to 1989, and 2000. The analysis of the regional diversity gives somewhat 
different pictures from the country level data, due to the regional concentration of each ethnic 
group in their autonomous republics. The channel through which the regional ethnic diversity 
was shaped is revealed to be migration that promoted ethnic mixing during the late-Soviet 
period. The counterfactual ethnic diversity level was made available thanks to the data 
constructed in the previous chapters. As a result, the contribution of migration in all the Soviet 
raions, except Transcaucasia and Moldavia, was positive and raised the regional ethnic diversity 
levels during the last decade of the Soviet period. In contrast, ethnic unmixing was clearly seen 
during the post-Soviet period. The change in FRAC due to migration was negative in all regions 
with no exception in the period between 1989 and 2000, meaning that ethnic migration after 
the collapse contributed to the homogenisation of post-Soviet states.  
The next section of this chapter attempts to document the relationship between the 
diversity and violence in the Soviet context, adding confirmation to the literature arguing for the 
negative effect of ethnic diversity on social outcomes. To be specific, the coefficients of ethnic 
diversity levels are positive and significant in explaining the frequency and the size of the 
violent incidents as well as raising the probability of civil wars. However, the change in ethnic 
diversity may have different implications, as the increase in FRAC, unlike its initial level, turns 
out to reduce the probability of ethnic violence. This can be partly explained by the ‘contact 
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hypothesis’, which argues that interethnic interactions prevent conflict, but is also related to the 
ethnic mobilisation in the regions where ethnic Russians left. 
In addition, non-linear relationship between diversity and conflict is found from 
quadratic specifications. Contrary to the prediction of the previous literature, however, the 
chance of conflict is highest when the regions are very homogenous and very fragmented, 
resulting in a U-shape relationship. This can be understood in the Soviet context. On the one 
hand, ethnic elites can most easily mobilise indigenous people and organise nationalist protests 
in the highly homogeneous regions131. On the other hand, major ethnic conflicts often occurred 
between two non-Russian nationalities who occupied one region, which would have very high 
FRAC with the presence of ethnic Russians132. Detailed examples will be presented in Section III 
of this chapter.  
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132 FRAC will be high when there are three or more ethnic groups who have comparable population sizes.  
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Chapter 2. Migrations of Ethnic Mixing and Unmixing – 
Evidence from a New Database 
 
Abstract 
The main aim of this chapter is to construct a new database documenting the migration patterns of 
major ethnic groups. After critically evaluating the existing method and sources of estimating 
Soviet and post-Soviet migration, I construct late- and post-Soviet net migration data by region and 
ethnicity for the first time in the literature. The dataset shows that the major ethnic groups had 
been distributed outside their own national territories, resulting in ethnic mixing in the late-Soviet 
period. This trend is dramatically reversed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, showing that 
the titular ethnic groups had a strong tendency to return to their own titular states. These findings 
provide a more accurate picture of the migration trend in the late- and post-Soviet periods and are 
expected to be used for various quantitative analyses in the future.  
 
I. Introduction  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought dramatic changes to the migration patterns of its 
diverse ethnic groups. While the restrictions on migration were lifted, the members of non-
titular nationalities suddenly became diaspora in the lands where they had had no trouble 
living. It is not unreasonable to infer that many of these ethnic groups were exposed to new 
discrimination and would choose to migrate to more favourable places for them. The changes in 
the migration patterns of different ethnic groups after the dissolution can be the source of 
interesting academic discussions, but the biggest challenge is that we do not have acceptable 
migration statistics during the post-Soviet transition period, especially when it involves 
ethnicity. 
The Soviet regime was notorious for manipulating and concealing its national statistics, 
and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the construction of a fine statistics management 
system was far down on the priority of newly established governments in the period of 
transition133. Although some Soviet official statistical sources, such as the Demographic 
                                                             
133 Heleniak, ‘Overview (2008)’, p.36 
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Yearbook of USSR, reveal the size of migration movements among the union republics and 
regions, information about ethnic movements was scarce. It was not until after 1991 that 
Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) started to provide quite detailed statistics on 
the migration of its population by ethnicity134, and none of the other FSU states has comparable 
data as Russia’s. To analyse the relationship between ethnicity and migration, with which the 
key research questions of my thesis are concerned, it is crucial to have more comprehensive 
statistics about the movements of major ethnic groups in all the union republics/FSU states 
during the post-Soviet transition period, as well as the relevant statistics for its late-Soviet 
counterpart.  
Only a small number of Soviet and Russian demographers tried to estimate the 
migration of ethnic groups before and after the dissolution. Some authors such as Schwartz 
(1991) and Kaiser (1994) are concerned about nationality redistribution during the Soviet 
period, but they could not carve out-migration from population changes due to the lack of data 
on natural increase135. Anderson and Silver (1989) tried to estimate the net migration of titular 
nationalities from 1959 to 1989, but they made somewhat unrealistic assumptions about 
natural increase by ethnicity136. As to the post-Soviet period, Heleniak’s 1997 and 2003 works 
are the only systematic attempt to construct net migration data after the dissolution. However, 
these were republic level data, which may be subject to larger margins of errors than regional 
level data when applying assumptions about fertility and mortality rates137. 
Therefore, one of the main aims of this chapter will be to estimate the regional migration 
flows of the major ethnic groups in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. With the newly constructed 
and improved dataset, it is made possible to see if the nationality and migration policies of the 
Soviet regime have affected the migration patterns before and after the collapse of the USSR. The 
                                                             
134 The statistics are only at the federal, but not regional, level.  
135 Schwartz, ‘USSR nationality’, pp.209-248; Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, pp. 170-90. 
136 They did not have natural increase data at ethnic level and assumed that the Soviet level natural increase of 
an ethnic group is the same as republic level natural increase. Anderson and Silver, ‘Demographic sources 
(1989), pp. 635-636  
137 Heleniak, ‘End of Empire (2003)’, p.141 
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data constructed here will also be useful to tackle the existing research questions of the Soviet 
migration literature: Did Russianization138 or ethnic mixing/unmixing occur, accelerating or 
diminishing during the transition period? Also, the data is expected to be used to quantitatively 
analyse the determinants of the migration and the ethnic diversity levels in the Soviet and post-
Soviet space, which will be scrutinised in the later chapters.  
To briefly summarise the estimation strategy and the results, this chapter attempts to 
estimate the regional net migration of major ethnic groups using a residual method, i.e. 
population change minus natural increase. The Soviet and post-Soviet censuses provide ethnic 
composition at the regional level, while vital statistics, obtainable from administrative records, 
are not available by ethnicity. I estimated regional level birth and death counts of an ethnic 
group by regressing republic level data on urbanisation rate and sex ratio. The constructed 
database, as a result, shows how members of titular ethnic groups had been distributed across 
the Soviet territories during the late-Soviet period, resulting in ethnic mixing in the sources and 
destinations. After the collapse, they moved to their own titular FSU states, e.g. Kazakhs to 
Kazakhstan or Ukrainians to Ukraine, which can be described as the migration in the direction 
of ethnic unmixing. This change in the migration patterns cannot be fully explained by the 
economic conditions because many have moved from more to less developed regions. Ethnic 
affinity must have played a role, as most FSU states saw an increase in their titular population 
after the collapse. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section II will discuss the commonly used sources 
of migration flows in the USSR and FSU countries and their associated measurement issues. 
Section III then introduces the main estimation strategy measuring the net regional migration of 
ethnic groups. Then the main results obtained by this method will be presented in Section IV, 
discussing whether the estimated net migration data is compatible with the observations of the 
previous work. Section V concludes.  
                                                             
138 This means the spread of ethnic Russians and Russian language in an area, distinguished from Russification, 
which indicates the assimilation of non-Russian people. Aspaturian, V., "The non-Russian nationalities." In 
Prospects for Soviet society (1968), pp. 35-63 
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II. Sources and measurement issues 
There are quite a few sources which can be used to estimate migration movements in the last 
decade of the Soviet era and in the post-Soviet period. The census is a good starting point for 
analysing Soviet and post-Soviet migration patterns, and alternatives such as administrative 
records, household surveys, and immigration-by-origin methods exist139. 
The Soviet authorities had conducted six national population censuses roughly once a 
decade since 1926140, among which the last three have information on migration. The migration 
studies were based on the “residence change in the previous two years” item for 1970 census 
and the place-of-birth data for 1979141. The 1989 census, which turned out to be the last Soviet 
census, has abundant information about migration. Volume XII of the census classifies the 
duration of stay in the place of permanent residence by republic, region, place of birth and 
nationality so that the data can be used for comprehensive understanding of the migration 
patterns of its population. In addition, the census data also contain substantial information 
about urbanisation process, including net rural-to-urban migration and current urbanisation 
rates, and these are also an important source of analysing internal movements.  
All Soviet successor states except Uzbekistan have also conducted population censuses 
with a similar type of information in around 2000. As shown in Table 2-1, all censuses have 
information relating to migration, either the place of birth or place of previous residence. Year 
of arrival and citizenship entries also give additional information about the internal and 
external movements of population.  
                                                             
139 Household survey and immigration-by-origin data are not relevant and omitted in this chapter. It was only 
after 2000 when household surveys were introduced to complement other statistics, e.g. census. 
140 Censuses were conducted in 1926, 1937, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989.  
141 Rowland, R., ‘Economic Region Net Migration Patterns in the USSR: 1979-89’, Soviet Geography vol. 31 no.9 
(1986), p.121 
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Table 2-1. The list of 2000 Round Censuses taken in the FSU states 
Country 
Census 
Year 
Place of  
Birth 
Place of 
Previous 
Residence 
Year of 
Arrival 
Citizenship 
Armenia 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Azerbaijan 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Belarus 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estonia 2000 Yes   Yes1) Yes Yes 
Georgia 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kazakhstan 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Latvia 2000 No  Yes2) No No 
Lithuania 2001 Yes  Yes2) No Yes 
Moldova 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Russia 2002 Yes No No Yes 
Tajikistan 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turkmenistan 1995 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ukraine 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uzbekistan3) – – – – – 
1) Place of previous residence during the 1989 census 
2) Place of previous residence one year prior to the census 
3) No census has been conducted in Uzbekistan since the disintegration of the USSR  
 Source: Makaryan, ‘Estimation of International Migration in Post‐Soviet Republics’, International 
Migration vol.53 no. 5 (2015), p.33 
 
Census statistics are far from perfect. Titma and Tuma’s 1992 work142 reveals six factors 
affecting the low reliability of Soviet census data, including data falsification and deformation by 
the republics’ chief-staffs, dishonest response, and bad quality of input, data coding and 
inquiries143. Also, many demographers have pointed out the unreliability and undercounting of 
migration statistics in the FSU countries even after the break-up, mainly because of lack of trust 
on the confidentiality of responses and the existence of undocumented migrants144. Emigration 
abroad, in particular, is hard to be captured in census unless it has relevant questions such as 
“duration of absence’, or ‘residence of children or siblings”, none of which were included in 
                                                             
142 Titma, M., and Tuma, N., Migration in the former Soviet Union, (Cologne, 1992), pp.13-14 
143 For example, Mikk Titma, who himself participated in processing the census data, testifies that it was usual 
to have input errors in one-tenth of entries. The data coding and enumeration were done by unprofessional 
and poorly motivated staff.  
144 Arel, D., ‘Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Censuses’, Population vol. 57 no.6 (2002), pp.806-
807  
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Soviet or post-Soviet censuses145. Another limitation of census data is that it does not take into 
account temporary migrants since the interval between two consecutive censuses is usually 
around ten years.  
These limitations can be partly addressed by exploiting other sources, such as 
administrative records of population registration (propiska discussed earlier). These have been 
widely used to measure internal migration of Soviet population and are more useful to capture 
the inflows and outflows of migrants in a short period, while the census is better used for 
finding out migrant stock or long-term trend. Propiska was originally used to control free 
movement of the Soviet population, but it also provides relatively accurate migration statistics. 
Soon after the Soviet Union dissolved, the Soviet type of obligatory propiska was abolished and 
replaced by a new, more liberal, registration system on a declaratory basis in Russia and other 
FSU countries146. This change guaranteed the freedom of movement for its citizens at the cost of 
downward mismeasurement of migration, as many no longer had an incentive to report a 
change in residence147. Despite the problem, arrival and departure counts which are based on 
propiska and published yearly by state statistical committees will be one of the main sources of 
migration data used in this thesis because those are the best available, and most comprehensive, 
data source as of now. These records can be found in the Demographic Yearbook of the USSR and 
the demographic yearbooks of FSU states and Interstate Statistical Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CISstat)148. 
The sources above provide direct measures of migration flows, but the literature 
frequently relies on the indirect measures, such as net migration derived by the residual method. 
The residual method requires the statistics of total population change and natural increase so 
that the contribution of net migration to population change can be calculated. The total 
                                                             
145 Makaryan, ‘Estimation’, p.34 
146 Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia, ‘Changes in migration patterns’, p.483 
147 Ibid., p.483 
148 11 out of 15 FSU republics are the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Non-
members’ (Baltics and Georgia) statistics are obtained in the official statistical agencies of each country.  
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population and crude birth and death counts are usually more easily obtainable and tend to be 
more accurate than migration statistics. When it comes to migration of ethnic groups, the net 
migration method is particularly useful because the Soviet migration statistics rarely provided 
the information regarding the migrants’ ethnicity. On the other hand, the population of almost 
all nationalities and their vital statistics are available in the census data and demographic 
yearbooks for both late- and post-Soviet periods. One advantage of using the residual method is 
that the regional patterns of net migration, in addition to country-level data, can be estimated 
since the sources have the regional level statistics of population and natural increase.  
Granted, it is not true that the residual method has only upsides. As the residual method 
needs population data from the census, it may be subject to the same reliability issues as 
discussed above. Besides, the ethnicity or nationality item was reported by the respondents 
themselves, and there is a possibility that they did not want to reveal his or her ethnicity 
honestly and consistently. In other words, the changes in ethnic composition can be not only the 
results of natural increase and in- and out-migration but also affected by the ethnic re-
identification, e.g. those who reported their identity as Tatar in 1979 change it to ethnic Russian 
in 1989149. Though there has been little information about this phenomenon during the Soviet 
period, some argue that there is evidence of ethnic re-identification of non-Russian nationalities 
into Russian or other major nationality of the region in the 1960s150. Therefore, the aspect of 
self-reporting should be considered when interpreting the results obtained by the residual 
method. 
 However, the margins of the error arising from this issue might not be too big, since the 
reporting of ethnicity was not based on nationalist sentiment or biological tie but was rather 
constructed and institutionalised through a series of nationality policies discussed in the 
introductory chapter. Also, the idea that people can choose their nationality is from Western 
                                                             
149 Anderson and Silver, ‘Demographic sources’, p.611 
150 The number of Russified ethnic minorities was estimated to be around 600,000, which accounts for less 
than 0.5% of the Russian population. Anderson, B., and Silver, B., ‘Estimating Russification of ethnic identity 
among non-Russians in the USSR’, Demography vol. 20 no. 4 (1983) pp.461-489 
51 
 
culture. There is large literature comparing civic nationalism versus ethnic nationalism in 
sociology, and they often argue that it is not common for people from the eastern culture to 
change their nationality151. Brubaker strongly argues that one’s nationality in the Soviet times 
depended on parental nationality and that there is no possibility of individual choice unless he 
or she is born to interethnic marriages152.  
What remains is the concern about the ethnicity choice for the children of the 
intermarried couples. According to Arutyunyan and Bromley, around 12 per cent of total Soviet 
families were ethnically mixed, and their children could choose between the nationalities of 
their parents when they become 16153. Though it is not possible to fully address this issue in my 
thesis, I assume that the re-identification is a form of ethnic migration, in that they sought after 
the better opportunity by changing their ethnicity even if they did not change their place of 
residence154. The idea of “vote with one’s feet” can be applied here by varying it as “vote with 
one’s identity choice”. 
To sum up the section, one can use a census for measuring immigration stock and 
administrative records / residual method for measuring immigration flows. Despite some 
limitations, the best available way to estimate the migration of ethnic groups is the residual 
method utilising the ethnic composition data from census and vital statistics from 
administrative records. The details of the estimation strategy will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but the list of available sources for Soviet and post-Soviet migration measurement is 
summarised in Table 2-2.  
  
                                                             
151 Anthony, S., Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2010), p.43 
152 Brbaker, ‘Nationhood’, 1994, p.75 
153 Arutyunyan, Y., and Bromley, Y. (ed.), Sotsial’no-kul’turnyy oblik sovetskikh natsiy (The socio-cultural aspect 
of Soviet nations) (Moscow, 1986), recited from Gorenburg, D. ‘Rethinking Interethnic Marriage in the Soviet 
Union’, Post-Soviet Affairs vol. 22 no.2 (2006), p.147 
154 However, the ethnic re-identification in the late-Soviet period can be the subject of future research, as no 
researchers have paid attention to this since Anderson and Silver. Chapter 5 for details. 
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Table 2-2.  Type of migration data and source 
 
In-migration Out-migration Net Migration 
Before 
dissolution 
Within a 
republic 1989 USSR Census 
  
USSR Demographic 
Yearbook 1990 
USSR Demographic 
Yearbook 1990 
1979, 1989, 2000 
round censuses, 
 
Vital statistics from 
demographic 
yearbooks 
(Residual method) 
Between 
Soviet 
republics 
From/to 
foreign 
countries1) 
N/A 
Immigration-by-origin 
of receiving countries 
After 
dissolution 
Within a 
state 
2000 round censuses 
 
Demographic 
yearbooks  
Demographic 
yearbooks or official 
migration statistics 
  
immigration-by-origin 
of receiving countries 
Between 
FSU states 
From/to 
foreign 
countries1) 
1) Other than FSU states 
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III. Estimation Strategy 
The main aim of this section is to construct a database of regional net migration of major ethnic 
groups. I will do this by looking at the changes in the distribution of nationalities adjusted for 
estimated natural increase of each ethnic group in a region. While I utilise the regional level 
distribution of nationalities and natural increase statistics published by Goskomstat USSR for 
the database construction, I will also have to make some assumptions and estimations to create 
ethnic-specific migration flows. 
Before measuring regional net migration, it would be helpful to become familiarised 
with the administrative divisions of the Soviet Union and FSU states first.  The USSR was divided 
into 15 union republics, each of which had been named after a titular nationality and formed an 
Figure 2-1. Economic regions of USSR, 1962 
Source: US CIA, 1962, Retrieved from the Library of Congress (https://www.loc.gov/item/78694965) 
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independent state after the dissolution. These 15 union republics can be classified into 19 
economic regions (raions)155, as shown in Figure 2-1. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) had ten raions and Ukraine had three, whereas three of these economic 
regions are each a union republic itself (Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and Moldavia) and the other 
three of them are the aggregation of three or four neighbouring republics: the Baltic (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia), Transcaucasia (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia), and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia).  
The census and demographic yearbook statistics also provide data at the lower level of 
administrative divisions, which is called oblast or krai in Russian. The Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republics (ASSRs) had the same rank as oblast. There were some other autonomous 
regions such as autonomous oblast or okrug, but they were subordinated to a normal Krai or 
oblast and were not included separately in my dataset. The USSR had around 160 oblasts, krais 
and ASSRs altogether, but since the regions have been merged and split from time to time, the 
number of regions kept changing during the period of concern. Figure 2-2 shows the 
administrative divisions at the oblast, Krai, or ASSR level in 1974156. 
 
                                                             
155 Raion was translated to “economic region” since the Soviet authority planned economic policies and 
compare regional performance based on this unit of division. Bernard P., Planning in the Soviet Union, 
(London, 2013), pp.33-34 
156 See appendix for the list of oblast/krai/ASSRs in the Soviet Union. 
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I will now describe the estimation method of the regional net migration of ethnic groups 
in the period between 1979 and 1989 and then extend it to the later period. The change in 
ethnic composition over the last decade of the Soviet era can be obtained from the 1979 and 
1989 USSR censuses. Since the data are available at the oblast and raion levels as well as at the 
union republic level157, I can track the population change of a certain ethnic group in an oblast 
over the intercensal period. Provided that the comparable data for the 10-year total natural 
increase are available, it is possible to calculate the regional level net migration of the ethnic 
group by the residual method discussed in the previous section. The estimation strategy to 
obtain 10-year net migration of ethnic group i in region r can be summarised in the following 
equations.  
                                                             
157 Institute of Demography, Higher School of Economics has published the electronic tables of ethnic 
composition in the USSR on its website (http://demoscope.ru). 
Figure 2-2. The Administrative divisions of USSR, 1974 
Source: Map Collection, Perry-Castañeda Library, University of Texas-Austin 
 
56 
 
𝑀𝑟,79_89
𝑖 = (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑟,89
𝑖 − 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑟,79
𝑖 ) − 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟,79_89
𝑖     
where 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟,79_89
𝑖 = 𝑤𝑟
𝑖 ∙ 𝑠𝑟
𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟,78_89 − 𝑠𝑟
𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑟,79_89 
 
𝑀𝑟,79_89
𝑖  is 10-year total net migration, 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑟,𝑡
𝑖  is the beginning of the year population and 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟,79_89
𝑖  is the natural increase from 1979 to 1989158, which are all of ethnic group i in 
region r. Using the 10-year crude births (𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟,78_89), crude deaths (𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑟,79_89) of a 
particular region and the share of each ethnic group in the region’s population (𝑠𝑟
𝑖 )159, I estimate 
the natural increase of each group in the region (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟,79_89
𝑖 ). Birth counts are adjusted for 
ethnic specific fertility weight (𝑤𝑖). 
Two publications of Goskomstat USSR (1988, 1989) provide the annual data of crude 
birth and death in 15 union republics from 1979 to 1989, while the regional level natural 
increase is available for the years 1980, 1985, 1986, and 1988160. Some assumptions are needed 
to fill the gap between these years, as Rowland does in his 1990 paper when he estimates the 
10-year total natural increase of every raion and oblast161. He calculates the “inflation ratio162” of 
each union republic and multiplies it by the 4-year sum of its oblast level natural increase. 
However, there was little theoretical justification for this mathematical adjustment, so I made 
an assumption for estimation. I assume that the population growth in a union republic was 
proportionally contributed by the growth rates of population in its oblasts. By applying the 
growth rate of the republic to the regional data of four base years, the annual natural increase 
for other 6 years can be estimated.   
Since all these natural increase data are not available at an ethnic level, I need to make 
more assumptions to estimate the natural increase of each ethnic group in a region and in the 
                                                             
158 Sum of the natural increase from 1979 to 1988 
159 Average share between 1979 and 1989 ethnic composition 
160 The natural increase for 1989 is also available, but the data up to 1988 are relevant here, because the 
change in ethnic composition is from January 1979 to January 1989. 
161 Rowland, ‘Economic Region’, p.659 
162 
10−year total natural increase
sum of natrual increase in 1980,1985,1986,1988
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whole USSR. I generally assume that the total natural increase in a region is contributed by the 
residing ethnic groups according to their shares. That is, if the share of Tatars in the regional 
population is 35%, 35% of the natural increase in the region is attributable to Tatars. However, 
since each ethnic group has different birth rates, the contribution of each ethnicity to regional 
birth counts is adjusted for fertility weight (𝑤𝑖)163. Table 2-3 shows that the total fertility rates 
of Slavic and Baltic nationalities had relatively lower than those of Central Asian ones and this 
ethnic variation can be captured in my estimation method. 
 
Table 2-3. Total fertility rates by ethnicity (Selected) 
USSR 
 
Russian SFSR 
Average 1.93 Average 1.80 
Russian 1.71 (0.89) Russian 1.72 (0.96) 
Ukrainian 1.76 (0.91) Ukrainian 1.81 (1.01) 
Belorussian 1.91 (0.99) Belorussian 1.82 (1.01) 
Uzbek 3.21 (1.66) Kazakh 2.44 (1.36) 
Kazakh 2.80 (1.45) Armenian 1.76 (0.98) 
Georgian 1.81 (0.94) Tatar 2.13 (1.18) 
Azerbaijani 2.46 (1.27) Jew 1.31 (0.73) 
Lithuanian 1.73 (0.90) Kazak SSSR 
Moldavian 2.17 (1.12) Average 2.36 
Latvian 1.51 (0.78) Kazakh 2.80 (1.19) 
Kirgiz 3.30 (1.71) Russian 1.94 (0.82) 
Tadzhik 3.47 (1.80) Ukrainian 2.22 (0.94) 
Armenian 2.02 (1.05) German 2.58 (1.09) 
Turkmen 3.16 (1.64) Tatar 2.31 (0.98) 
Estonian 1.59 (0.82) Uzbek 3.08 (1.31) 
 Note: The average total number of births per woman in her lifetime. In parenthesis is the fertility weight 
(𝑤𝑖) in the estimation equation, calculated as the ratio of the number of births to the USSR or 
union republic’s average 
 Source: 1989 USSR Census 
 
                                                             
163 𝑤𝑖  is calculated as the ratio of the number of births per woman of the group to the average of the republic 
to which it belongs (Table 2-3). 
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The potential problem with the fertility weight is that it does not contain regional 
variation. 1989 census only provides the birth per women by ethnicity for the whole USSR and 
each union republic, but in the latter case often only for Russians and titular ethnic group. This 
means that the fertility weight cannot take it into account even if Armenians in Volgograd have 
significantly low fertility rate than, say, Armenians in Tashkent. In order to overcome this 
limitation, I attempt to use the additional information I have about urban population and sex 
ratios of some ethnic groups. I run a regression of the average number of birth per woman on 
urbanisation rates164 and sex ratio imbalance165 and predict the regional fertility weights for 
ethnic groups (𝑤𝑟
𝑖) with the obtained coefficients. 
From Figure 2-3, one can clearly see that both urbanisation rates and sex ratio imbalance 
are negatively associated with fertility. In other words, the more urbanised an ethnic group is 
and the bigger the difference between the numbers of their men and women is, the fewer babies 
a woman is likely to have in her life. Some regressions confirm this prediction as Column (1) of 
Table 2-4 shows that the coefficient of urbanisation is -1.42 and sex imbalance is -2.29, with 
both being significant at 1% level. I add a dummy variable, Central Asia because it had been 
reported that Central Asian nationals had higher fertility than others during the Soviet era. 
Column (2) confirms the prediction by showing the positive and significant coefficient of this 
                                                             
164 Urbanisation rates = Urban population / Total population 
165 Sex ratio = |(Male population / Female population) – 1| 
Figure 2-3. Fertility and urbanisation rates / sex ratios 
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dummy variable. Alternatively, in Column (3) and (4), I replace the sex ratio imbalance variable 
with its logarithmic form, assuming that the relationship between sex imbalance and fertility is 
non-linear. The regressions with logarithm fit the model better and report a negative coefficient 
which implies that the curve is concave to the origin.  The explanatory power (measured by R2) 
is the biggest in the fourth model, so I apply the fitted values to each ethnicity in each region to 
obtain 𝑤𝑟
𝑖, controlling for some outliers166. 
With this weight, the contribution of an ethnic group is inflated or deflated according to 
the fertility rate of the group. Since I have no data regarding the mortality rates available at the 
ethnic level and I find little evidence that the rates were significantly different among ethnic 
groups during the Soviet period, I made an assumption that the death rate is the same across the 
nationalities if they live in the same region167. Once the regional natural increase and net 
migration for each ethnic group are estimated, they can be summed up to raion, union republic 
and the whole USSR levels. 
 
Table 2-4. Regression results for an average number of births per woman 
Dependent Variable:  
Average number of births 
per woman 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Urbanisation ratio -1.43*** -1.49*** -1.29*** -1.35*** 
(-8.07) (-8.25) (-8.75) (-9.13) 
Sex ratio imbalance -2.29*** -2.07***   
(-4.04) (-3.76)   
Log (Sex ratio 
imbalance) 
  -0.20*** -0.18*** 
  (-7.47) (-6.71) 
Central Asia  0.32***  0.19** 
 (3.10)  (2.08) 
Constant 3.22*** 3.20*** 2.37*** 2.43*** 
(36.22) (37.44) (17.55) (17.91) 
Total observation 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.73 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics (z-statistics for Heckman estimators). ***, **, * denote the significance 
level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
                                                             
166 Outliers come out when the number of residents is too small and the ratio of men to women is over 2.  
167 It does not mean that my strategy totally ignores ethnic variation in mortality. If an ethnic group has higher 
death rates, the regions where this ethnic group has high share will show high mortality rates. This can be 
captured in my dataset. 
60 
 
Table 2-5. An example of estimates, Tatars in Volga raion 
(i=Tatars) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝r,89
𝑖
− 𝑃𝑜𝑝r,79
𝑖  𝑤𝑟
𝑖 𝑠𝑟
𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟,78_89 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑟,79_89 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐r,79_89
𝑖  𝑀79_89
𝑖  
Annual Net 
migration2) 
(persons)  (%) (persons) (persons) (persons) (persons) (per 1000) 
Volga raion 169,098 1.18 13.69 2,586,311 1,690,215 185,2871) -16,189 -0.80 
Astrakhan oblast 874 1.09 7.48 164,310 100,028 5,879 -5,005 -7.03 
Volgograd oblast 444 1.10 1.02 398,609 282,781 1,591 -1,147 -4.45 
Kuibyshev oblast 11,675 1.05 3.44 495,262 325,942 6,671 5,004 4.57 
Penza oblast 3,071 1.39 5.29 225,042 173,789 7,319 -4,248 -5.33 
Saratov oblast 4,919 1.12 1.92 404,693 302,817 2,880 2,039 4.04 
Ulyanovsk oblast 24,328 1.10 11.01 213,285 143,595 10,034 14,294 9.73 
Kalmyk ASSR -14 1.23 0.43 76,525 27,504 286 -300 -22.77 
Tatar ASSR 123,801 1.06 48.06 608,585 333,759 150,626 -26,825 -1.57 
Note 1) Note that 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟,79_89
𝑖  for the whole raion is not the same as the one calculated by the equation. 
It is the sum of oblast-level 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐79_89
𝑖  below, and this difference comes from the fact that my 
estimation reflects the regional variation of fertility levels.  
2) Annual net migration rate is obtained by dividing annual average net migration by the average 
population of Tatars between 1979 and 1989. 
 
 
Taking the example of Tatar in Volga raion of Russia (Table 2-5), net migration of Tatars 
from 1979 to 1989 was -16,189 in the economic region, obtained by subtracting Tatars’ natural 
increase (185,287) from the change in Tatar population (169,098). The natural increase of 
Tatars is estimated by summing up the oblast-level natural increase, which is the product of the 
weighted share of Tatars and the total natural increase in an oblast. The raion-level natural 
increase of Tatars, the sum of the oblast-level ones, is not the same as the one applying the 
weighted share to the total natural increase of the raion, because this estimation strategy 
captures the regional variation of fertility.  
The same method can be applied to the post-Soviet period. The previous section 
discusses the censuses conducted in the FSU states around the year 2000, and most of them 
reveal the ethnic information, often at the regional level. The availability and level of birth and 
death counts vary across the countries, but the biggest states in the area, including Russia and 
Ukraine, usually have regional level vital statistics. Whereas the oblast-level data is sometimes 
unavailable, namely for Central Asian states, raion-level net migration can be calculated for the 
whole FSU area for the 1990s.  
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IV. Results 
Before collapse, 1979-89 
Table 2-6 summarises the population change of major nationalities in the USSR from 1979 to 
1989, dividing it into two components: natural increase and net migration. The population of 
ethnic Russians increases in the European part of the Soviet Union whereas it decreases in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, generally consistent with the analyses of previous works. The 
Soviet demographers have agreed that the return migration of ethnic Russians from non-Slavic 
southern republics had begun from the mid-1970s and continued during the transition 
period168. The movement of ethnic Russians toward RSFSR during the late Soviet period has not 
been confirmed by the actual migration data in the previous literature, while Table 2-6 clearly 
shows that the net migration rates of ethnic Russians are positive in Russia and negative in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The number of ethnic Russians in other Slavic and Baltic 
republics did not decrease, however, indicating that they continued to migrate towards their 
relatively close neighbours during the 80s169.  
Looking at the net migration of other ethnic groups in RSFSR, the population of other 
titular groups in RSFSR also increased due to both natural increase and positive net migration. 
Russia seems to have attracted not only the ethnic Russians but also other ethnic groups, and 
these groups appear to migrate from their titular republics inferring from the fact that some of 
these groups showed negative net migration in their homes (e.g. Ukrainians, Belarusians, 
Armenians, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks). 
                                                             
168 Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, p.166; Zaionchkovskaia, Migration patterns, pp. 17-18; Codagnone, The 
new migration in Russia in the 1990s, in The New Migration in Europe (London, 1998), p.89; Heleniak, ‘End of 
Empire (2003)’, p. 137 
169 This also confirms the arguments of the previous works, for example, Kaiser (1994, p.166). 
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Table 2-6. Population change by ethnicity, 1979-89, major ethnic groups 
  Population by nationality Change from 1979 to 1989 
 % Thousands 
% 
Change 
Thousands Per 1000 
  1979 1989 1979 1989 
Total 
change 
Natural 
increase 
Net 
migration 
Annual 
rate1) 
Russia 100 100 137,410 147,022 7.3 9,612 8,061 1,551 1.09 
Russians 82.6 81.3 113,522 119,866 5.6 6,344 5,073 1,271 1.09 
Ukrainians 2.7 3 3,658 4,363 19.3 705 256 449 11.20 
Belarusians 0.8 0.8 1,052 1,206 14.6 154 64 91 8.06 
Kazakhs 0.4 0.4 518 636 22.8 118 77 41 7.11 
Tatars 3.6 3.7 5,006 5,522 10.3 516 564 -48 -0.91 
Chuvash 1.2 1.2 1,690 1,774 5.0 84 166 -82 -4.73 
Bashkir 0.9 0.9 1,291 1,345 4.2 54 157 -103 -7.81 
Germans 0.6 0.6 791 842 6.4 51 63 -12 -1.47 
Jews 0.5 0.4 692 537 -22.4 -155 0.4 -156 -25.39 
Ukraine 100 100 49,609 51,452 3.7 1,842 1,795 48 0.09 
Ukrainians  73.6 72.7 36,488 37,419 2.6 930 1,412 -482 -1.30 
Russians 21.1 22.1 10,472 11,356 8.4 884 252 632 5.79 
Jews 1.3 1.0 633 486 -23.2 -146 1.4 -148 -26.45 
Belarus 100 100 9,533 10,152 6.5 619 648 -28 -0.28 
Belarusians 78.9 78.6 7,568 7,905 4.5 337 552 -215 -2.78 
Russians 11.9 13.2 1,134 1,342 18.3 208 47 161 13.00 
Poles 4.1 4.2 403 418 3.7 15 25 -10 -2.44 
Lithuania 100 100 3,391 3,675 8.4 283 192 91 2.58 
Lithuanians 80.0 80.0 2,712 2,924 7.8 212 121 91 3.23 
Russians 9.0 9.4 303 344 13.5 41 14 27 8.35 
Georgia 100 100 14,057 15,727 11.9 408 487 -79 -0.53 
Georgians 68.8 70 3,433 3,787 10.3 354 315 41 1.14 
Russians 6.5 5.0 372 341 -8.3 -30 23 -53 -14.87 
Armenians 9.0 8.1 448 437 -2.5 -11 52 -63 -14.24 
Armenia 100 100 3,037 3,305 8.8 268 487 -291 -9.18 
Armenians 89.7 93.3 2,725 3,084 13.2 359 511 -153 -5.27 
Russians 2.3 1.6 70 52 -25.7 -19 9 -28 -45.90 
Kazakhstan 100 100 14,685 16,464 12.1 1,780 2,639 -858 -5.51 
Kazaks 36.0 39.7 5,289 6,535 23.6 1,245 1,373 -128 -2.17 
Russians 40.8 37.8 5,991 6,228 4.0 236 728 -492 -8.05 
Ukrainians 6.1 5.4 898 896 -0.2 -2 65 -67 -7.47 
Germans 6.1 5.8 900 958 6.4 57 115 -57 -6.14 
Uzbekistan 100 100 15,389 19,810 28.7 4,421 5,021 -600 -3.41 
Uzbeks 68.7 71.4 10,569 14,142 33.8 3,573 3,636 -63 -0.51 
Russians 10.8 8.4 1,666 1,653 -0.8 -12 176 -188 -11.33 
Kazaks 4.0 4.1 620 808 30.3 188 135 53 7.42 
Tatars 3.5 2.4 531 468 -11.9 -63 56 -119 -23.82 
Note: 1) Annual rate is obtained by dividing average annual net migration by mid-census population. 
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Some ethnic groups whose population increased show negative net migration after 
controlling for its relatively fertile nature. These patterns tend to be seen among the ethnic 
minorities whose autonomous republic is within RSFSR, namely Tatars, Chuvash, and Bashkir. 
The patterns shown in these groups may have caused incomplete or even wrong interpretations 
since the previous literature relied on the change in ethnic distribution only, not thoroughly 
considering the contribution of natural increase and net migration to it. For example, Kaiser 
said Armenians were returning to their homeland based on the increased share of Armenians in 
Armenia170, but it turned out that population increase was due to natural increase whereas the 
net migration was in effect negative (Table 2-6).  He also argued that 8 out of 16 autonomous 
republics in Russia experienced an increase in indigenous population not stating the reasons 
clearly171, but the new dataset shows that net out-migration of titular groups occurred in 15 
autonomous republics with only one exception of North Ossetia.  
The Jews had already begun to leave the country even before the borders were fully 
opened, showing the highest level of net-out migration rate. Germans also show net out-
migration, but the extent to which the outflows occur was not as big as that of Jews in the 80s. 
This is also in line with the previous analysis, such as Heitman’s 1994 work, which argues that 
the emigration of Germans did not begin until the late 80s and early 90s. 
More interesting results of Raion- and oblast-level net migration can be found in Table 2-
7 and Figure 2-4, respectively. Now we can see the regions to and from which the ethnic groups 
migrate, which is a novel contribution of this chapter. Table 2-7 summarises the net migration 
of major ethnic groups at the raion-level, giving the estimated annual average numbers and 
rates per 1000. Figure 2-4 shows the annual net migration rates of selected ethnic groups at the 
level of lower administrative divisions, oblast. The oblasts coloured in red have net out-
migration and the ones in blue have net in-migration, whereas yellow means the in-and out-
migration in the region was balanced or its population was just inactive in migrating.  
                                                             
170 Kaiser, Geogrphy of Nationalism, p.166 
171 Ibid., p.171 
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Table 2-7. Net migration of the ethnic groups, Annual average and per 1000, 1979-89 
Economic 
Region 
All 
Nationalities 
Russians Ukrainians Armenians Kazakhs Tatars Jews Germans 
North 
4,394  7,013  2,060  62  151  565  -202  -221  
(0.7) (1.5) (7.2) (10.6) (44.2) (13.4) (-29.1) (-12.2) 
North-West 
42,154  36,901  4,833  434  404  434  -3,663  82  
(5.3) (5.1) (23.8) (34.3) (70.8) (8.5) (-28.0) (12.4) 
Central 
83,169  70,288  10,470  1,998  634  1,560  -5,968  342  
(2.8) (2.5) (17.0) (36.1) (43.5) (6.2) (-23.5) (16.2) 
Volga-
Vyatka 
-25,630  -11,261  1,048  106  138  -2,549  -328  10  
(-3.0) (-1.8) (16.2) (28.6) (74.7) (-10.9) (-20.1) (3.0) 
Central 
Black Earth 
-16,093  -15,844  365  322  75  100  -309  47  
(-2.1) (-2.1) (1.5) (67.4) (38.5) (14.0) (-27.7) (14.2) 
Volga 
-6,746  -11,524  20  1,000  1,260  -5,502  -960  408  
(-0.4) (-1.0) (0.1) (50.7) (5.1) (-2.5) (-22.7) (6.4) 
North 
Caucasia 
5,895  -11,881  4,042  8,576  181  -891  -1,520  668  
(0.4) (-1.1) (8.9) (28.1) (21.5) (-14.0) (-36.6) (11.2) 
Ural 
-57,712  -27,574  -3,283  401  39  -1,914  -1,174  -1,424  
(-2.9) (-1.9) (-7.4) (33.5) (0.2) (-1.0) (-24.6) (-9.5) 
West 
Siberia 
86,799  57,317  15,148  787  532  4,879  -479  -1,884  
(6.2) (4.8) (31.2) (67.7) (4.5) (13.9) (-19.0) (-4.6) 
East-Siberia 
5,335  5,299  2,564  412  290  -1,499  -423  -690  
(0.6) (0.7) (10.1) (50.5) (37.0) (-12.8) (-34.6) (-10.5) 
Far East 
33,000  23,261  6,888  431  350  -20  -499  219  
(4.5) (3.9) (12.4) (50.0) (40.8) (-0.2) (-21.7) (12.6) 
Donetsk- 
Dnieper1) 
13,808  33,229  -15,994  1,405  333  -275  -14,770  371  
(0.6) (5.1) (-1.1) (30.3) (37.7) (-3.2) (-26.4) (10.3) 
South- 
West1) 
-30,225  11,155  -35,032  1,405  333  -275  -14,770  371  
(-1.4) (6.7) (-1.8) (30.3) (37.7) (-3.2) (-26.4) (10.3) 
South1) 
21,154  18,826  2,800  1,405  333  -275  -14,770  371  
(2.9) (6.9) (0.7) (30.3) (37.7) (-3.2) (-26.4) (10.3) 
West 
(Baltic) 
24,109  16,041  4,601  310  89  224  -895  -105  
(2.8) (7.0) (21.0) (48.9) (43.0) (14.1) (-18.9) (-9.7) 
Transcauca
sia 
-64,246  -20,925  367  -37,509  222  -1,039  -1,549  -113  
(-4.3) (-24.6) (4.2) (-9.9) (67.2) (-29.8) (-34.2) (-37.8) 
Central Asia 
-100,262  -40,024  2,512  50  5,356  -14,617 -1,178  -5,258  
(-3.4) (-12.1) (7.9) (0.6) (6.4) (-21.3) (-13.1) (-29.0) 
Kazakhstan 
-85,835  -49,184  -6,662  292  -12,758  -876  -427  -5,771  
(-5.5) (-8.1) (-7.4) (17.6) (-2.2) (-2.7) (-20.7) (-6.2) 
Belarus 
-2,823  16,121  4,549  188  91  145  -2,120  83  
(-0.3) (13.0) (17.4) (49.0) (50.3) (12.5) (-17.1) (27.7) 
Moldova 
-6,392  2,441  -968  67  44  34  -1,893  -525  
(-1.5) (4.6) (-1.7) (27.8) (53.3) (11.2) (-26.0) (-56.1) 
Note: per 1,000 rates are in parenthesis. See text for the sources and estimation method. 
           1) The net migration of the whole Ukraine replaces that of these three raions when regional level 
data are incomplete.  
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Figure 2-4. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1979-89 
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Figure 2-4. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1979-89 (Cont.) 
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Figure 2-4. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1979-89 (Cont.) 
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    Note: Each map has a different legend. 
Figure 2-4. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1979-89 (Cont.) 
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The first map shows the redistribution of total Soviet population from Central Asian part 
to European part, namely the Baltics and Central raions of Russia, and Siberia. This trend is 
mainly led by ethnic Russians, looking at the net migration of ethnic Russians in the third map. 
Net out-migration from Central Asia and Transcaucasia is seen more clearly, and net in-
migration into Slavic and Baltic regions is also quite intense. As shown in Table 2-7, the 
destination of the ethnic Russians arriving in RSFSR seems to have been Northern, Central and 
Siberian raions. Central raion, including Moscow, was one of the most popular destinations for 
most ethnic groups except Jews, while Siberia was also attracting many members of ethnic 
groups in the 80s.  
Similar to the Russians, Ukrainians also show positive net migration in the European 
part and negative in Central Asia as shown in the fourth map of Figure 2-4. The difference is that 
they appear to have left their titular republic and spread across all the regions of Russia and 
neighbouring republics. This is also seen in Table 2-7, showing that the Ukrainians out-migrated 
from Donetsk-Dnieper and South West raions of Ukrainian SSR and in-migrated to all other 
regions, except for Ural, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan and Moldovan raions. Two other major 
titular ethnic groups, Armenians and Kazakhs, show distinctive migration patterns during this 
period. It is observed that both ethnic groups have gained population through the channel of net 
migration in most of the regions of the USSR except in their titular republics. The figures in 
Table 2-7 show that the Armenians and Kazakhs show negative net migration in Armenia172 and 
Kazakhstan, whereas it is positive in all other regions. Tatars tend to move towards the 
northern and central regions of the RSFSR, showing a similar trend to that of all nationalities. 
The second map of Figure 2-4 shows the net migration rate of each titular nationality in 
its home republic, including ASSRs, e.g. Latvians in Latvia or Yakuts in Yakut ASSR. It seems that 
many titular nationalities left their home territories as more red regions are observed, 
especially in densely populated western parts. It can be inferred that the titular groups were 
                                                             
172 In the table, net out-migration of Armenians is observed in Transcaucasia raion, where Armenia was located.  
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leaving for other parts of the USSR where their co-ethnics are relatively scarce and thus ethnic 
mixing was happening. This trend will be shown completely reversed in the post-collapse map. 
By the method proposed, the net migration of non-titular ethnic minorities, such as Jews, 
can be calculated as well. The map for the Jews, as expected, is covered in red except for the 
Tyumen oblast of West Siberia. Tyumen oblast has been famous for oil and gas production and 
had the highest income level among the Soviet oblasts, attracting the members of almost all 
ethnic groups, even including fleeing Jews, in the 80s. To what extent this economic factor was 
significant in shaping the migration patterns will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
After collapse, 1989-2000173 
The table corresponding to Table 2-6 is not presented for the 90s because the interval between 
two censuses conducted in each country was different174 and thus it is not meaningful to 
compare total net migration of ethnic groups during the intercensal period in the 1990s175. 
Instead, I calculate the number of annual average net migration and the annual rates per 1000, 
and Table 2-8 and Figure 2-5 summarise the movement of major ethnic groups after the 
dissolution at raion- and oblast-levels, respectively.  
The net migration patterns dramatically changed in the 1990s. The biggest difference is 
the increase of net out-migration regions, partly explained by the fact that the restrictions on the 
international emigration were lifted in the late 80s. Also, the absolute number of net migration, 
which reflects the extent of mobility, became much larger compared to pre-dissolution 
counterparts. The map for all nationalities shows that the intensifying net-out migration from 
Central Asia and the new trend of the population losing in Siberia. The European part of the 
Russian Federation appears to gain population through net migration during this period.   
                                                             
173 Even though post-dissolution data overlaps about two years of the Soviet period (89 and 90), it does not 
affect the discussion as the restrictions on migration began to be abolished from the late 80s. 
174 For example, the intersensal period is 16 years in Moldova but only 6 years in Turkmenistan. See Table 2-1.  
175 However, Heleniak (2003) does have a similar table, making an assumption on the ethnic distribution in 
1999 and natural increase of each ethnic group. Heleniak, ‘End of Empire (2003)’, p141, Table 8.5 
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Table 2-8. Net migration of the ethnic groups, Annual average and per 1000, 1989-
2000 
Economic 
Region 
All 
Nationalities 
Russians Ukrainians Armenians Kazakhs Tatars Jews Germans 
North 
-53,996  -32,210  -9,825  220  -212  -1,285  -232  -333  
 (-9.5)  (-6.8)  (-40.2)  (28.7)  (-68.7)  (-32.5)  (-52.0)  (-20.9) 
North-West 
26,474  7,600  -4,582  1,242  -276  -171  -4,871  117  
 (3.3)  (1.1)  (-24.0)  (56.6)  (-46.4)  (-3.3)  (-64.4)  (15.6) 
Central 
240,643  164,801  -2,978  12,613  -277  2,238  -7,965  401  
 (7.9)  (5.9)  (-4.7)  (89.2)  (-17.3)  (8.3)  (-49.5)  (16.3) 
Volga-
Vyatka 
1,396  6,502  -1,173  1,009  -99  -355  -516  100  
 (0.2)  (1.1)  (-19.0)  (96.7)  (-50.4)  (-1.6)  (-48.7)  (25.5) 
Central 
Black Earth 
35,198  33,886  -4,201  2,122  -73  450  -374  307  
 (4.6)  (4.7)  (-19.7)  (109.8)  (-39.0)  (43.5)  (-56.4)  (57.4) 
Volga 
60,820  40,714  -6,541  5,609  1,514  18,457  -1,342  -1,350  
 (3.7)  (3.4)  (-21.7)  (93.3)  (5.5)  (7.7)  (-48.2)  (-23.0) 
North 
Caucasia 
178,249  67,554  -11,235  18,728  -160  737  -1,545  -1,967  
 (10.0)  (5.9)  (-27.6)  (40.0)  (-17.8)  (10.8)  (-62.8)  (-37.7) 
Ural 
14,881  17,204  -9,094  2,780  593  -15,432  -1,528  -4,238  
 (0.7)  (1.2)  (-24.1)  (87.1)  (3.3)  (-8.2)  (-49.0)  (-35.1) 
West 
Siberia 
7,045  25,942  -11,896  2,679  121  -1,186  -881  -10,100  
 (0.5)  (2.0)  (-23.4)  (80.7)  (0.9)  (-3.0)  (-51.7)  (-29.0) 
East-Siberia 
-44,403  -29,516  -9,572  1,098  -372  -1,773  -361  -809  
 (-5.0)  (-4.0)  (-44.3)  (62.0)  (-47.9)  (-16.6)  (-45.7)  (-13.3) 
Far East 
-98,778  -62,574  -26,096  515  -478  -2,786  -1,011  -475  
 (-13.5)  (-10.6)  (-57.8)  (35.4)  (-58.3)  (-38.6)  (-71.3)  (-28.5) 
Donetsk- 
Dnieper1) 
-12,205  -92,346  91,846  2,254  -383  -844  -8,287  -281  
 (-0.6)  (-15.7)  (6.5)  (50.4)  (-47.8)  (-16.9)  (-79.6)  (-15.9) 
South- 
West1) 
-23,726  -49,236  38,622  421  -383  -305  -13,341  60  
 (-1.1)  (-35.6)  (2.0)  (30.7)  (-47.8)  (-31.2)  (-106.0)  (6.3) 
South1) 
1,437  -31,251  22,451  1,256  -383  390  -5,936  -14  
 (0.2)  (-12.1)  (5.5)  (67.3)  (-47.8)  (19.0)  (-91.3)  (-1.7) 
West 
(Baltic) 
-30,648  -18,828  -6,190  
N/A N/A 
4,423  -1,771  508  
 (-3.6)  (-8.4)  (-30.2)  (96.4)  (-57.9)  (36.9) 
Transcauca
sia 
-168,670  -51,689  -4,762  -70,543  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 (-10.8)  (-102.5)  (-72.8)  (-19.0) 
Central Asia 
-303,242  -143,849  -18,444  -2,800  -13,580  -29,718  
N/A 
-16,944  
 (-8.4)  (-52.7)  (-70.9)  (-32.9)  (-13.2)  (-55.3)  (-159.8) 
Kazakhstan 
-322,057  -208,906  -36,078  -557  129,990  -9,467  -1,177  -67,850  
 (-20.5)  (-39.0)  (-50.0)  (-32.9)  (17.9)  (-32.8)  (-93.3)  (-103.5) 
Belarus 
11,163  -14,009  -4,451  
N/A N/A 
-229  -7,903  
N/A 
 (1.1)  (-11.3)  (-16.9)  (-20.3)  (-113.1) 
Moldova 
-34,307  -12,107  -10,620  
N/A N/A N/A 
-3,858  
N/A 
 (-8.3)  (-26.0)  (-20.4)  (-109.4) 
Note: per 1,000 rates are in parenthesis. See text for the sources and estimation method. 
           1) The net migration of the whole Ukraine replaces that of these three raions when regional level 
data are incomplete. 
          2) The raion level net migration data are not available for some ethnic groups mainly due to their 
negligible size. 
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Figure 2-5. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1989-2000 
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Figure 2-5. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1989-2000 (Cont.) 
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Figure 2-5. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1989-2000 (Cont.) 
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 Note: Each map has a different legend. 
  
Figure 2-5. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1989-2000 (Cont.) 
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Looking at the net migration of ethnic Russians, the fleeing from the southern part of the 
former USSR territories had continued in an enlarged extent. The out-migration of ethnic 
Russians was most intense in the war-torn regions, namely Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and 
Tajikistan where there were ethnic conflicts and civil wars in the late 80s and early 90s. The net 
out-migration rate of ethnic Russians in Transcaucasia skyrocketed from 24.6 per 1000 in the 
80s to 102.5 per 1000 in the 90s, and those in Central Asia and Kazakhstan also marked as high 
as 70.9 and 50 per 1000, respectively176.  
What is different from the 80s is that the ethnic Russians have left not only the non-
Russian southern raions but also all other non-titular FSU states. Their net migration rates in 
the Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltics were all negative. They appear to have gone to Central and 
North Caucasus raions in Russian Federation, confirming the conclusion of the previous 
literature once again. The accelerated repatriation of ethnic Russians from not only 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia but also from the Slavic and Baltic regions was observed in the 
publications of the Rosstat177.  
Another striking feature of the post-dissolution migration pattern is the migration of 
other titular nationalities to their own national territories. The map of net migration for the 
titular nationalities (the second one in Figure 2-5) reveals that most of the ethnic groups have 
positive net migration rates in their titular nations, with showing many blue regions. The 
pattern of return migration is vividly observed in the maps of two major titular nationalities, 
Ukrainians and Kazakhs, where the net migration is positive only in their homes and negative in 
all other regions. Ukrainian and Kazak cases are especially interesting in that the post-Soviet 
trend had shown dramatic reverse compared to that of the late-Soviet period. This reverse of 
migration patterns shed light on the motivation of migrants, in that Ukrainians and Kazakhs 
                                                             
176 Compared to “the age of mass migration” in the 19th century, these rates are remarkable. The highest 
emigration rates per 1000 population were not higher than 20, even for actively emigration Irish or Italians 
(Hatton and Williamson, Age of mass migration, p.33) 
177 Codagnone, ‘New Migration’, p.49; Heleniak, ‘End of Empire (2003)’, pp. 137-139 
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decided to leave relatively affluent Russia and Baltic countries for less developed Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. Though the motivation of migrants is not the direct concern of this chapter, we can 
deduce that the ethnic factor must have worked in the post-dissolution cases just by looking at 
the migration pattern. 
Finally, the migration of ethnic minorities also shows interesting patterns in the 90s. The 
exodus of Jews is observed in both Table 2-8 and Figure 2-5, with amplified intensity. The 
number of Jews declined in all the regions, and the net out-migration rates were as high as 50 to 
100 per 1000. Germans, who had been relatively inert in emigrating during the late-Soviet 
period, now seem to begin their rush abroad, especially from Central Asia.  Table 2-8 suggests 
that around 90,000 Germans have left Central Asian region (including Kazakhstan) over the 
intercensal period of the 90s, marking the net out-migration rates of all-time high 159.8 (Central 
Asian raion) and 103.5 (Kazakhstan). Many of the ethnic Germans who have left the FSU states 
are thought to have returned to Germany under the framework of Aussiedler178 policy179. 
 
Compatibility checks  
In the last sub-section, I crosschecked the results from my own estimation with other 
relevant available sources. Even though mine was the first attempt to estimate regional level 
migration by ethnicity, there have been aggregate migration data for the late-Soviet period, 
which were recorded by the Soviet statistical agencies and compiled by CISstat180  as 
summarised in Table 2-9.  
  
                                                             
178 German word indicating resettler or immigrant. Munz ‘Ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe and 
their return to Germany’, in Munz and Ohliger, Diasporas (Portland, 2003), p.263 
179 De Tinguy, A., ‘Ethnic Migrations of the 1990s from and to the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union: 
‘Repatriation’or Privileged Migration’, in Munz and Ohliger, Diasporas (Portland, 2003), p.113 
180 CISstat (2006), 15 years of the Commonwealth of Independent States ,1991-2005: Statistical abstract, 
Moscow: Interstate statistical committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
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Table 2-９. Net migration in the Soviet republic and FSU countries, 1981-2005 
 Net migration (1000 persons) 
 1981 – 1985 1986 – 1990 1991 – 1995 1996-20001) 
Slavic     
Russia 848 737 2,075 1,399 
Ukraine  25 -157 117 -565 
Belarus 6 -93 23 -3 
Transcaucasia     
Azerbaijan  -113 -205 -87 2 
Georgia -28 -86 -552 -294 
Armenia -46 -77 -507 -115 
Central Asia     
Kazakhstan  -419 -791 -1,515 -1,180 
Uzbekistan  -213 -669 -454 -274 
Tajikistan -36 -132 -430 -178 
Kyrgyzstan  -56 -184 -259 -17 
Turkmenistan -35 19 213 -16 
Baltics     
Latvia  48 2 -136 -42 
Lithuania  44 5 -116 -124 
Estonia  27 -16 -107 4 
     
Moldova  -14 -100 -115 -40 
Total  37 -1,746 -1,851 -1,442 
1) 1996-1999 for Turkmenistan 
Source: CISstat (2006) 
 
For example, one can compare the net migration of all nationalities in Tables 2-7 and 2-8 with 
the sum of first two columns and the sum of second two columns, respectively. The estimated 
ten-year total net migration of all nationalities in Russia between 1979-89 is 1,550,606, which 
are comparable to the net migration between 1981-1990 (1,585,000) in Table 2-9. For other 
republics, the extent of differences varies but the sign and magnitude of net migration are 
similar between the estimated and recorded migration. The same can be applied to post-
collapse period. Estimated net migration in Russia between 1989-2000 is 4,904,887, whereas 
the administrative record shows the net migration of 3,474,000. Other republics also have 
similar net migration in both methods.  
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Similar sign and magnitude of net migration between the estimation and administrative records 
for all nationalities are not surprising in that the variation by ethnicity is not considered here. 
Assumptions were mostly applied to the natural increase of different ethnic groups, the margin 
of errors might be bigger in the net migration at an ethnic level. There are no comparable data 
of net migration by ethnicity for pre-collapse period, but Russian demographic yearbooks181 have 
some data regarding the migration of different ethnic groups between Russia and other 
countries after the collapse. Between 1989 and 2000, net migration Russians in Russia was 
3,045,818, and this figure is close to my estimation of 3,222,071. However, it is hard to find the 
similarity between this record and my estimates for other republics. For example, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians were estimated to have negative net migration in my estimation but 
Demographic yearbook shows the opposite. For other groups, the magnitude or sign of net 
migration do not match very well between these two methods.  
However, the discrepancies found between the estimation and administrative records do not 
weaken the results of my methods too much, as my data can go down to an oblast level, where 
the margins of error should be smaller than the raion or republic level data. If there is an error 
occurred in one direction, the aggregate level data should be more inaccurate compared to the 
regional level data. Therefore, even if the sum of all regional level data are found to be 
inconsistent with other data sources, it does not necessarily discredit the usefulness of lower 
level data. This can be the case in my dataset.   
  
                                                             
181 Rosstat (1993-2010) Demograficheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii: Statisticheskiy sbornik (Demographic Yearbook 
of Russia: Statistical Handbook). Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii 
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V. Conclusion 
 This chapter seeks to review the existing method and sources for measuring/estimating the 
migration flows during the transition period, and to construct the database containing 
information about the regional migration at the ethnic level. Section III, in particular, makes a 
novel contribution to the literature as it has never been scrutinised systematically in the 
previous works. It constructed a new dataset showing the regional migration movements of 
major ethnic groups during the late-Soviet period and improved upon the only relevant study of 
Heleniak as to the post-Soviet period.  
The results of this chapter turn out to be well in line with the observations of the 
previous literature. To be specific, the return of ethnic Russians to Russian Federation during 
the transition period has been claimed to be one of the major phenomena in the literature and is 
confirmed in my dataset. It is also confirmed that some ethnic minorities, notably Jews, began to 
leave the USSR even before its dissolution. In addition, there were some original findings in this 
chapter, which show that the non-Russian titular ethnic groups, for example, Ukrainians, 
Kazakhs, and many others, also have shown strong tendency to return to their own titular states. 
This chapter was able to suggest specific figures of the level and rates of net migration at the 
regional and ethnic level, and some of the ethnic groups show net migration rates which are far 
higher than those shown in Europe during the “age of mass migration”.  
The migration trends revealed in my dataset shed light on the motivation of the 
migrants during the transition period. Firstly, it can be inferred that ethnicity played a role in 
population distribution. The changing directions of migration from pre- to post-collapse periods 
indicate that the trends shifted from ethnic mixing to ethnic unmixing. Migrants are likely to 
have considered the share of their own ethnic groups in the destinations when deciding to move, 
especially after the dissolution. Secondly, the fact that the regions with the highest wages and 
living conditions, e.g. Tyumen oblast, tend to have positive net migration might suggest that 
economic conditions also had some influence on migration patterns. This might confirm that 
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income differentials, which have been the conventional determinants of migration, also worked 
to explain Soviet and post-Soviet migration decisions and destination choice. Lastly, the regions 
suffering from civil wars and political conflicts show the highest level of net out-migration. It is 
not too bold to argue that migrants wanted to avoid conflict and decided to leave these places.  
These findings, of course, need to be tested in order to be accepted as a solid conclusion. 
This task will be continued in the next chapter, analysing the determinants of regional net 
migration of ethnic groups, using econometric specifications. Beyond this, the newly 
constructed dataset as to the migration trends for the late- and post-Soviet periods is expected 
to be used for various quantitative analyses in the future. 
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Chapter 3. Ethnicity as a determinant of migration: Soviet 
and Post-Soviet case 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims to analyse the determinants of regional net migration in the late- and post-
Soviet space from 1979 to 2000. The conventional wisdom in the literature is that migration 
patterns are determined by different economic conditions between the source and destination. 
During the post-Soviet transition period, however, ethnicity also played an important role in 
shaping regional migration patterns. Following the lift of migration restrictions after the 
collapse, it is evident that people migrated to the regions where their co-ethnics were prevalent 
to pursue utility maximisation and avoid discrimination. The impact of ethnic affinity remains 
robust after controlling for the economic variables. In the late-Soviet period, the effect of 
ethnicity was exactly the opposite and people moved to where their co-ethnics were rare. This 
is due to the lack of freedom in migration decision and “ethnic mixing” policies of the Soviet 
authority.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
The determinants of migration have been a popular subject in the literature which aims to 
answer the question as to which of the different characteristics between sending and receiving 
regions drive people to move from one to another. Among the most prominent explanations are 
the different economic conditions. People decide to move when the potential destinations can 
offer better economic opportunities, notably higher wages, higher chances of employment, and 
cheaper living costs than where they currently live. Apparently, however, money is not the only 
matter of concern for potential migrants. I will argue that ethnic identity is another important 
factor affecting migration decisions and destination choice, though it has not been paid explicit 
attention in the literature until recently.  
While ethnic affinity had been considered important only in conjunction with the 
broader concept of the network effects, it has not been long since the attempts to include 
ethnicity into a discussion on the motivation and assimilation of migrants were made by 
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scholars182. It has been argued that identity and economic behaviours are closely related183, and 
thus potential migrants are highly likely to be influenced by the presence of the community 
which their co-ethnics have built in the possible destinations. This view has been supported in 
some articles regarding the internal migration within ethnically diversified countries, notably 
the US184. In addition to the direct impact, the governments also have incentives to discourage 
or encourage the migrants who have a certain ethnicity since the ethnic composition in a 
country also has a significant influence on its economic development as surveyed in Alesina and 
La Ferrara (2005)185. 
 The migration patterns in the Soviet and post-Soviet space were evidently affected by 
nationality policies as discussed in the previous chapters. However, ethnicity has rarely been at 
the centre of analyses, even though the determinants of Soviet and post-Soviet migration were 
investigated by many scholars. In particular, most of the studies adopting a quantitative 
approach focus on the interregional migration within the Russian Federation and none of these 
have paid attention to the ethnic aspect, except for one paper written by Locher186. Quantitative 
research on inter-regional migration in the Russian Federation includes Brown (1997), 
Andrienko and Guriev (2004), Gerber (2006), and Guriev and Vakulenko (2015). While these 
managed to quantify the effects of the labour market and housing conditions on migration flows 
during the post-Soviet transition period, their focus was only on Russia. Migration across the 
whole territory of the USSR and FSU states is particularly interesting as it involves various 
ethnic groups, each of which has shown a unique migration pattern.  
The only attempt to analyse the motivation of ethnic migration throughout the FSU 
states during the 1990s was Locher (2002). She used Heleniak’s dataset on net migration of 
ethnic groups between 1989 and 1999 to filter out its main determinants. Besides economic 
conditions, she also includes “ethnic sorting” as an explanatory variable to see if migrants tend 
to move to the areas in which the proportion of their own ethnic group is high when analysing 
                                                             
182 Constant and Zimmerman, International Handbook, p.259 
183 Akerlof and Kranton, ‘Economics and identity (2000)’; Akerlof and Kranton, ‘Identity (2005)’ 
184 Kritz and Nogle 1994; Gurak and Kritz 2000; Frey and Liaw 2005; and Kritz et al. 2011 
185 Alesina and La Ferrara, ‘Ethnic diversity’  
186 Locher, ‘Migration’ 
84 
 
80 ethnic migration movements occurred between 1989 and 99. Locher did find the evidence of 
significant influence for ethnic sorting as well as for economic factors on emigration and 
immigration of ethnic groups.  
However, this paper has limitations in that its sample is small and incomplete. Her 
interpretation is weakened because her data is limited to the country level and is unable to be 
decomposed into in- and out-migration. Only regional level data can alleviate this issue in the 
absence of interregional flows. Also, since the migration patterns in the Central, Northern and 
Siberian regions of Russia have been completely different from one another, it is crucial to see 
the regional variations. These problems can be addressed in my dataset constructed at the 
regional level in the previous chapter.  
The previous research has room for improvement in three major areas. First, none of the 
articles has paid attention to the pre-dissolution period. This is because there has been no 
consistent dataset spanning both pre- and post-dissolution periods. The literature dealing with 
the late-Soviet period tends to rely on incomplete datasets and therefore no rigorous 
econometric analysis could be conducted on migration in this period. Second, the analyses on 
regional net migration patterns tend to concentrate on Russian Federation, again mainly due to 
data availability. The inter-republic (or inter-FSU state) migration accounts for a high 
proportion in the Soviet and post-Soviet migration movements, but this is generally disregarded 
in the previous literature, at least as far as quantitative analysis is concerned. Third, the only 
article extending its scope to the ethnic migration, Locher (2002), also does not have complete 
dataset especially in terms of a small sample and unavailability of regional level data. The ethnic 
aspect, which may have many interesting implications to the present migration discussion, 
could not be fully exploited in her works.  
The dataset constructed in the previous chapter, which consists of regional and ethnic 
level data spanning the late- and post-Soviet periods, enables to overcome all the above-
mentioned limitations. The econometric analysis with the better sample of ethnic migration 
data is revealing the decisive role of ethnic identity in the direction of ethnic unmixing in the 
85 
 
post-Soviet period. That is, the migrants are likely to move to the regions where their co-ethnics 
were prevalent and/or likely to stay if they are already in such regions. The results also report 
significant effects of economic variables on migration decision as predicted in previous works. 
These seem robust when different combinations of control variables are added. On the other 
hand, the pre-collapse migration shows a stark contrast to its post-Soviet counterpart. Ethnicity 
again had a significant effect but this time in an opposite direction of ethnic mixing, that 
increases the ethnic diversity of a region.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section II discusses the hypotheses as to the two 
major determinants of migration, namely economic conditions and ethnic affinity, discussing 
whether these hypotheses can hold in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. I will briefly explain 
the data and method I use for the quantitative analysis in Section III, and then provide the main 
results for the post-collapse period in Section IV. Section V will deal with pre-collapse 
specifications separately, and Section VI examines whether recent migrants were more likely to 
return in the post-Soviet period. I conclude in Section VII.  
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II. Hypothesis 
There are two hypotheses which I would like to test in this chapter. First, the difference in the 
conventional economic factors between the source and destination determine the size of 
migration flows. Second, ethnic factors are as important as the economic factors because the 
ethnic affinity also exerts a significant influence on potential migrants’ decision making and the 
migration policy of the receiving country.  
  The first hypothesis is well supported by theory and evidence. The importance of 
expected lifetime income in the destination in determining migration decision has been 
emphasised in many studies as reviewed in the introductory chapter187. Some attempt to prove 
the influence of economic variables on migration in the post-Soviet context as well. Brown 
(1997) was the first to attempt to quantify the effects of the labour market and housing 
conditions on migration flows in the early period of transition, though his results were 
somewhat inconclusive188. Andrienko and Guriev (2004) find the results expected by neo-
classical migration theory, by using enhanced region-to-region flow data from 1992 to 1999 and 
direct measures of economic opportunity189. Gerber (2006) and Guriev and Vakulenko (2015) 
drew a similar conclusion with different method and datasets190.  
It was also seen in the previous chapter that the regions with thriving industry and high 
wages, e.g. Tyumen oblast in West Siberia, tend to have positive net migration, suggesting 
economic conditions also had some influence. This seems to be the case for both late- and post-
Soviet periods and will be tested formally in the next section.   
The second hypothesis is yet to be fully discussed in the literature, though some authors 
have already started to pay attention to the relationship between ethnicity and migrants’ 
motivation and assimilation. Focusing on the determinants of migration, I expect that ethnicity, 
                                                             
187 See Constant and Zimmerman, International Handbook, for survey. 
188 Brown, ‘Economic determinants’ 
189 Andrienko and Guriev, ‘Determinants’ 
190 Gerber, ‘Regional Economic performance’; Guriev and Vakulenko, ‘Breaking out’ 
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along with economic factors, plays a significant role in migrants’ decision-making process. I will 
argue that individuals have an incentive to live in the region or country where the presence of 
their co-ethnics is prevalent, and the governments also benefit from the more ethnically 
homogenous country.  
The starting point is the influence of identity on a person’s economic behaviours. 
Identity, defined as a person’s sense of self, can be an important determinant of labour market 
performance and earnings191. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) have argued that a rational 
individual would seek to achieve their ideal self and may sacrifice monetary compensation for 
this sake. Ethnic identity is especially important in the context of migration since it usually 
comes up to the surface when a person moves to a society dominated by other ethnic groups. It 
is possible, therefore, that a potential migrant wants to choose destinations where he or she can 
find their co-ethnics, regardless of economic gains.  
As I reviewed in the first chapter, there is also a stream of literature maintaining that 
ethnic identity of immigrants is closely correlated with labour market outcomes in the 
destination (Constant and Zimmermann 2008, 2013; Bisin et al. 2011; Hatton and Leigh 2011; 
Patacchini and Zenou 2012).  These studies support the idea that the ethnic identity is one of the 
most important factors affecting migrants’ economic performance and therefore will affect the 
decision making and destination selection process of potential migrants in the first place.  Also, 
some authors explore the direct role of ethnicity in the migration decision itself. Analysing the 
internal migration of the US ethnic minorities, Kritz and Nogle (1994), Gurak and Kritz (2000), 
and Frey and Liaw (2005) conclude that ethnic sorting, i.e. the concentration of an ethnic group 
in a region, occurs due to the factors like kinship ties, social support network, and access to 
informal employment opportunities192.  
                                                             
191 Constant and Zimmermann, International Handbook, p.17 
192 See ‘Previous literature’ section of Chapter 1 for details 
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I have so far discussed the potential effects of ethnicity on the individual level migration, 
but the ethnic sorting or unsorting through migration is also a matter of serious concern to 
policymakers. The literature studying the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic 
performance concludes that ethnically heterogeneous society has been disadvantaged in terms 
of economic growth and social stability. The negative impact, however, is alleviated in an 
advanced economy where the complementarities of different skills can be realised more 
easily193.  
There are several channels through which high diversity hampers economic 
development. First, an ethnically fragmented society may have counterproductive institutions 
due to the conflict of preferences and rent-seeking behaviour by different ethnic groups which 
lead to the diversion of resources from productive investment194. Second, the fragmented 
preferences will make it hard to reach agreement about the provision of public goods such as 
education and infrastructure, which again lower the level of output195. Third, an ethnically 
diversified, or polarised, society may be prone to ethnic conflicts as it is more difficult to 
coordinate the distribution of scarce resources196. Related to this, the fiscal burden on the 
government to deal with the conflicts should be high and therefore affect its economic 
performance.  
For these reasons, the government has an incentive to strengthen ethnic homogeneity of 
the country, though how the policymakers execute this idea is largely in question. Rather, any 
efforts to discriminate against ethnic minorities are condemned as politically incorrect. 
However, it is true that the promotion of nationalist politicians still appeals to many, and a set of 
policies favouring the native ethnicity only are popular among some voters. This trend is 
especially salient in the countries which are at the initial stage of nation-building or 
experiencing economic hardships. The discrimination against ethnic minorities in individual 
                                                             
193 Alesina and La Ferrara, ‘Ethnic diversity, p.763 
194 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic diversity’, p.308 
195 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s tragedy’, p.1216 
196 Vanhanen, ‘Domestic ethnic conflict’, p.58 
89 
 
and collective levels has deterred potential immigrants from coming or driven the non-native 
residents out, which result in ethnic sorting.  
Others argue that the diversity can have a positive effect on the economic outcomes. It is 
argued that better political institutions can make the most of complementarities arising from 
different skills, experiences and ideas by coordinating communication197. In line with this, 
Alesina and La Farrera provided evidence that the economic performance is not hampered by 
ethnic fractionalisation in high-income countries198. This claim has been supported by some 
recent empirical works such as Bellini et al. (2013), Alesina et al. (2016), Bove and Elia 
(2017)199. Although evidence for the adverse effect of diversity still dominates the literature, it 
should be considered that governments may want to encourage the heterogenization of the 
society to gain from it.   
In this sense, it is worth noting that ethnic sorting is not always occurring. “Ethnic 
mixing”, as opposed to ethnic sorting or ethnic “unmixing”, can happen in the course of 
attracting foreigners into a society as a policy objective, e.g. in the countries who suffer from a 
labour shortage200. In this case, the role of ethnicity in determining migration will be different 
from what we discussed previously, as people will move to the places which are dominated by 
other ethnic groups. The late-Soviet migration can be a good example of ethnic mixing. I will 
show in Section V that ethnicity had been working in the opposite direction before the Soviet 
borders were open and restrictions on migration were lifted, as a special case observed in the 
society heavily controlling labour distribution.   
  
                                                             
197 Lazear, ‘Diversity and immigration’, p.119 
198 Alesina and La Farrera, ‘Ethnic diversity (2005)’, p.770 
199 See Chapter 1 for literature review.  
200 And this ethnic mixing has been accepted as the general consequence of more migration. Brubaker, ‘Ethnic 
unmixing (1998)’, p.1047 
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III. Data and Method 
I will do the main regressions on the post-collapse sample (1989-2000201), though my dataset 
span both late- and post-Soviet periods. Since the two periods show a stark contrast in terms of 
migration patterns and economic conditions, the pooled estimators do not give meaningful 
interpretations. Beyond the significant shifts in the political and economic regimes in the 
independent FSU states, the abolition of internal passports and emigration restrictions brought 
a huge difference to the motivation of potential migrants and actual migration decisions. In 
addition, it is possible to gather more complete regional data of explanatory variables for the 
latter period202. Therefore, I will begin with regressions on post-Soviet sample as a benchmark 
in Section IV, then will see if the pre-collapse counterpart shows any differences in Section V. 
When possible, all the explanatory variables on the right-hand side are included in the 
specifications of both periods for comparison even though some of these do not have 
significance in one of two periods. 
I select eight ethnic groups to include in the specifications203. The criteria for selection 
are the size of population, distribution across the whole USSR and data availability, and the 
potential selection bias will be corrected later. I gathered the dataset regarding the share of 
each ethnic group and the indices for economic performance in different regions204 so that I can 
compare their relative impacts on the net migration patterns. I begin with a simple OLS 
estimation in a reduced form specification, summarised as follows: 
 
(𝑀 𝑃⁄ )𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟, 𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟,𝑡−1 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑟
+ (𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)′𝛽 +  𝑋′𝑟,𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑟,𝑡 
 
                                                             
201 The post-collapse sample overlaps about three years of the Soviet period (89-91), it does not affect the 
discussion too much as the migration restrictions began to be lifted from the late 80s. 
202 Most of the regional level data is available only for 1985 and 90 as to the Soviet period.  
203 Eight groups are Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Jews, and Germans 
204 I mean oblast/kray/ASSR level administrative divisions by ‘region’ throughout this analysis. 
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I assumed that these regional net migration rates of an ethnic group (𝑀 𝑃⁄ )𝑟,𝑡 are 
determined by two major factors, the share of the ethnic group in the region and the economic 
conditions. The dependent variable is the net migration per 1,000 persons which was 
constructed in the previous chapter. Though it would be ideal if there is in- and out-migration 
data separately, net migration is also acceptable in the regional level specification. The members 
of an ethnic group usually moved in the same direction in a region, i.e. if they tend to move out 
of a region, they do so continuously over a certain period. To calculate annual net migration 
rates, I divide ten-year total net migration by 10 and then by the average population and 
multiply 1000205. For ethnic shares, the regional ethnic composition can be obtained from the 
census data provided by the official statistics agencies of the USSR and other FSU states.  
The economic conditions of a region can be measured by the level of wages and 
employment. I included the level and/or growth of wages to measure the compensation which 
the potential migrants may receive in the source and destination. As there was no 
unemployment data for the Soviet period – they claimed full employment all the time, – I used 
the share of employment relative to the regional population in the hope that it can serve as a 
proxy for regional economic activity. Unemployment rates were available for the post-Soviet 
period, so I use these data where applicable.  
  Food consumption was included as a supplement to wage data because Sovietologists 
often discredit the use of official wage data. In the Soviet period, official labour statistics were 
prepared by enterprises and organisations on the purpose of administrative reporting. As these 
enterprises and organisations were evaluated by the authority in terms of output and 
employment targets, they had a strong incentive to distort and falsify the data reported206. Also, 
due to multiple prices (e.g. black market), it is hard to produce real wages from the nominal 
wages. Real consumption is thought to be more accurate in measuring the actual living standard 
                                                             
205 The number of years between two census points is not always 10 for all FSU countries in the post-Soviet 
period. For example, the first census in Russian Federation was 2002, so I first estimate 13-year total net 
migration and divide it by 13.  
206 Clarke, S., The formation of a labour market in Russia, (Moscow, 1999), p.273 
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of the Soviet people, so I approximate this real consumption by the level of food consumption 
per capita in a region.  
All the economic variables for the Russian regions were obtained from the first 
publication of Regiony Rossii (2002), which has detailed regional statistics for two years (1985 
and 1990) of the Soviet period and the annual data from 1995. For the regions in non-Russian 
union republics/FSU states, I gathered data from Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR (1991) and 
Official Statistics of CIS states (2008). As three Baltic States were not included in the CIS, I visited 
the websites of statistical agencies of each state and collected the relevant data.  
Besides these main explanatory variables, dummies for each of the seven ethnicities are 
included to capture the ethnic-specific characters which might have influenced the migration 
decision. For example, some ethnic groups, such as Armenians showed a tendency to have high 
in-migration throughout the regions whereas others, notably Jews, showed exactly the opposite. 
I also included the dummy for war/conflicts, with any war-torn regions being coded 1, and 
other control variables such as urbanisation rates, crime rates, number of schools, hospital beds, 
January/July temperatures etc. in the equation to see if the other factors related to living 
standards besides ethnic and economic variables affect the migration patterns207. 
For the OLS estimators, I did not worry about the endogeneity problem caused by 
reverse causation. I used lagged variables for main explanatory variables and it is unlikely that 
the future ethnic migration affected the ethnic share or wage levels of the past in any forms. It is 
especially the case in the Soviet Union because the wages were exogenously determined by the 
government and they were unlikely to be correlated with the post-Soviet counterparts. 
The OLS estimator, however, may be biased because of sample selection problem, as I 
selected only 8 out of over 120 ethnic groups residing in the Soviet Union. Even for the 8 major 
groups, the ethnic share or net migration data are not available for some regions, especially 
when the ethnic group has a negligible share in the regional population. This might bias 
                                                             
207 See Table 3-1 and Appendix for the full list of control variables and their sources. 
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coefficients of main regressors because it is hard to believe that the small ethnic groups, which 
are more likely to be omitted in the sample, tend to have less likelihood of migration.  
To deal with this problem, I applied a two-step Heckman selection model, with the main 
selection variable of log regional population in the first step probit regression. As shown in the 
equation below, I assume that ethnic data is likely to be missing when the share of the ethnic 
group is below 0.05% of the regional population. This should depend on the absolute size of the 
regional population because the bigger the region is, the bigger the population of each ethnic 
group is as well. This absolute size of the ethnic population is often more important than its 
share for the statistics agency to decide to include this group in the official data. In other words, 
even if Kazakhs accounted for about 0.05% in both small and large regions, they are likely to 
appear only in the large region’s statistics as their absolute size is bigger. The result tables later 
will show that this often turns out to be the case.  
 
𝐼∗(𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟,𝑡) = 𝑏1 + 𝑏2 log(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟,𝑡) + 𝑏3𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟 + 𝑏4 log(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑤)𝑟 + 𝑢𝑟,𝑡 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝐼∗(𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟,𝑡) = {
1 if 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡 > 0.05 (%)
0 if 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 0.05 (%)
 
 
The use of regional population as the main selection variable also seems to meet the 
exclusion criterion as it does not directly affect the migration patterns of an ethnic group in the 
region. Gravity model considers the population size as one of the main factors affecting the 
magnitude of migration, but this is not the case in my specification. This is because the total 
regional population is not likely to have an influence on the migration of a certain ethnic group, 
but it would be the population of the ethnic group itself which matters more. Moreover, the 
absolute population does not need to be included as one of the regressors because it is already 
adjusted when calculating the net migration rates. In fact, the correlation between total 
population and ethnic migration rates turned out to be very weak.   
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I also include in the first step estimation the port dummy and distance from Moscow. It 
is easier to collect the detailed data on the ethnicity and include them in the statistics if the 
region has access by sea or big river and it is close to the capital. This will be justified in the 
result section of the selection equation.  
Before moving on to the result, I would like to highlight the improvement of my method and 
data compared to the previous literature. First and foremost, it has enabled the inclusion of the 
ethnic dimension in the analysis of migration. Second, the sample spans both pre- and post-
collapse periods, which has never been done in previous quantitative analyses. Finally, it 
captures the effect on long-term migration, which occurred between two census periods usually 
having a 10-year gap. Though annual data might be useful in observing short-term trend 
changes more easily, my data can be useful to find out the fundamental determinants of 
migration.  
Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics, after collapse 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean SD. Min Max 
Net migration rates per 1000 723 -16.78 47.80 -114.29 118.54 
Ethnic share, 89 % 1,113 9.35 23.19 0 97.39 
Wage growth, 85-90 % 1,113 1.90 5.90 -21.00 14.71 
Employment share, 90 % 1,113 0.42 0.09 22.76 57.12 
Unemployment rates, 95 % 1,113 11.46 4.02 6.34 43.3 
Food consumption, 90 Kg 1,092 795.99 125.45 547 1021 
House space, 90 M2 1,092 12.89 3.51 6.6 19.8 
Number of students, 90 per 1000 1,092 181.82 40.52 116.63 267.55 
Number of doctors, 90 per 1000 1,092 17.51 1.73 12.6 22.9 
Passenger distance, bus, 90 km per capita 1,092 1638.32 440.39 710.37 2979.07 
Share of urban population, 90 % 1,092 60.25 13.29 31.07 90.36 
Temperature range (July-Jan) ºC 1,113 28.46 6.70 16.0 53.9 
Crime rates, 90 per 1000 1,092 9.29 4.25 1.91 31.76 
Regional population, 89 thou. persons 1,113 2578 4658 29 51500 
Distance to Moscow Km 1,113 1983 1905 0.01 11876 
Port dummy 1 or 0 1,113 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Conflict dummy 1 or 0 1,113 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Note) Obs.: number of observations, SD: standard deviation. For source, see Appendix  
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IV. Main Results for Post-Soviet Sample 
a. Full sample: OLS and Heckman 2-step estimations 
Table 3-2 summarises the results from OLS and Heckman 2-step estimations for the post-
collapse sample. Along with ethnic share, employment and conflict, I first put wage growth in 
the specification, then replace it with log food consumption, and finally include both. 
If you look at the results from OLS estimations first, ethnic share in a region turns out to 
have a positive and significant effect on net migration of the ethnic group, as shown in Column 
(1) of Table 2-2. This implies that a person who has a certain ethnicity tends to move to a place 
where his or her co-ethnics account for a high share in the regional population, and/or not to 
move if he or she is already living in such a place. The result remains unaffected by choice of 
wage growth or food consumption (Column (2) and (3)). In an econometric sense, one standard 
deviation change in ethnic share raises the net migration rates by 10.0 to 10.6 per 1000.   
It is a confirmation of the hypothesis that the migrants consider the ethnic affinity in a 
region important when they decide to migrate or choose the destination. As a result of people 
choosing to move to the places where their co-ethnics live, ethnic unmixing occurs. At this stage, 
it is hard to tell which of the channels discussed earlier, namely individual utility maximisation, 
network effect and policy, is responsible for this effect. It seems clear, however, that ethnicity 
has an independent influence on migration even after controlling for economic variables. 
All the economic and conflict variables also have significant coefficients with predicted 
signs. Lagged wage growth and employment had a positive impact on regional net migration, 
reassuring the conclusions of previous studies discussed in Section II. When replacing wage 
growth with a log of food consumption, it also turns out to be significant and well explains the 
net migration rates. The contribution of food consumption, 11.4 - 12.3 rises in net migration 
rates for 1 SD deviation, seems larger than that of growth (4.2 - 5.2). They stay significant when 
both are included together, though.  
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Table 3-2. OLS & Heckman 2-step estimation, after the collapse 
Dependent Variable:  
Net migration per 
1000 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Heckman 
(5) 
Heckman 
(6) 
Heckman 
Ethnic Share 
0.35*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
(6.04) (5.76) (6.65) (6.21) (5.98) (5.98) 
Wage 
1.26***  0.89*** 1.23***  0.87*** 
(4.82) (3.47) (4.72)  (3.37) 
Food consumption  69.16
*** 63.47***  54.36*** 47.40*** 
(8.65) (10.16)  (11.21) (5.80) 
Employment 
1.59*** 2.28*** 1.91*** 1.70*** 2.29*** 2.01*** 
(9.30) (14.81) (11.10) (10.26) (15.30) (11.94) 
Conflict 
-23.65*** -9.64** -2.12 -21.37*** -11.00*** -11.73*** 
(-6.28) (-2.38) (-0.55) (-6.07) (-2.85) (-3.06) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection equation  
(DV: Ethnic data availability) 
Regional 
population 
   0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 
  (5.09) (5.09) (5.09) 
Port  
  0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
  (6.78) (6.78) (6.78) 
Distance to 
Moscow 
   -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
  (-9.72) (-9.72) (-9.72) 
Total observation 825 709 709 1,272 1,272 1,272 
R2 0.61 0.63 0.68    
Censored obs.    447 447 447 
Inverse mills ratio     -35.84
*** -29.09*** -29.78*** 
 (-7.77) (-6.50) (-6.65) 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics (z-statistics for Heckman estimators). ***, **, * denote the significance 
level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
 
On the other hand, the effect of conflict is unclear. Its coefficient is negative as predicted 
and significant at 1% level in Column (1), but it becomes significant at 5% level when the food 
consumption is included and eventually insignificant when both wage and food come in the 
equation (Column (2) and (3)). This may indicate that the effects of reduced food consumption 
absorb the effect of war. 
Columns (4), (5) and (6) report the results from the first and second step regressions of 
the Heckman correction model. About 30 per cent of the sample is censored and the selection 
variables seem to work quite well. The data is more likely to be missing when the absolute 
population of the region is small, there is no major port and Moscow is far. The significant 
inverse Mills ratio in all three specifications means that there is possible selection bias in the 
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sample which is corrected by the Heckman model. However, the Heckman estimations do not 
result in substantially different coefficients from what I have in the OLS regression. The sign and 
significance of ethnic share and other economic variables remain unchanged, while the conflict 
variable stays significant in Column (6).  
b. Robustness check 
I then check the robustness of main variables by trying different combinations of control 
variables, such as temperature range, average house space, number of students, passenger 
distance by bus, number of medical personnel and crime rates, etc., carefully considering 
multicollinearity issues. It seems that employment and house space are positively correlated so 
I include them separately.   
Most notable among the results in Table 3-3 is the stability and robustness of the ethnic 
share variable. It remains significant with positive coefficients around 0.30. The expected 
increase in net migration along with one standard deviation change in ethnic share is from 8.3 
to 8.6, not much lower than the previous results shown in Table 3-2. It is safe to conclude that 
the ethnicity is one of the most important factors affecting the migration patterns of ethnic 
groups during the decade after the dissolution of the USSR, again confirming the hypothesis 
discussed in Section II.  
The economic variables also turn out to be quite robust even though their significance is 
not as stable as that of ethnic share variable. For example, the standardised coefficients for 
employment share range from 0.17 to 0.37, which means a change in the net migration rate of 
8.0 to 17.9 per 1000 for one standard deviation change in employment. The influence of food 
consumption is also somewhat sensitive to the changes in specifications, whose standardised 
contributions vary from 8.4 to 12.8 per 1000. Though the size of effects for these economic 
variables is not as stable, we still can conclude that the wage growth, employment, and food 
consumption level are all important in determining net migration rates, given the strong 
significance of their coefficients throughout.  
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Table 3-3. Robustness check, Heckman 2-step estimation, after collapse 
Dependent Variable:  
Net migration per 
1000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ethnic share 
0.31*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 
(5.63) (5.74) (5.59) (5.68) (5.89) (5.91) (5.86) 
Wage growth 
1.11*** 1.15*** 1.09*** 0.54** 0.63** 0.60** 0.60** 
(4.11) (4.38) (4.22) (2.13) (2.48) (2.30) (2.33) 
Food consumption 
52.93*** 40.32*** 36.75*** 68.18*** 77.15*** 65.28*** 62.48*** 
(6.19) (4.54) (4.14) (8.45) (8.95) (7.26) (6.76) 
Conflict 
-7.58* -11.04*** -7.10* -15.62** -10.63** -11.07** -10.04*** 
(-1.85) (-2.63) (-1.67) (-4.38) (-2.74) (-2.73) (-2.41) 
Employment  
2.00*** 2.07*** 1.92***     
(10.76) (10.23) (9.38)     
House space 
   6.17*** 6.63*** 6.33*** 6.09*** 
   (14.77) (14.27) (13.54) (12.11) 
Education 
0.07* 0.12*** 0.18***  0.16*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
(1.81) (2.82) (3.98)  (3.99) (4.41) (4.47) 
Health 
0.87 0.98 1.02*  0.69 0.81 0.89 
(1.41) (1.60) (1.67)  (1.19) (1.41) (1.54) 
Transportation 
 10.62** 14.15***   15.59*** 16.82*** 
 (2.15) (2.85)   (3.39) (3.58) 
Weather 
 -0.84*** -0.82***   -0.32** -0.32** 
 (-4.26) (-4.19)   (-1.76) (-1.77) 
Crime rates 
  0.01    0.01 
  (0.79)    (0.80) 
Ethnic Diversity 
  -23.77***    -5.53 
  (-4.06)    (-0.93) 
Dummy for ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection equation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 1255 1255 1255 1252 1252 1252 1237 
Censored obs. 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 
Uncensored obs. 808 808 808 805 805 805 790 
Inverse Mills ratio  -35.71
*** -21.83*** -20.71*** -17.65*** -20.94*** -15.22*** -15.40*** 
(-7.21) (-4.06) (-3.90) (-4.15) (-4.67) (-2.96) (-2.99) 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics for Heckman estimators. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text.  
 
Another interesting aspect of the result above is that other explanatory variables related 
to the welfare and living conditions of residents are significant. This is not observed in the late 
Soviet period as will be seen in the next session, and it means that now people can choose the 
place where they want to move in and conventional variables explaining migration patterns 
begin to work. Living space per capita, education and transport now seem to influence the 
migration positively, going in line with the predictions of economic theory. Temperature range 
between winter and summer, usually varied due to cold winter, has negative and significant 
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coefficients, implying that the potential migrants are likely to leave the colder places and move 
to warmer ones. Ethnic diversity seems to have negative effect on migration, though not always 
consistently. This may mean that conflict arising due to high ethnic diversity level discouraged 
in-migration or encouraged out-migration. However, this effect is not robust and will be 
investigated further in the next chapter in more details.  
Health does not report any significance in post-collapse specifications. This is possibly 
due to the universal health care system, which is regarded as one of the few legacies of Soviet 
socialism. People had been already benefitting from the relatively egalitarian medical system 
and there is little reason that they consider health care seriously when they decide to move.  
In sum, the ethnic share and other economic variables, including wages, employment and 
food consumption, did influence the net migration rates during the post-soviet period. The 
migration patterns are also determined by other explanatory variables related to living 
conditions. 
c. Sensitivity variations by ethnic groups 
I now run the same regressions separately for each ethnic group to see if there are differences 
by ethnicity in responding to ethnic affinity and/or economic conditions. In Table 2-4, you can 
see that each ethnic group has different responsiveness to the explanatory variables. Russians, 
Ukrainians and Kazakhs were most sensitive to ethnic share in the destination or the source, 
showing standardised coefficients of 17.7, 7.0 and 7.8, respectively. On the other hands, 
Belarusians and Armenians do not seem to care much about the presence of their co-ethnics in 
the migrating regions. The interesting case is the Jews, who show the negative coefficient on the 
ethnic variable. This may be because when the proportion of Jewish people is high in a region, 
they are better organised and help each other to leave the region more easily.  
 
 
100 
 
 
Table 3-4. Sensitivity variation by nationality, Heckman 2-step estimation 
Dependent Variable:  
Net migration per 
1,000 
(1) 
Rus 
(2) 
Ukr 
(3) 
Bel 
(4) 
Arm 
(5) 
Kaz 
(6) 
Jew 
(7) 
Non-
Rus 
(8) 
Non-
Jew 
Ethnic share 
0.50*** 0.21** 0.23 0.02 1.64** -15.97*** 0.41*** 0.29*** 
(6.12) (1.95) (1.05) (0.04) (2.11) (-3.92) (5.07) (5.37) 
Wage growth 
1.50*** 0.48 0.60 2.27** 0.47 1.42*** 0.96*** 1.06*** 
(4.51) (1.09) (1.26) (2.18) (0.52) (3.47) (3.26) (3.69) 
Food consumption 
38.29*** 71.21*** 42.83*** 70.96* 58.09 -18.5 42.52*** 52.57*** 
(2.83) (3.61) (2.65) (1.76) (1.40) (-0.99) (3.72) (10.80) 
Employment  
0.38 0.88* 2.38*** 3.28*** 0.92 1.65*** 2.11*** 1.81*** 
(1.08) (1.91) (7.24) (4.15) (1.02) (4.37) (9.10) (8.27) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for 
ethnicity 
No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Selection variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standardised coefficients: 
Change in net migration per 1,000 responding to 1 SD increase in 
Ethnic share 17.7*** 7.0** 1.8 0.2 7.8** -8.0*** 6.4*** 8.1*** 
Wage growth 7.3*** 2.3 2.3 11.0** 2.1 6.4*** 4.3*** 4.8*** 
Food consumption 5.6*** 10.4*** 6.1*** 10.3* 6.7 -2.5 6.0*** 7.5*** 
Employment 2.8 6.5* 16.5*** 24.1*** 6.1 0.4*** 15.1*** 13.1*** 
Total observation 156 156 156 159 159 156 1098 1099 
Censored obs. 49 49 53 54 82 53 398 394 
Uncensored obs. 107 107 103 105 77 103 700 705 
Inverse mills ratio 
-10.35* -20.98*** -14.10* -52.06** -5.97 -15.99* -23.85*** -23.89*** 
(-1.73) (-2.57) (-1.68) (-2.04) (-0.22) (-1.94) (-3.69) (-3.84) 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics for Heckman estimators. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 
1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
 
As to the economic variables, each ethnicity shows different sensitivity. Some seem to 
respond more to wage growth (e.g. Armenians and Jews), and others seem more to food 
consumption (e.g. Ukrainians and Belarusians208). Kazakhs do not consider the economic 
conditions very seriously as the data constructed in the previous section have suggested.  
                                                             
208 This result is not surprising in that the Slavic countries are famous for their agricultural products.  
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When I remove possible exception of ethnic Russians and Jews (Column (7) and (8)), the 
results are reporting the significance of both ethnic and economic variables, which again 
confirms the robustness of the conclusion I draw previously.  
 
V. Pre-collapse Migration Patterns 
The late-Soviet specifications exhibit some notable differences compared to its post-Soviet 
counterpart in many ways (Table 3-5 and 3-6). First, the sign of the ethnic share variable 
becomes negative, showing the evidence of ethnic mixing. The significance remains strong and 
robust. Second, the role of economic variables was important in explaining the Soviet migration 
as well, since the coefficients of wages, food consumption and employment share are all positive 
and significant. Third, military conflicts and civil wars appear to have affected the migration 
patterns, even if they occurred after the period of migration in the pre-collapse sample209. 
Finally, variables related to living standards have little impact, possibly due to the smaller 
autonomy in deciding destinations during the Soviet period.  
Table 3-5 summarises the results from baseline OLS and Heckman 2-step estimations 
for the period before the dissolution of the USSR. The results reveal some significant 
determinants of late-Soviet migration, but the interpretation is not so simple because migration 
was still controlled by the Soviet regime during the 1980s. The fact that this government 
regulation was gradually mitigated during the perestroika and glasnost period in the late 1980s 
makes the interpretation more complex. A variable with a significant coefficient could be read 
as one of the government’s priorities in allocating people in certain regions, or as potential 
migrants’ motivation for voluntary migration. 
Column (1) reports a negative coefficient of ethnic share, showing that ethnic mixing 
clearly occurred during this period. Considering the government’s initiative on ethnic 
                                                             
209 Most ethnic conflicts were concentrated between 1991 and 1995, whereas the pre-collapse sample has 
data on migration between 1979 and 89. An exception is Nagorno-Karabakh War which began in 1988.  
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equalisation and population distribution, migrants were likely to be allocated to the places 
where the share of their co-ethnics was small. This result also implies that if one was living in 
the region dominated by his or her own ethnic group, he or she is more likely to leave. This is in 
line with the balanced regional development plan led by the Soviet regime and confirms that the 
ethnicity was among the key criteria of population reallocation.  
 
 
Table 3-5. OLS & Heckman 2-step estimation, before collapse 
Dependent Variable:  
Net migration per 
1,000 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Heckman 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Heckman 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
Heckman 
Ethnic Share 
-0.21*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
(-6.13) (-6.30) (-6.63) (-6.62) (-6.65) (-6.66) 
Wage Growth 
0.30** 0.35**   0.20 0.27* 
(2.03) (2.32)  (1.34) (1.78) 
Food consumption  
 20.65*** 16.71*** 19.52*** 14.87*** 
 (4.25) (3.21) (3.96) (2.81) 
Employment 
0.94*** 0.87*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 
(9.05) (8.29) (10.58) (10.13) (8.72) (8.11) 
Conflict 
-6.01*** -9.16*** -6.65*** -9.54*** -5.79** -8.51*** 
(-2.66) (-3.62) (-3.10) (-4.01) (-2.58) (-3.46) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection equation  
(DV: Ethnic data availability) 
Regional 
population 
 0.29***  0.29***  0.29*** 
(4.94)  (4.94)  (4.94) 
Port  0.63
***  0.63***  0.63*** 
(5.94)  (5.94)  (5.94) 
Distance to 
Moscow 
 -0.11**  -0.11**  -0.11** 
(-2.42)  (-2.42)  (-2.42) 
Total observation 939 1,269 939 1,269 813 1,269 
Censored obs.  348  348  348 
R2 0.50  0.51  0.52  
Inverse Mills ratio   
-16.59***  -12.15***  -12.75*** 
(-3.47) (-2.54) (-2.65) 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics (z-statistics for Heckman estimators). ***, **, * denote the significance 
level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
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The magnitude and significance of the ethnic variable remain unaffected by the changes 
in specifications and the combination of other explanatory variables. When standardising the 
size of the ethnic share coefficient, one standard deviation change decreases the net migration 
rates by about 4.7 to 4.8 per 1000. It seems to have been among the largest and most significant 
explanatory variables affecting the migration patterns of ethnic groups.  
The OLS estimation also shows that wage growth did have an influence on net migration, 
so did the employment level. When wage is replaced by food consumption in Column (3), it 
remains influential on migration patterns with increased significance. Among these three 
economic variables, employment was the only economic variable which might have contributed 
to the migration decision relatively consistently. Other things being equal, one standard 
deviation increase in employment share would raise the net migration into the region by 4.4 to 
5.3 per 1000, which is similar to or somewhat higher than the contribution of ethnic share. The 
significance of wage growth is gone when both the wage and food consumption are included as 
seen in Column (5). 
The presence of political conflict turns out to have repressed in-migration and/or 
encouraged out-migration. It is notable that the major civil wars were concentrated in the early 
1990s, which does not overlap the period of concern in this specification, but still affects the 
regional migration patterns. This might imply that the tension and enmity forming before the 
actual military conflicts are also important in shaping the decision-making of potential migrants.  
The results from the Heckman correction model are presented in columns (2), (4) and 
(6). About 30 per cent of the sample is censored and the selection variables seem to work quite 
well. The significant inverse Mills ratio in all three specifications means that there is possible 
selection bias in the sample.  However, the Heckman model does not seem to bring about large 
changes to the signs and significance of the main coefficients, except that the t-statistics for 
wage variable becomes slightly bigger. I can conclude that the ethnic share and conflict 
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negatively affect the regional migration patterns whereas food consumption and the 
opportunity of employment positively do so.  
 
Table 3-6. Robustness check, Heckman 2-step estimation, before collapse  
Dependent Variable:  
Net migration per 
1,000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ethnic Share 
-0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
(-6.30) (-6.33) (-6.51) (-6.23) (-6.52) (-6.58) (-6.68) 
Food consumption 
23.40*** 28.71*** 28.05*** 32.98*** 35.04*** 15.23** 20.48*** 
(3.38) (3.92) (3.87) (5.02) (5.24) (2.23) (2.80) 
Conflict 
-10.86*** -12.27*** -10.22*** -12.21*** -10.84*** -10.42*** -10.12*** 
(-4.13) (-4.82) (-3.97) (-4.970) (-4.20) (-4.37) (-4.06) 
Employment 
0.98*** 0.80*** 0.56***     
(8.42) (5.76) (6.75)     
House space 
   2.65*** 1.84***   
   (9.53) (4.67)   
Education 
     -0.27*** -0.22*** 
     (-10.90) (-5.77) 
Health 
-0.78 -1.16* -0.75 -0.25 -0.86 -0.36 -0.75 
(-1.39) (-1.92) (-1.24) (-0.49) (-1.43) (-0.72) (-1.29) 
Transportation 
-1.59 -2.10** -2.01*** -2.37** -2.04* -3.32*** -2.97*** 
(-1.63) (-2.10) (-2.12) (-2.52) (-2.08) (-3.63) (-3.14) 
Weather 
 -0.28* -0.21  0.04  0.01 
 (-2.11) (-1.55)  (0.30)  (0.04) 
Crime rates 
 0.83** 0.87***  0.84***  0.58* 
 (2.46) (2.62)  (2.63)  (1.78) 
Ethnic Diversity 
  -18.22***  -12.27***  -6.71 
  (-4.82)  (-2.90)  (-1.48) 
Dummy for ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 
Censored obs. 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 
Uncensored obs. 897 897 897 897 897 897 897 
Inverse mills ratio  
-11.02** -10.28** -11.76** -9.45* -13.32** -4.2 -7.58 
(-2.16) (-1.94) (-2.22) (-1.89) (-2.52) (-0.86) (-1.45) 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics for Heckman estimators. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
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I check whether this conclusion remains robust even after trying different combinations 
of control variables (Table 3-6). Since wage growth becomes insignificant when food 
consumption is added, I remove wage variable this time. In addition, I add mean housing space, 
proxies for education, health, and transport, share of urban population, temperature, crime 
rates, and ethnic fractionalisation. A test of multicollinearity of the control variables shows that 
employment, housing space and education are positively correlated, so these are included 
separately. 
The sign and significance of ethnic share variable survive in all the specifications. In fact, 
all the ethnic share, food consumption and conflict dummy seem robust to the addition of other 
variables. Among the control variables, the effects of education and transport are worth noting, 
as their coefficients are consistently reported to be significant but contradictory to theory. It is 
against the conventional wisdom that migrants move towards the place providing poorer 
education and less transportation. The same goes for crime rates, as people choose to stay in the 
places where there are more crimes. This implies that the Soviet authorities tried to allocate 
people by artificially manipulating employment level, food consumption or housing space in 
some regions, whose living standards were in effect not very high. It seems that other variables 
such as health or weather had little influence on the migration patterns in the pre-collapse 
period, and this might be because migrants had limited autonomy in choosing their destinations.  
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VI. Duration of Stay and Return Migration 
The entirely different results on the coefficients of the ethnic variable between the pre- and 
post-collapse samples are confirming the dramatic changes from the trend of ethnic mixing to 
that of ethnic unmixing. This means that the members of an ethnic group who had been moving 
into a region completely changed their migration pattern and began to leave at some point 
around the dissolution of the USSR. One interesting question to be raised then is whether this 
trend change was due to the return migration of recent migrants or old settlers, as answering 
this question would tell more about the motivation of returnees. They may have been a) those 
who recently migrated to other regions for some reasons, e.g. economic benefits, but decided to 
return due to the removal of the reasons, or b) those who had settled in foreign lands long ago 
and had not been able to move because of restrictions, but finally returned to their home 
regions after the dissolution.  
Even though there is no data that allows me to directly observe the characteristics and 
motivation of each migrant, I can still look at the relationship between duration of stay and net 
migration in my dataset to see if the regions with a relatively high share of new immigrants 
show the high share of net out-migration. If it was the case, i.e. the recent migrants tend to leave 
their residence more frequently, then I can cautiously say that their motivation might have been 
the removal of initial benefits of moving to the region. The data for duration of stay by ethnicity 
are available in 1989 USSR census, though it is mostly for the major ethnic groups in Russian 
SFSR and titular groups for 14 other union republics. Unfortunately, there is not regional level 
data for ethnic groups. I attempt to compensate this by using the regional level duration of stay 
data for total and working-age population. This section first reviews the relevant descriptive 
statistics and then reports the regression results.  
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Figure 3-1. Duration of stay, Titular nationality 
 
Source: 1989 USSR Census, Volume12, Table5-6 
 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the duration of stay in their current residence for titular nationalities in 
15 union republics right before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is observable that the ethnic 
groups in the less developed regions, such as Transcaucasia or Central Asia, show relatively high 
rates of those who live from birth and low rates of migrants in their titular republics. The least 
mobile ethnic group is Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, with migrant share of less than 15%210. On the 
other hand, the European part of the USSR, except Moldova, shows the relatively high share of 
migrants, ranging from 53% in Lithuania and 40% in Ukraine. Among the immigrants, you can 
see that in all Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Moldova, the share of immigrants who 
migrated less than ten years ago exceeds that of those who had settled for more than 10 years.  
Figure 3-2 shows the duration of stay for selected ethnic groups211 in Russian SFSR. Over 
80% of Ukrainians and Belarussians were not born in Russia, while 37% and 34% of them, 
respectively, migrated less than 10 years ago. The shares of recent migrants (<10yrs) were 
similar for Armenians and Kazakhs to Ukrainians and Belarussians. Jews, on the other hand, 
show less than 10% share of recent migrants, meaning that in-migration into Russia had not 
been active among Jews, which is not surprising.  
                                                             
210 This might not mean that Uzbeks are least mobile in general, as it is possible that they settle in the places 
other than Uzbekistan which 1989 census does not reveal.  
211 The list overlaps the ethnic groups selected for econometric analyses in previous sections, except that 
ethnic Germans are missing.  
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Figure 3-2. Duration of Stay, Selected Ethnic groups in Russian SFSR 
 
Source: 1989 USSR Census, Volume12, Table5-6 
 
 
These two results show the share of immigrants according to their duration of residence 
among different members of ethnic groups, they do not contain any information about the 
regional level statistics. Table 3-7, alternatively, can be used to see the regional variations in the 
share of recent migrants for the working-age population. The general trend shown in Table 3-7 
is that more developed regions in Slavic republics, including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, show 
a higher share of recent migrants. To be specific, in relatively affluent Central and North raions 
of Russia, which have Moscow and Leningrad, only 6.9% of their working-age population had 
migrated there during the previous 2 years. On the contrary, Siberia and the Far East show 10.5% 
of recent migrant share, which is much higher than the USSR average (7.5%). The share is below 
average also in Ukraine and Belarus. This is in line with the migration trend caused by balanced 
regional development policies discussed in the previous literature.  
Non-Slavic republics, however, do not follow the trend of Russia and other Slavic 
republics. While more developed Baltic republics attracted a high share of immigrants (8.7%), 
less developed Trans Caucasus did not (4.4%). Central Asia also shows the low share of new 
immigrants. This can be explained by the migration of ethnic Russians, who were pulled out of 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia from the 80s. Russians’ destinations often include Baltic 
republics.  The exceptionally low share of immigrants in Trans-Caucasian regions can be further 
attributed to the ethnic conflicts prevalent in that region during the late 80s.   
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Table 3-7. Share of new immigrants among working-age population1), by region 
Region 
New immigrants2) 
(thousands) 
Total population 
(thousands) 
Share of New 
immigrants 
USSR 11,844 158,911 7.5% 
RSFSR 6,769 83,746 8.1% 
North-Central 1,752 25,552 6.9% 
Volga-Ural 2,992 38,850 7.7% 
Siberia-Far East 1,974 18,823 10.5% 
Non-Russian 
Slavic2) 
4,495 65,518 6.9% 
Baltic3) 415 5,000 8.3% 
Transcaucasia4) 388 8,786 4.4% 
Central Asia5) 1,742 25,103 6.9% 
Source: 1989 USSR Census, Volume12, Table8 
Note: 1) USSR census defines “working age” as 16-59 years old for men and 16-54 years old for women.  
2) Number of immigrants who migrated to the region less than 2 years ago.  
3) Non-Russian Slavic includes Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. 
4) Baltic includes Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
5) Transcaucasia includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. 
6) Central Asia includes Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan.  
 
 
Using the data discussed above, one can see how the duration of stay affects migration 
patterns in an econometric setting. I use the same method as the previous sections to regress 
after-collapse net migration rates on “share of recent immigrants in 1989” variables along with 
ethnic share and economic conditions. Since data for the share of immigrants are not available 
at the ethnicity level, I adjusted the regional data for ethnic variations in Russian SFSR. After 
performing regressions with a full sample (eight ethnic groups), I exclude ethnic Russians to 
rule out having the biggest ethnic group drive the results.  In addition, since the ethnic level 
duration of stay data is not available for Germans, I do regressions first replacing them with the 
data for total population and then excluding them from the sample.  
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Table 3-8. Effect of the share of new immigrants, Heckman 2-step estimation 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration per 
1,000 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
All 
(3) 
Excl. Rus 
(4) 
Excl. Rus 
(5) 
Excl. Ger 
(6) 
Excl. Ger 
New Immigrants 
-3.51*** -1.97** -4.06*** -2.34** -3.36*** -2.26** 
(-5.78) (-2.75) (-5.94) (-2.87) (-5.35) (-3.11) 
Ethnic share 
0.31*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
(5.86) (5.78) (5.04) (4.72) (6.40) (6.45) 
Wage growth 
1.03*** 1.32*** 0.99*** 1.27*** 1.10*** 1.45*** 
(4.06) (5.11) (3.43) (4.32) (4.25) (5.57) 
Food consumption 
51.08*** 45.68*** 52.28*** 47.76*** 43.69*** 41.07*** 
(6.02) (4.98) (5.22) (4.47) (5.04) (4.43) 
Employment  
2.34*** 2.42*** 2.61*** 2.68*** 2.22*** 2.35*** 
(12.93) (11.10) (12.64) (10.63) (11.98) (10.72) 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Dummy for 
ethnicity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 1029 1012 919 905 892 878 
Censored  obs. 284 284 284 284 229 229 
Inverse mills ratio 
-3.78 0.89 -1.80 3.46 -6.19 -2.31 
(-0.54) (0.12) (-0.25) (0.45) (-0.86) (-0.31) 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics for Heckman estimators. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
 
 
Table 3-8 summarises the regression results. The coefficients on the share of new 
immigrants are continuously reported to be significant and negative regardless of variations in 
samples and control variables. In the standardised versions, one standard deviation change in 
new immigrant share results in the reduction of the net migration rates by 4.8 to 9.5 per 1000. 
This means that the regions with higher shares of new immigrants are likely to show higher net 
out-migration rates, implying that it may have been the recent migrants who disproportionally 
return to the home republics after the collapse.  
Granted, this result does not confirm the characteristics of returnees as recent migrants. 
It could be interpreted as a conventional “crowding out” effect of immigration, i.e. the people in 
the regions where there are more immigrants suffer from lower wage and higher 
unemployment and thus are displaced to other regions. However, my interpretation can be 
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justified in that the former in-migrants and current out-migrants have the same ethnicity in the 
sample, not having an immigrant-native relationship. The in-migration of a certain ethnic group 
was occurring in the region where their co-ethnics were relatively rare before the collapse 
(ethnic mixing), and then the share of the same ethnic group dropped when its members had 
left there after the collapse (ethnic unmixing). Therefore, the return migration story makes 
more sense than the displacement one. This interpretation, of course, needs to be investigated 
more thoroughly when the relevant microdata-based evidence becomes available.  
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VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have assessed the key determinants of net migration rates during the 
transition period. While the conventional migration literature emphasised the role of economic 
motivations, I argue that ethnicity also exerted a significant influence on the migration decisions 
and destination choice.  
Using the newly constructed dataset in the previous chapter, I conducted OLS and 
Heckman 2-step estimations on the pre- and post-dissolution periods separately. As the 
hypotheses predicted, the role of ethnic share turns out to be positive and significant in the 
post-Soviet period. This result is a complete reverse of what had happened during the late-
Soviet period, where the coefficients on the ethnic share are negative. This reverse shows that 
the effect of ethnicity on migration might be non-linear. I did not deal with the non-linearity of 
this effect directly, as quadratic form specifications do not fit the model very well. However, the 
changing signs of the coefficients of ethnic share imply that the effect of ethnicity on migration 
may be depending on some conditions.  
Economic variables, notably wage growth, employment shares and food consumption, 
also affected migration patterns significantly in both periods, and the presence of civil wars 
have significant coefficients in some cases but not consistently. The significance of conflict 
becomes weaker when food consumption is included in the post-Soviet specifications and this 
might indicate that the food shortage was the channels through which the conflict affected 
migration.  
Another interesting finding in this chapter is that the variables related to the living 
standards of residents, namely housing space, education or weather, had little influence on 
migration patterns during the Soviet period, possibly due to the lack of autonomy in choosing 
destinations. However, the post-Soviet specifications show that the living conditions began to 
have a stronger impact on migration decision.  
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Additional exercise with the post-Soviet sample about the relationship between the 
duration of stay and migration show that the regions with high new immigrant shares have 
higher net migration rates. This result can be interpreted as the returnees to home republics 
were mostly those who recently had moved to other regions for some benefits but returned 
when those benefits disappeared. This interpretation needs more backup from individual-level 
evidence, though.  
The methods and conclusions suggested in this chapter not only contribute to the better 
understanding of Soviet and post-Soviet migration patterns but also can be used in the analyses 
of the migration patterns for different regions or periods, as the literature looking at the 
determinants of migration from the ethnic perspective has been rare. Also, this research 
combining with the future similar studies may enhance our understanding of the recent rise of 
nationalism. The pre- and post-collapse periods show a stark contrast in migration patterns and 
the role of ethnicity explaining it. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the dramatic change 
from ethnic mixing to unmixing is what has been observed after any major waves of 
globalisation. Investigating the reasons for the drastic change in migration patterns during the 
post-Soviet period will allow researchers to understand policymakers’ intention to increase or 
decrease ethnic homogeneity by controlling immigration. The next chapter will attempt to 
analysis one possible reason for the change, increasing ethnic diversity.  
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Chapter 4. Diversity Backlash? Migration, Ethnic 
Fractionalization and Violence in the Soviet Union 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims to reveal how the frequency and size of violent incidents were influenced by 
regional ethnic diversity in the Soviet period. I first investigate the role of migration in shaping 
the ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation index of each region, concluding that ethnic 
diversity did increase in many regions during the last decade of the Soviet period. The titular 
ethnic groups moving out of their own national territory explain this increase. Based on this 
result, I analyse whether historically determined patterns of ethnic diversity played a significant 
role in bringing about the violent incidents which occurred at the end of the Soviet period. I 
found that more diverse regions tend to have bigger and more frequent protests and riots 
related to ethnic and nationalist demand, while the relationship between these two may not be 
linear. Another finding is that, while the level of ethnic diversity has a negative impact, the 
increase in diversity due to migration mitigates this impact.  
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have examined the changing migration patterns in the periods 
around the collapse of the Soviet Union and pointed out that an ethnic factor was one of the 
most important determinants of these patterns along with economic ones. The pre-collapse 
period saw the trend of ethnic mixing, which is characterised by people being dispersed to the 
regions where there are a small number of their co-ethnics, while the trend was completely 
reversed in the post-collapse period, allowing ethnic sorting, or ethnic unmixing, to happen.   
In this chapter, I attempt to measure the actual effect of ethnic migration on the regional 
ethnic diversity and then analyse the relationship between diversity and violent incidents 
occurring during the last years of the Soviet Union. This subject is particularly interesting in that 
it may reveal whether the migration causing ethnic mixing contributed to the outbreak of 
nationalist movements and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. If this was the case, the post-
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collapse migration of titular ethnic groups to their national territories could also be understood 
as a backlash to previous ethnic mixing. Even though the rapid regime shift around the collapse 
seems to trigger the large-scale inter-FSU state migration, it might not be a Soviet-specific 
phenomenon in that the collapse was not exogenous to ethnic diversity. If the ethnic unmixing 
afterwards is the result of social unrest and eventual breakup of the Soviet Union, the reverse in 
migration pattern can be interpreted in the context of a general globalisation backlash story of 
the early 20th century or even today. Borrowing an expression from Williamson (1998), ethnic 
migrations may have planted the seed of its own destruction212.  
Although it is extremely difficult to pin down the collapse of the Soviet Union to one or 
two causes, many scholars have argued that the nationalist factor had played an important, if 
not primary, role in tearing apart the multi-ethnic empire into 15 independent states213. Brutal 
Stalinist repression which later led to sclerotic society gradually fuelled the animosity against 
the Soviet elites who are in most case Russian nationals214. The liberalisation (Glasnost) during 
the Gorbachev era, then, empowered the cultural and academic elites in the peripheral republics 
to publicly articulate nationalist themes, and soon triggered secessionist movements215. From 
1987 to 1991, the demonstrations with nationalist demands were not only more frequent but 
also more effective in mobilising people than those with other demands, such as for democracy 
or economic reforms216. The aim of this chapter is to reveal the effect of historically shaped 
ethnic diversity on the ethnic mobilisation which eventually brought about the demise of the 
Soviet Union.  
The first task is to see how regional ethnic diversity had changed during the Soviet era 
and whether migration played a crucial role in shaping the diversity levels. I measure the ethnic 
                                                             
212 Williamson, ‘Globalisation’, abstract 
213  For example, Suny, Revenge; Strayer, R., Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical 
Change (New York, 1998); Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilisation (2002); Beissinger, M., ‘Nationalism and the 
Collapse of Soviet Communism’, Contemporary European History vol. 18 no. 3 (2009), pp.331-347; Tuminez, 
A., ‘Nationalism, ethnic pressures, and the breakup of the Soviet Union’, Journal of Cold War Studies vol. 5 no. 
4 (2003), pp. 81-136; Ali, M., The collapse of the Soviet Union : the nationality causes (New Delhi, 2004) 
214 Ibid., p.337 
215 Strayer, Understanding Historical Change, pp.149-50 
216 Beissinger, ‘Nationalism (2009), p.336 
116 
 
diversity with ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation indices following the convention of the 
literature217 and found a general trend of increasing heterogeneity in the Soviet regions, 
especially in the decade before the dissolution. I calculate the contribution of migration to the 
changing diversity levels in the 1980s218, by producing the counterfactual fractionalisation 
index in the absence of net migration and comparing it to the actual one. As a result, it turns out 
that migration did make all the regions but Transcaucasia more diverse, confirming that ethnic 
mixing occurred. 
Then I try to document the effect of increasing regional diversity on the outbreak of 
ethnic conflicts or riots. The literature has two opposite views on the relationship between 
diversity and economic or social outcomes. On the one hand, heterogeneous society is prone to 
competition over limited resources and thus likely to be subject to more conflicts219. On the 
other hand, people might benefit from skill complementarities and the diffusion of new ideas 
when the society is more diverse220. In terms of violence, more contact with ethnically and 
culturally different members may enhance interpersonal tolerance and reduce the likelihood of 
violence. A political scientist, Robert Putnam, denotes this as “contact hypothesis” which 
competes with “conflict theory”221.  
I test the hypotheses derived from the above literature using Bessinger’s data collection 
of 7,586 mass demonstrations which took place in the Soviet Union and its successor states 
from 1988 to 1992. I found that violent incidents are more likely to occur in the places whose 
initial diversity level was higher, while its probability reduces when the diversity level had 
increased due to migration. The latter argument partly supports the contact hypothesis, but it is 
also related to the nationalist mobilisation in the late-Soviet period. Ethnic unmixing occurred 
                                                             
217 Fearon, J., Ethnic and cultural diversity by country’, Journal of economic growth 8, no. 2 (2003), pp.195-222; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, ‘Ethnic divesity’ 
218 I only look at the 1980s due to the data availability. 
219 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s tragedy’; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic diversity’, Esteban, J., and Ray, D., 
‘Linking conflict to inequality and polarization’, American Economic Review vol. 101 no. 4 (2011), pp.1345-74. 
220 Lazear, ‘Diversity’; Ottaviano, G. and Peri, G., ‘The economic value of cultural diversity: evidence from US 
cities’, Journal of Economic geography vol. 6 no. 1 (2006), pp. 9-44; Bove and Elia, ‘Migration’ 
221 Putnam, ‘Diversity and community’, pp.141-2 
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due to ethnic Russians’ out-migration and made it easier for nationalist elites to mobilise the 
indigenous population, leading to more protests and riots222. This results in the negative 
correlation between increasing ethnic diversity and the frequency of violent events.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section II will discuss how the level of ethnic 
diversity changed over the post-WWII Soviet period by constructing various measures of 
regional diversity and then examine the sources for this change focusing on the effect of 
migration. In Section III, I will conduct some econometric analyses to document the relationship 
between the constructed ethnic diversity measures and the increasing ethnic tensions in the 
late-Soviet period. Here I will first see the effect of ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation 
indices on the frequency of protests and riots, then alternatively on the size of these violent 
incidents and major armed conflicts.  Section IV concludes. 
  
                                                             
222 Suny, Revenge, pp.154-5; Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, pp.358-367; Beissinger, Nationalist 
Mobilization, pp.76-9 
118 
 
II. Effect of regional net migration on ethnic diversity  
a. The trend of regional ethnic diversity  
Different migration patterns by ethnicity, combining with different mortality and fertility rates, 
have shaped the regional ethnic diversity levels fluctuating over time. Not many demographers 
looked at the change in ethnic diversity during the Soviet period, except Schwartz (1990) who 
argues that the diversity levels of 1979 were higher in every ASSRs and autonomous oblasts 
than in 1926223.  Non-autonomous regions were not considered in Schwartz’s work, though. In 
this section, I will track the change in the trend of regional ethnic diversity during the Soviet 
period as far as the data allow, specifically for 1959, 70, 79 and 89. I also look at the post-Soviet 
states’ 2000 round censuses for comparison224.  
To measure ethnic diversity, I use a typical ethnic fractionalisation index (FRAC) 225 
which has been adopted by the most studies in the literature including Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Collier (2000), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2016). This index 
measures the probability that two persons randomly drawn from the population of a country 
are in two different ethnic groups. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggest an ethnic 
polarisation index (POLAR)226 as an alternative to fractionalisation while examining the non-
monotonic relationship between the level of diversity and conflict. POLAR measures how close 
the distribution of ethnic groups is to a bipolar distribution where the two biggest groups take 
up the half of the whole population each227. Lastly, I propose the share of Russians and/or 
titular nationalities in the regional population considering the distinctive ethnic composition of 
the Soviet republics228. Ethnic diversity levels of non-Russian republics were often determined 
by the relative shares of Russians and respective titular nationality.  
                                                             
223 Schwartz, ‘Regional population redistribution’, pp. 149-151 
224 The FSU states did not conduct 2000 round censuses in the same year. For details, See Chapter 1, Table 1. 
225 FRAC = 1- ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖
2
 where 𝑠𝑖  is the share of ethnic group i 
226 POLAR = 1- ∑ (
1/2−𝑠𝑖
1/2
)2𝑖 𝑠𝑖  where 𝑠𝑖  is the share of ethnic group i 
227 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic diversity’, p.798 
228 This will be suggested in the text when applicable rather than shown in a table.  
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Table 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 show the change in ethnic diversity measures compiled from the 
censuses in 1959, 70, 79, 89 and 2000. One caveat is that when I calculate the aggregate FRAC 
and POLAR, I use the average of the FRAC of each region weighted by its population size rather 
than using the FRAC directly calculated from the ethnic composition of higher level 
administrative divisions. For example, the FRACs of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Kaliningrad 
oblast of Russia, which comprise the Baltic raion, are 0.34, 0.59, 0.47, and 0.39, respectively. 
However, if I calculate FRAC of the Baltic raion using its combined ethnic composition, it 
becomes 0.77, which is far higher than any of the FRACs of the lower level regions. This is due to 
the regional concentration of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Russians in each of four 
regions reducing the FRACs there, while the shares of these four groups in the total Baltic 
population are still sizeable229. It can be criticised that the ethnic fractionalisation index does 
not reflect the true picture of ethnic diversity when there is regional concentration as shown in 
the Baltic case. Bleaney and Dimico (2017) suggested population-weighted regional 
fractionalisation to correct possible distortion arising from this issue if one has the regional 
level data available, which is the case in my calculation230.  
This point is worth a second look because the same can be applied when aggregating 
regional FRAC for the whole USSR. The commonly used source, Taylor and Hudson (1972), 
reports that FRAC of the USSR is as high as 0.67, quoting the data compiled by Soviet 
researchers, Atlas Narodov Mira, in 1960231. They even argued that this high FRAC in the USSR 
could be a sign of small ideological bias since it is somewhat contradictory to the regime’s 
efforts to achieve Sovietisation of its citizens232. This data seems to be derived and adjusted 
from the ethnic composition statistics of the 1959 USSR census, where FRAC is calculated to be 
0.71. However, the weighted average of regional FRACs is 0.35, which is far lower than the 
                                                             
229 The shares of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Russians in their titular republics are 0.80, 0.57, 0.68 and 
0.77, respectively, while those in total Baltic population are 0.34, 0.18, 0.12 and 0.25, respectively. 
230 Bleaney, M., and Dimico, A., ‘Ethnic diversity and conflict’, Journal of Institutional Economics vol. 13 no. 2 
(2017), p.366 
231 Taylor, C., and Hudson, M., World handbook of social and political indicators, (Ann Arbor, 1972), p.272 
232 Ibid., p.216; also, in Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s tragedy’, p.1219 
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above measures. The aggregate FRAC would not allow measuring the effect of ethnic diversity 
on economic development or ethnic conflicts of the USSR, because it is unlikely that the 
Russians in the Far East are involved in violence with Tajiks in Tajikistan, but Armenians and 
Georgians in Transcaucasia are more likely to be competing over limited resources. Therefore, it 
is necessary to consider the possibility of regional concentration in country-level data, which is 
used in the diversity literature233.  
 
Table 4-1. Ethnic Fractionalisation Index from 1959 to 2000 
 FRAC % Change 
Economic region 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000 59-70 70-79 79-89 89-00 
USSR 0.345 0.360 0.350 0.354 0.325 4.3% -2.6% 0.9% -8.0% 
Russia 0.271 0.264 0.265 0.279 0.277 -2.5% 0.2% 5.3% -0.7% 
North 0.285 0.283 0.284 0.292 0.258 -0.7% 0.2% 2.8% -11.6% 
North West 0.159 0.164 0.165 0.179 0.229 3.4% 0.7% 8.2% 28.2% 
Central 0.103 0.111 0.113 0.128 0.179 7.7% 1.8% 13.3% 39.7% 
Volga-Vyatka 0.253 0.261 0.262 0.266 0.266 3.2% 0.3% 1.6% -0.1% 
Central Black Earth 0.081 0.074 0.080 0.092 0.100 -9.0% 8.0% 14.9% 9.3% 
Volga 0.343 0.346 0.351 0.365 0.363 0.8% 1.5% 4.0% -0.6% 
North Caucasia 0.319 0.347 0.361 0.391 0.401 8.8% 4.0% 8.2% 2.5% 
Ural 0.407 0.402 0.397 0.396 0.392 -1.2% -1.3% -0.2% -1.0% 
West Siberia 0.272 0.240 0.239 0.269 0.252 -11.9% -0.5% 12.5% -6.2% 
East Siberia 0.287 0.263 0.258 0.266 0.245 -8.5% -1.8% 3.1% -8.0% 
Far East 0.353 0.307 0.305 0.325 0.271 -13.0% -0.7% 6.4% -16.5% 
Ukraine 0.381 0.401 0.382 0.390 0.344 5.4% -4.7% 1.9% -11.6% 
Baltic 0.426 0.447 0.455 0.464 0.409 4.9% 1.8% 2.0% -11.8% 
Transcaucasia 0.431 0.393 0.379 0.330 0.170 -8.8% -3.5% -13.0% -48.5% 
Central Asia 0.638 0.606 0.545 0.515 0.418 -5.0% -10.0% -5.6% -18.9% 
Kazakhstan 0.715 0.701 0.645 0.639 0.566 -1.9% -8.0% -1.0% -11.4% 
Belarus 0.331 0.331 0.341 0.363 0.314 0.1% 3.1% 6.3% -13.4% 
Moldova 0.538 0.547 0.552 0.547 0.492 1.7% 1.0% -1.1% -10.1% 
Source: 1959, 70, 79 and 89 USSR census; 2000 round censuses (for details, see Chapter 1, Table 1) 
                                                             
233 Recent literature captures this discrepancy between national and local fractionalisation indices and 
supplement it using segregation index (Alesina, A., and Zhuravskaya, E., ‘Segregation and the quality of 
government in a cross section of countries’, American Economic Review vol. 101 no. 5 (2011), p.1880 
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Returning to the result in Table 4-1, we can see that weighted-average FRACs of the 
whole USSR had fluctuated around 0.350 from 1959 to 2000, remaining lower than the World 
average but higher than the West234. It slightly went up from 0.350 to 0.354 between 1979 and 
89 but dropped sharply to 0.325 in the early 2000s, which is well in line with the reversal of the 
trends from ethnic mixing to unmixing after dissolution. In other words, the migration patterns 
in the direction of ethnic mixing raised the ethnic diversity in the USSR while the post-Soviet 
ethnic unmixing made the FSU states ethnically more homogenous235.  
The regional decomposition gives a clearer idea as to where this diversity variation took 
place. Although there is difference in the extent, the FRACs rose in most of the Russian economic 
regions except the Ural. Baltic and Slavic republics also experienced an increase in the diversity 
level. Somewhat surprising was the reduced diversity in Central Asia and Transcaucasia in the 
80s, because we observed the out-migration of the titular groups from these regions to other 
parts of the USSR in the first and second chapters. This seemingly contradictory result can be 
explained as follows.  
Firstly, there were two kinds of forces which drove the change of the ethnic diversity in 
non-Russian republics: the migration of their titular ethnic groups and that of ethnic Russians. If 
Russians leave the region, it means that the share of titular groups goes up and thus the ethnic 
diversity level goes down. Even before the collapse, it is reported that the Russians began to 
migration out of Transcaucasia and Central Asia from as early as 1975236. This may have 
lowered the FRAC level in these two regions even though the titular ethnic groups also out-
migrated, possibly because the magnitude of Russian out-migration was larger. For example, net 
out-migration of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was 128,000 while that of Russians was 492,000 
between 1979 and 1989. For Uzbekistan, it was 63,000 for Uzbeks and 188,000 for Russians. 
                                                             
234 Fearon (2003) measures average FRAC of the World to be 0.48 and that of West to be 0.24, though regional 
concentration is not considered. Fearon, ‘Ethnic and cultural diversity’, p.212 
235 Since the change in ethnic diversity is also attributable to natural increase, this argument needs a closer 
look. This will be elaborated in the next sub-section.  
236 Chapter 1, Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, p.166 
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Georgia, in contrast, gained 41,000 Georgians by net in-migration, whereas 53,000 Russians 
left237. This is partly proven by Table 4-2 which shows slightly smaller change when Russian 
population was excluded from the FRAC calculation.  
Secondly, the titular groups show higher fertility rates in their national territories than 
Russians or other minority groups. For example, the average number of children born to 
Azerbaijani women in Azerbaijan was 2.48 per 1,000 whereas that to Russian women was 1.56. 
In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, it was 3.21, 3.55, and 3.34, respectively, for titular 
groups but 1.71, 1.77, and 1.93, respectively for Russians residing there238. Even though the 
titular groups left the region to other parts of the USSR in the 70s and 80s, the high fertility rates 
allow their population to grow and reduce ethnic diversity.  
Lastly, there were non-titular and non-Russian ethnic groups whose members left 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. For example, around 63,000 Armenians left Georgia and 67,000 
Ukrainians left Kazakhstan in the 80s. These also raised the ethnic homogeneity of these regions. 
The relative contributions of migration and natural increase will be suggested in the next sub-
section when discussing the effect of migration on shaping regional ethnic diversity.  
Looking closely at regional diversity levels, European Russia, including Northwest, Central, 
Volga-Vyatka and Central Black Earth raions, tends to have relatively low FRACs ranging 
between 0.08 and 0.27, while showing an increasing trend over time. The share of Russians was 
over 90% in this part whereas that of the biggest not-titular groups, Ukrainian or Belarusian, 
was between 1 and 2%. Non-European Russia, including Volga, North Caucasus, Ural and the Far 
East was more fractionalised than its European counterpart, with the FRACs lie between 0.31 
and 0.41. This level goes up when the raions have large autonomous republics because these 
regions tend to have a high titular share and low Russian share. For example, the share of Tatars 
in Tatar ASSR of Volga raion is 48.5% whereas Russians account for 43.3% in 1989, making its 
                                                             
237 Chapter 2, Table21-6 
238 1989 USSR census, Volume 4, Table 5 
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FRAC as high as 0.578. The 1989 census reports that the average FRAC of all ASSRs in Russia is 
0.570, far higher than Russian average of 0.271239.  
Both West and East Siberia has lower FRACs than the average. In 1979, it was 0.239 and 
0.258 in West and East Siberia, respectively, both of which were smaller than 0.264, the Russian 
average. It is due to the fact that Siberia was not a popular destination until the natural resource 
industries were moved to Tyumen or Krasnoyarsk oblasts and attracted members of non-
Russian ethnic groups from the mid-70s240. This migration raised ethnic diversity in Siberia 
from 79 to 89, which later dropped again after the dissolution when those who had moved into 
this region went back to their home republic as shown in the previous chapters.  
The FRACs of other non-Russian Union republics are all higher than Russia’s. The 
dispersion of ethnic Russians, or what is known as Russianization, increased the share of 
Russians in the regions where other titular ethnic members had been residing, thus raised the 
level of ethnic diversity as well. The highest share of Russians was shown in Kazakhstan, where 
it reached 42.7%, which is higher than the share of Kazakhs, 30.0% in 1959. Armenia, on the 
other hand, was quite homogeneous as the share of Armenians was 88.0% in 1959 and jumped 
up to 97.9% in 2001241. Naturally, the FRAC was very low in Armenia falling continuously from 
0.220 in 1959 to 0.128 in 1989 and later reached 0.042 in 2001. The high FRACs of 
Transcaucasia raion in Table 4-1 is due to other two Union republics, Georgia and Azerbaijan.  
In Figure 4-1, oblast-level ethnic diversity at the end of the Soviet period is visually 
presented in a map. As discussed above, oblasts in European Russia are relatively homogenous 
whereas non-European Russian oblasts are more fragmented. Central Asian regions and ASSRs 
(E.g. Yakut ASSR in Eastern Siberia) show high ethnic fractionalisation among others. Armenia, 
on the other hand, stands out as the most homogenous region among its neighbours in Trans- 
and North-Caucasus regions.  
                                                             
239 Author’s calculation from 1989 USSR census 
240 Allen, R., ‘The rise and decline of the Soviet economy’, Canadian Journal of Economics vol. 34 no. 4 (2001), 
pp.876-8 
241 The share of Russians in Armenia was not higher than 3% from 1959 to 2001.  
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Figure 4-1. Ethnic Fractionalisation Index at oblast level, 1989 
 
 
Table 4-2 shows the FRACs calculated excluding Russian population for non-Russian 
Union republics. The level and change in the non-Russian FRACs give information about the 
influence of the Russian population in shaping regional ethnic diversity when comparing to the 
whole population FRACs. The exclusion of Russians generally decreases the level of FRAC, 
meaning that the Russians were the most significant non-titular ethnic group in those regions. 
This tendency is more clearly shown in Slavic and Baltic republics where Russian in-migration 
was observed. The interesting feature in this table is that all non-Russian FRACs go down from 
1959 in most of the republics except a few cases in Slavic and Baltic republics. This means that 
the continuing concentration of indigenes occurred throughout the Soviet Era either through 
net in-migration or natural increase242.  
                                                             
242 Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, pp.162-164 
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Table 4-2. Ethnic Fractionalisation Index from 1959 to 2000, excluding Russians 
 FRAC % Change 
Economic region 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000 59-70 70-79 79-89 89-00 
Ukraine 0.144 0.137 0.135 0.136 0.122 -5.1% -1.6% 0.8% -11.2% 
Lithuania 0.239 0.224 0.222 0.222 0.201 -6.7% -0.9% 0.0% -10.4% 
Latvia 0.282 0.339 0.353 0.370 0.323 16.8% 4.0% 4.6% -14.6% 
Estonia 0.128 0.178 0.192 0.217 0.165 28.1% 7.3% 11.5% -31.5% 
Georgia 0.469 0.451 0.425 0.417 0.269 -4.0% -6.1% -1.9% -55.0% 
Azerbaijan 0.371 0.316 0.272 0.229 0.148 -17.4% -16.2% -18.8% -54.7% 
Armenia 0.169 0.167 0.153 0.101 0.033 -1.2% -9.2% -51.5% -206.1% 
Uzbekistan 0.474 0.446 0.382 0.363 0.329 -6.3% -16.8% -5.2% -10.3% 
Kirgizstan 0.628 0.585 0.549 0.547 0.425 -7.4% -6.6% -0.4% -28.7% 
Tajikistan 0.553 0.524 0.534 0.508 0.322 -5.5% 1.9% -5.1% -57.8% 
Turkmenistan 0.443 0.399 0.371 0.328 0.314 -11.0% -7.5% -13.1% -4.5% 
Kazakhstan 0.686 0.647 0.584 0.557 0.404 -6.0% -10.8% -4.8% -37.9% 
Belarus 0.214 0.180 0.168 0.176 0.143 -18.9% -7.1% 4.5% -23.1% 
Moldova 0.440 0.438 0.433 0.424 0.391 -0.5% -1.2% -2.1% -8.4% 
Source: 1959, 70, 79 and 89 USSR census; 2000 round censuses (for details, see Chapter 1, Table 1) 
 
Finally, Table 4-3 reports ethnic polarisation index (POLAR). POLAR is an alternative 
measure of ethnic diversity which some authors argue is more relevant to explaining conflicts. 
POLAR is the index describing how close the ethnic composition of a region is to a bipolar 
distribution where two groups account for half of the population each. The justification to use 
this alternative is that the conflicts are more frequent when there is a major ethnic group 
confronted by a large ethnic minority243. POLAR will be 1 when there are two equal-size ethnic 
groups in a region and will decline as the number of ethnic groups increases, whereas FRAC 
keeps increasing whenever another ethnic group is added.  In the Soviet context, the measure of 
POLAR will be high if there is a non-Russian ethnic group which has a sizeable population in a 
Russian region, as in ASSRs, or if the size of the Russian population is large in a non-Russian 
region. This is observed in Table 4-3.  
                                                             
243 This will be shown to be not applicable to the soviet context. See c. Results of Section III. Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic diversity’, pp.304-5 
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Table 4-3. Ethnic Polarisation Indices (POLAR) from 1959 to 2000 
 POLAR % Change 
Economic region 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000 59-70 70-79 79-89 89-00 
USSR 0.508 0.531 0.539 0.537 0.504 4.4% 1.4% -0.4% -6.5% 
Russian SFSR 0.393 0.407 0.410 0.416 0.428 3.4% 0.9% 1.4% 2.7% 
North 0.395 0.412 0.420 0.432 0.394 4.1% 2.0% 2.6% -9.6% 
North West 0.281 0.290 0.292 0.313 0.391 2.9% 0.8% 6.8% 19.8% 
Central 0.190 0.203 0.207 0.233 0.308 6.6% 2.0% 10.9% 24.4% 
Volga-Vyatka 0.440 0.451 0.452 0.456 0.452 2.5% 0.2% 0.8% -0.9% 
Central Black Earth 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.176 0.188 -10.3% 7.0% 11.9% 6.4% 
Volga 0.557 0.558 0.563 0.577 0.577 0.1% 0.9% 2.4% -0.1% 
North Caucasia 0.425 0.449 0.460 0.495 0.510 5.2% 2.6% 7.0% 3.0% 
Ural 0.561 0.555 0.550 0.550 0.543 -1.1% -0.8% 0.0% -1.3% 
West Siberia 0.444 0.400 0.395 0.423 0.390 -11.2% -1.2% 6.6% -8.3% 
East Siberia 0.475 0.448 0.442 0.451 0.424 -6.0% -1.4% 2.0% -6.2% 
Far East 0.567 0.503 0.494 0.509 0.432 -12.8% -1.8% 3.0% -18.0% 
Ukraine 0.645 0.686 0.650 0.654 0.572 6.0% -5.5% 0.6% -14.2% 
Baltic 0.670 0.684 0.695 0.701 0.652 2.1% 1.6% 0.9% -7.5% 
Transcaucasia 0.595 0.562 0.529 0.462 0.305 -5.9% -6.2% -14.4% -51.5% 
Central Asia 0.714 0.717 0.802 0.749 0.633 0.3% 10.6% -7.0% -18.3% 
Kazakhstan 0.718 0.743 0.817 0.808 0.765 3.3% 9.1% -1.1% -5.7% 
Belarus 0.541 0.548 0.594 0.614 0.547 1.2% 7.8% 3.2% -12.2% 
Moldova 0.712 0.717 0.724 0.723 0.689 0.7% 1.0% -0.2% -4.9% 
Source: 1959, 70, 79 and 89 USSR census; 2000 round censuses (for details, see Chapter 1, Table 1) 
 
The POLARs of non-Russian raions are reported to be higher than those of Russian raions, 
similar to what was observed in FRAC tables. Central Asia and Kazakhstan are most polarised in 
the USSR throughout the Soviet period, and this can be explained by the high proportion of 
ethnic Russians in those regions as discussed above. In the 1980s, however, POLARs dropped 
slightly because of the early out-migration of ethnic Russians from Central Asia. Baltic regions, 
on the other hand, kept gaining Russian in-migrants until the end of the Soviet period and 
POLAR rose as a result. 
It is not surprising that the Russian raions are less polarised than other Union republics, 
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because the proportion of Russians are high and other ethnic groups are fragmented, rather 
than one big ethnic group dominates. Exceptions are the raions having big ASSRs, such as Volga 
(Tatar ASSR), Ural (Bashkir and Udmurt ASSRs), North Caucasia (Chechen-Ingush ASSR) and 
Far East (Yakut ASSR). This is because the titular group has a comparable population to 
Russians in their autonomous regions, and these raions have POLARs around or over 0.5, which 
are higher than the Russian average, 0.416, in 1989.  
Figure 4-2 depicts the relationship between the FRAC and POLAR in around 150 Soviet 
oblasts in 1989. The correlation is as high as 0.897 in the whole sample, but it turns negative to -
0.569 when the FRACs over 0.5 is considered. This merely shows the mathematical relationship 
between two different measures where highly fragmented regions should have low polarisation 
index by definition. POLAR, however, has been useful in capturing the non-monotonic effect of 
diversity on development or conflicts in the literature. I will test whether FRAC and POLAR 
exert different influence on the frequency of violent incidents in Section III.  
 
Figure 4-2. Correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation 
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Table 4-4. Ethnic Polarisation Index from 1959 to 2000, excluding Russians 
 POLAR % Change 
Economic region 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000 59-70 70-79 79-89 89-00 
Ukraine 0.261 0.249 0.256 0.242 0.215 -4.7% 2.7% -5.8% -12.7% 
Lithuania 0.432 0.407 0.401 0.400 0.379 -6.2% -1.5% -0.1% -5.5% 
Latvia 0.461 0.527 0.544 0.561 0.527 12.5% 3.1% 3.1% -6.4% 
Estonia 0.236 0.315 0.337 0.376 0.312 25.3% 6.5% 10.3% -20.5% 
Georgia 0.652 0.634 0.624 0.618 0.473 -2.8% -1.6% -0.9% -30.7% 
Azerbaijan 0.606 0.528 0.467 0.397 0.277 -14.7% -13.0% -17.6% -43.7% 
Armenia 0.316 0.312 0.288 0.191 0.080 -1.3% -8.6% -50.3% -139.7% 
Uzbekistan 0.619 0.600 0.625 0.563 0.532 -3.2% 4.1% -11.0% -6.0% 
Kirgizstan 0.688 0.696 0.829 0.747 0.667 1.1% 16.0% -11.0% -12.0% 
Tajikistan 0.795 0.795 0.791 0.788 0.598 0.0% -0.5% -0.4% -31.7% 
Turkmenistan 0.624 0.592 0.665 0.594 0.534 -5.5% 11.1% -12.1% -11.2% 
Kazakhstan 0.661 0.673 0.75 0.721 0.581 1.8% 10.3% -4.0% -24.0% 
Belarus 0.387 0.326 0.331 0.333 0.273 -18.7% 1.6% 0.3% -21.7% 
Moldova 0.678 0.674 0.673 0.664 0.628 -0.6% -0.1% -1.3% -5.8% 
Source: 1959, 70, 79 and 89 USSR census; 2000 round censuses (for details, see Chapter 1, Table 1) 
 
Table 4-4 reports the polarisation index when excluding ethnic Russians in non-Russian union 
republics. This shows whether there were two non-Russian ethnic groups dominated a union 
republic. Central Asian republics tend to have high non-Russian POLAR, whereas Slavic or Baltic 
republics have low non-Russian POLAR.    
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b. Diversity change due to net migration 
As shown thus far, ethnic diversity has been increasing in most of the Russian and non-Russian 
raions during the last decade of the Soviet Era, in terms of both fractionalisation and 
polarisation. The notable exceptions were Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which may be due to 
the early exodus of Russians from these regions and high fertility rates of titular national 
groups. It is necessary in this section to look more closely at the sources of the change in ethnic 
diversity because the implications of increasing diversity on violence can be different depending 
on whether it is due to natural increase or net migration. Particularly, it is important to reveal 
the effect of migration on the changing ethnic diversity independent of fertility and mortality 
variations, because the tension between two or more groups would rise more when the 
diversity increases due to the influx of outsiders than when it is just due to the size of some 
insiders getting bigger.  
Using the net migration data constructed in the previous chapters, I produced a 
counterfactual ethnic fractionalisation index in the absence of net migration and calculated the 
difference between the actual and counterfactual values244. Ethnic and regional level migration 
data are required to calculate the counterfactual ethnic diversity, and I can utilise the dataset I 
constructed in Chapter 2 for this purpose. This practice will be applicable only to the 1979-89 
and 89-00 periods since the net migration estimates are available only for these two periods. I 
subtract net migration of all ethnic groups from their population at the end of each period and 
calculate counterfactual FRAC assuming there was no migration. Then the difference between 
actual and counterfactual FRACs should be the contribution of net migration to the changing 
ethnic diversity. The late-Soviet period is my main period of concern since the ethnic violence 
was concentrated in the late 80s and early 90s, and the aim of this chapter is to see whether the 
ethnic mixing due to migration raises the chance of those conflicts occurring.    
                                                             
244 Similar approach is adopted to explain the changing ethnic diversity in the US counties. Winkler, R., and 
Johnson, K., ‘Moving toward integration? Effects of migration on ethnoracial segregation across the rural-
urban continuum’, Demography vol. 53 no. 4 (2016), p.1036 
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Table 4-5. The sources of change in ethnic diversity, 1979-89 
 FRAC % Change 
Economic Regions 
1979 
actual 
1989  
actual 
1989  
no NM1) 
total due to  
NI2) 
due to  
NM 
USSR 0.350 0.354 0.341 0.9% -2.7% 3.6% 
Russian SFSR 0.265 0.279 0.272 5.3% 2.8% 2.5% 
North 0.284 0.292 0.291 2.8% 2.7% 0.1% 
North West 0.165 0.179 0.178 8.2% 8.1% 0.1% 
Central 0.113 0.128 0.126 13.3% 11.1% 2.1% 
Volga-Vyatka 0.262 0.266 0.264 1.6% 0.7% 0.9% 
Central Black Earth 0.080 0.092 0.088 14.9% 10.0% 4.9% 
Volga 0.351 0.365 0.363 4.0% 3.3% 0.7% 
North Caucasia 0.361 0.391 0.379 8.2% 5.0% 3.2% 
Ural 0.397 0.396 0.380 -0.2% -4.2% 3.9% 
West Siberia 0.239 0.269 0.258 12.5% 8.0% 4.5% 
East Siberia 0.258 0.266 0.260 3.1% 0.6% 2.5% 
Far Eastern district 0.305 0.325 0.315 6.4% 3.2% 3.2% 
Ukraine 0.382 0.390 0.376 1.9% -1.6% 3.5% 
Baltic 0.455 0.464 0.454 2.0% -0.2% 2.2% 
Transcaucasia 0.379 0.330 0.355 -13.0% -6.3% -6.7% 
Central Asia 0.545 0.515 0.420 -5.6% -23.0% 17.4% 
Kazakhstan 0.645 0.639 0.575 -1.0% -10.9% 9.9% 
Belarus 0.341 0.363 0.329 6.3% -3.7% 10.0% 
Moldova 0.552 0.547 0.555 -1.1% 0.5% -1.5% 
Note: 1) NM denotes net migration. This column shows the counterfactual level of ethnic diversity when 
there had been no net migration at all.  
  2) NI denotes natural increase.  
 
Table 4-5 shows the sources of change in the level of ethnic diversity from 1979 to 89, 
decomposing it into a change due to natural increase and that due to net migration. In this table, 
the effect of migration on ethnic mixing is shown more clearly. Migration raised ethnic diversity 
from 1979 to 89 in the USSR as a whole and in all Russian and non-Russian economic regions 
except Transcaucasia and Moldova. This result reinforces the conclusions of the previous 
chapters which argue that the migration occurred in the direction of ethnic mixing and 
therefore increase the ethnic diversity of the sending and receiving regions.  
FRAC in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is seen dropping by 5.6% and 1.0%, respectively, 
between 1979 and 1989 in Table 4-1 and in the column “total change” of the table above. 
However, it turns out that the out-migration of titular nationals did increase ethnic diversity by 
17.4% in Central Asia and 9.9% in Kazakhstan, while the even higher fertility of the indigenous 
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people accounts for the observed homogenisation. This is in line with what I discussed 
previously as to the reasons why FRACs in Central Asia lowered despite the ethnic mixing.  
Transcaucasia remains as an exception. Even though some members of the titular 
groups left and decreased ethnic diversity, the early exodus of ethnic Russians from this raion 
was more significant and worked as a force pulling the FRACs down. High Russian in-migration 
in North Caucasia, which is adjacent to Georgia and Azerbaijan, during the 1980s also shows 
that the magnitude of out-migration of ethnic Russians from Transcaucasia.  
Table 4-6 reports the sources of change in ethnic diversity in the first decade of the post-
Soviet period for comparison. As expected, migration played a great role in lowering ethnic 
diversity in all the regions without a single exception. This again reinforces the earlier point of 
ethnic unmixing and sorting which occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
Table 4-6. The sources of change in ethnic diversity, 1989-2000 
Economic Regions 
FRAC % Change 
1989 2000 
actual 
2000 
no NM 
total 
due to  
NI 
due to  
NM 
USSR 0.354 0.325 0.354 -8.0% 0.2% -8.2% 
Russian SFSR 0.279 0.277 0.300 -0.7% 7.7% -8.5% 
North 0.292 0.258 0.280 -11.6% -3.9% -7.6% 
North West 0.179 0.229 0.260 28.2% 45.5% -17.3% 
Central 0.128 0.179 0.195 39.7% 52.2% -12.5% 
Volga-Vyatka 0.266 0.266 0.270 -0.1% 1.2% -1.3% 
Central Black Earth 0.092 0.100 0.112 9.3% 22.6% -13.3% 
Volga 0.365 0.363 0.375 -0.6% 2.7% -3.4% 
North Caucasia 0.391 0.401 0.423 2.5% 8.3% -5.7% 
Ural 0.396 0.392 0.409 -1.0% 3.3% -4.3% 
West Siberia 0.269 0.252 0.283 -6.2% 5.6% -11.8% 
East Siberia 0.266 0.245 0.268 -8.0% 0.8% -8.8% 
Far Eastern district 0.325 0.271 0.316 -16.5% -2.6% -13.9% 
Ukraine 0.390 0.344 0.391 -11.6% 0.4% -12.1% 
Baltic 0.464 0.409 0.445 -11.8% -4.1% -7.8% 
Transcaucasia 0.330 0.170 0.242 -48.5% -26.8% -21.7% 
Central Asia 0.515 0.418 0.464 -18.9% -9.8% -9.1% 
Kazakhstan1) 0.692 0.622 0.682 -10.1% -1.5% -8.6% 
Belarus 0.363 0.314 0.329 -13.4% -9.4% -4.0% 
Moldova 0.547 0.492 0.555 -10.1% 1.6% -11.6% 
Note: 1) Country-level FRAC is used to compare two periods since the regional data is not available for 
Kazakhstan in 1999 census.  
132 
 
Figure 4-3. FRAC change due to migration, before and after the collapse 
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The changing trend from ethnic mixing to ethnic unmixing after the collapse can be 
vividly observed in Figure 4-3 as well. In the late-Soviet period, most regions are coloured blue 
or grey, with a notable exception of Transcaucasia, meaning that migration in this period 
contributed to the heterogenization of Soviet oblasts. On the other hand, red or orange oblasts 
are dominant in the post-collapse map, showing the clear sign of ethnic unmixing caused by net 
migration.  
I estimate simple regressions of the determinants of changing diversity in the late-Soviet 
period. As I discussed before, two important migratory streams which shaped the regional 
ethnic diversity in the 1980s were the out-migration of titular ethnic groups from their national 
territories and that of ethnic Russians from non-Russian republics, notably Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia. It is possible to compare the contributions of these two groups by regressing the 
change in FRAC or POLAR on the migration of both titular groups and Russians, with the 
estimation equation constructed as follows. 
 
∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑟 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1(𝑀/𝑃)𝑟
𝑇 + 𝑎2(𝑀/𝑃)𝑟
𝑅 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟
𝑇 + 𝑋′𝑟,𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑟,𝑡 
 
∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑟 is the difference in ethnic fractionalization indices between 1979 and 1989 in 
region r and I replace it with ethnic polarization indices later. The main explanatory variables, 
(𝑀/𝑃)𝑟
𝑇 and (𝑀/𝑃)𝑟
𝑅, are the net migration of the titular group and Russians per 1000, 
respectively. The sign of the coefficient on titular nationals’ migration should be negative, as the 
net in-migration of the titular group in their national territory would raise the ethnic 
homogeneity of the region. With the same logic, out-migration, which is expressed as negative 
net migration, would raise the ethnic diversity, making its coefficient negative. (𝑀/𝑃)𝑟
𝑅  will be 
included for the non-Russian sample, and the Russian net-migration should have a positive 
coefficient as the influx of Russians to the regions where there are the indigenes already settling 
will raise the ethnic diversity, and vice versa for net out-migration. I also include the birth per 
women of titular groups relative to the average of the region, 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟
𝑇, to control for the 
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offsetting effect of high fertility rates as discussed above. Other control variables, X, include 
share of employment, food consumption, share of recent migrants, proxy for transport and port 
dummy.  
The caveat to the interpretations is that there is no causal relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Rather, there should be a mechanical relationship 
between net migration and ethnic diversity indices because if a titular group member moves out 
of an oblast, it affects the numerator and denominator of their share in total population and the 
denominator of the share of all other groups. This means that the fractionalization index will be 
affected by the changing share due to migration. However, this practice is still useful in that it 
allows me to see the different contributions, even if it is mechanical, of the titular groups and 
Russians to changing diversity relatively easily. Also, it reveals some information about the 
correlation between the diversity measures and other variables such as fertility.  
 
Table 4-7. The relationship between migration and diversity, 1979-89 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶 ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶 ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶 ∆𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅 ∆𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅 ∆𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑅 
Titular migration 
-0.22** -0.33** -0.51*** -0.06 -0.12 -0.30* 
(-2.70) (-3.14) (-4.41) (-0.73) (-1.05) (-2.39) 
Russian migration  
 0.48**   0.47** 
 (3.13)  (2.90) 
Titular fertility 
-0.18* -0.08 -0.18 -0.14 0.11 0.00 
(-2.05) (-0.52) (-1.26) (-1.58) (0.67) (0.00) 
Employment 
0.31*** 0.13 0.12 0.40*** -0.01 -0.02 
(3.41) (0.74) (0.75) (4.28) (-0.07) (-0.10) 
Food consumption 
0.19* 0.31* -0.12 0.16* 0.40** -0.02 
(2.40) (2.35) (-0.62) (2.06) (2.85) (-0.10) 
Recent migrants 
0.25** 0.23* 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.06 
(3.00) (2.12) (1.24) (1.81) (1.36) (0.55) 
Transport 
0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.05 
(0.27) (-0.74) (-0.04) (0.59) (-0.31) (0.34) 
Port 
-0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.00 
(-0.53) (-0.69) (-0.17) (-1.06) (-0.53) (-0.04) 
R2 0.36 0.35 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.32 
No. Obs.  156 100 100 156 100 100 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 4-7 reports the results of OLS estimation for the relationship between migration 
and ethnic diversity change. First three columns are when the change in FRACs is the dependent 
variable. Column (1) shows that, in the full sample, the migration of titular ethnic groups has a 
negative and significant coefficient as predicted. This means that the inflow or outflow of titular 
national groups was one of the main drivers shaping ethnic diversity in a region. To be specific, 
one standard deviation (SD) increase in net in-migration rates of titular members will decrease 
the ethnic fractionalization index by 0.22 of its standard deviation. This becomes much clearer 
when you look at the results from a non-Russian sample in Columns (2) and (3), where the beta 
coefficient of Titular migration variable goes down to -0.33 and -0.51 with a high significance 
level. When the migration of Russians is included in Column (3), the result comes out in line 
with the prediction showing a positive and significant coefficient on it. One SD increase in the 
net-migration rates of Russians will increase the ethnic diversity in the non-Russian regions by 
0.48 SD of FRAC. The fertility rate of titular groups turns out to be somewhat significant in the 
full sample but not in the non-Russian sample, though the sign was negative as predicted. It 
seems that the migration of sizable groups was a more important driver of ethnic 
fractionalisation than natural increase during this period.  
Other control variables like employment and food consumption turn out to be significant 
in the full sample, but this significance disappears when I excluded Russian regions from the 
sample. Some variables related to the living standard seem to increase ethnic diversity by 
attracting various non-titular ethnic groups to the regions. The share of recent migrants also has 
a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that the migration was in the direction of ethnic 
unmixing during the late-Soviet period. The most obvious example of this is Siberian regions, as 
discussed in the previous section. This effect is not seen in the non-Russian sample since first, 
the regions whose diversity was most affected by living conditions were located in Russia and 
second, the ethnic Russians were most responsive to these control variables as shown in the 
previous chapter. This is evident from the fact that none of the control variables has significance 
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when Russian migration is included in Column (3).   
Looking at the last three columns, it seems that migration affected the ethnic polarization 
to a less extent. Though the signs are the same as previous models with FRACs, the significance 
level is little or none for the titular migration. Russian migration, however, had some influence 
in shaping regional POLAR for the non-Russian regions as the coefficient is reported positive 
and significant in Column (6). Most of the other control variables, including the fertility rates, 
seem to have little effect on the change in ethnic diversity.   
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III. Ethnic Diversity and Violence 
Thus far we have seen how the regional ethnic diversity had changed during the Soviet period 
since 1959. I suggested that the reasons for this change include the migration of the members of 
different ethnic groups in the direction of ethnic mixing or unmixing and the different fertility 
rates shown among these groups. In this section, I will examine whether the level of ethnic 
diversity affected the frequency and the size of the violent incidents at the end of the Soviet era.  
 
a. Previous literature 
There has been an extensive discussion in the literature as to the impact of ethnic diversity on 
economic and social outcomes, though the conclusion is not straightforward245. It is argued that 
a more fragmented society is subject to rent-seeking behaviours, competition over public goods 
and resulting social unrest, leading to a reduction in investment and poor economic 
performance (Easterly and Levine 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Vanhanen 1999; Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Esteban and Ray 2011; Bleany and Dimico 
2017). However, the adverse effect of ethnic fractionalisation may not be very large if the 
society has an ability to deal with the coordination problem. Many authors recognise the 
different implications of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity depending on the institutional 
settings of affected societies. (Collier 2000, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Fish and Kroenig 
2006; Goren 2014). For example, Collier (2000) found that democratic countries are not 
affected much by ethnolinguistic fragmentation246. In addition, some argue that a country or an 
organisation can benefit from more diversity (Lazear 2000; Ottaviano and Peri 2006; Putnam 
2007; Horwitz and Horwitz 2007; Bove and Elia 2017). The diffusion of new ideas, 
complementarities between different skill levels and mutual learning can bring about positive 
outcomes from diverse societal members247.  
                                                             
245 See Chapter 1, Literature Review for details. 
246 Collier, ‘Ethnicity (2000)’ 
247 Bove and Elia, ‘Migration’, pp.228-229 
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In this section, I will test which of the positive and negative impacts was bigger in the 
Soviet context, using the late-Soviet regional data. I focus on the effects of level and change rate 
of ethnic fractionalisation on the occurrence of violent incidents. The implication of ethnic 
diversity on violence may not be as simplistic in the Soviet context. I will discuss the Soviet-
specific phenomenon in the result section if applicable.   
 
b. Data and method 
I firstly use the number of protests and riots occurred from 1987 to 1992, which was collected 
by Beissinger (2002), to measure the level of violence. 5,583 protests and 2,003 riots were 
recorded based on press or government reports, with the information about the time, location, 
participants (protest only) and causes/demands of individual events. I rearrange the events by 
their location so that they match the ethnic fractionalisation index of 150 regions248 in my 
dataset. I also separate the protests and riots related to ethnic or nationalist demands for an 
alternative regression model. Later, I use the dummy for major conflict as a dependent variable 
to see if other measures of ethnic violence are affected by ethnic diversity level.  
Table 4-8 shows the number of uprisings249 per 1 million population, FRAC, POLAR and 
change in diversity due to net migration in the regions where the level of violence is the highest. 
All five regions on the top belong to three Transcaucasian Union republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, whereas other two are ASSRs in Russians SFSR. The most violent regions show a 
high ethnic diversity level except Nakhichevan ASSR and Armenia, with the FRAC index of 
Abkhaz ASSR (0.73) being bigger than twice the USSR average (0.35) in 1979. Two ASSRs at the 
bottom are also amongst the most ethnically fractionalised regions in Russian territories. 
However, the change in ethnic diversity caused by migration over the next 10 year was negative 
in all top 5% regions. 
                                                             
248 Regions include oblast and ASSRs, but Union republic are sometimes included as a region when their size is 
relatively small.  
249 Uprising includes both protest and riot.  
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Table 4-8. Top 5% high violence oblast / ASSR, 1988-1992 
Oblast / ASSR 
Number of uprisings 
Major 
conflict 
FRAC79 POLAR79 
ΔFRAC89 
due to NM 
Total 
Per 10 
million 
Abkhaz ASSR 242 292 Yes 0.727 0.720 -1.9% 
Nakhichevan ASSR 89 214 No 0.085 0.175 -13.7% 
Baku 1036 135 Yes 0.387 0.583 -20.4% 
Tbilisi 868 95 Yes 0.483 0.659 -4.9% 
Armenian SSR1) 522 77 Yes 0.191 0.345 -8.5% 
Moldovan SSR1) 409 55 Yes 0.552 0.724 -1.5% 
Chechen-Ingush ASSR 120 31 Yes 0.622 0.817 -2.1% 
Tuva ASSR 11 25 Yes 0.503 0.913 -1.0% 
USSR Average 60 9 - 0.350 0.539 0.9% 
Note: 1) Both Armenia and Moldova are treated as a unit of region in my dataset due to the smaller size 
compared to other oblasts/ASSRs. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the most violent regions seem to be in line with the 
hypotheses I made above. The violent incidents may be positively correlated with the level of 
ethnic diversity while the increase in diversity reduces their probability. In order to test the 
hypotheses formally, I conducted a cross-sectional regression analysis summarised below.  
 
𝑈𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑟 + 𝑎2∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚𝑟 + 𝑎3log (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑟 + 𝑋′𝑟,𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑟,𝑡 
 
Regional ethnic fractionalisation index (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑟) and its change due to net migration 
(∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚𝑟) are included as two main explanatory variables250. If the hypotheses hold, the 
coefficient of 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑟 should be positive and that of ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚𝑟 should be negative. I include 
population measure as the number of uprisings is expected to be bigger in the regions with a 
larger population251. I also include other control variables, X, which may have affected the 
outbreak of violent incidents, including income, urbanisation rates, education, temperature, 
                                                             
250 FRAC is later replaced by POLAR. 
251 I alternatively divide the dependent variable by population to capture this. The results do not differ 
significantly in both ways.  
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transport, etc. As to the regional income, I use official wage level data first and then replace it 
with food consumption as a proxy for real consumption. The results will report specifications 
including food consumption instead of official wages, as the former works better in general.  
In addition, it should be considered that the relationship between conflict and ethnic 
fractionalisation may be non-linear, as some authors recognise (Collier 2000, 2001; Montalvo 
and Raynal-Qurol 2005; Janus and Riera-Crichton 2015). The possibility of conflict is not high 
when there is too a small share of the non-native population (low diversity) or there are too 
many different ethnic groups in a society (high diversity)252. I include the square of FRACs 
following Collier (2000)253 to see if there is any non-linear relationship. A theory suggests that 
the coefficient on the square of FRAC should be negative because it is when there is a medium 
level of ethnic fractionalisation that ethnic violence becomes most intense. POLAR index, on the 
other hand, does not need the quadratic term. Since the ethnic polarisation level goes down by 
definition when the number of ethnic groups increases after 2, the non-linear relationship will 
not be observed in the relationship between POLAR and conflicts.  
Since the dependent variable is the number of protests, which is a non-negative integer, 
it is not appropriate to use an OLS estimation. Poisson regression is usually used in the count 
variable model, but this is only applicable when the distribution of dependent variable has the 
same mean and variance. The variance of the protest data is far higher than its mean, i.e. the 
count variable is overdispersed (see Table 4-9), a possible alternative will be a negative 
binomial model254. As the uprising variable is not subject to excessive zero realisation255, I will 
use a normal negative binomial estimation in the beginning. This issue can arise when I conduct 
an alternative regression as to the participants of ethnic protests, then I will need a zero-inflated 
model. The details will be provided in subsection d. 
                                                             
252 Collier, P., ‘Implications of ethnic diversity’, Economic policy vol. 16 no. 32 (2001), pp. 150-1. 
253 Collier, ‘Ethnicity (2000)’, p.233 
254 Suesse, M., ‘Adjusting the Size of Nations: Empirical Determinants of Separatism and the Soviet Breakup’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics (forthcoming) 
255 The share of regions with no uprising is less than 10%.  
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Table 4-9. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD. Min Max 
Uprisings 150 46.8 117.6 0 1036 
Uprisings_Ethnic 150 37.0 122.8 0 1036 
Protest Participants 150 659358 1634417 0 9917621 
Protest Participants_Ethnic 150 671436 3572038 0 9917621 
FRAC, 79 150 0.363 0.214 0.038 0.861 
∆FRAC7989  150 0.055 0.101 -0.309 0.346 
POLAR, 79 150 0.550 0.264 0.743 0.982 
Log population, 89 150 14.2 0.7 12.6 16.6 
Log wage, 85 150 5.0 0.2 4.8 5.9 
Log food consumption, 85 147 6.6 0.2 6.3 6.9 
Urbanisation rate, 85 150 0.598 0.168 0.193 0.963 
Number of students, 85, per 1000 147 182.2 48.3 115.7 280.7 
Log passenger distance, bus 147 7.3 0.3 6.4 8.0 
Temperature range (July-Jan), ºC 150 28.6 6.8 16.0 53.9 
Note) Obs.: number of observations, SD: standard deviation. 
c. Results 
Table 4-10 shows the results from the baseline negative binomial where only diversity 
measures and population are included as independent variables. Column (1) reports the 
predicted sign and significance of all the coefficients. More fractionalised regions do seem to 
experience more frequent uprisings, while the probability of violence reduced when the 
diversity changes by net migration. When the protests and riots with nationalist causes are 
considered in Column (2), the result is similar with slightly higher coefficients of all variables.  
The significant and negative effect of increasing diversity due to migration 
(∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚7989) on the frequency of violent events is worth more discussion. These results 
may be confirming the contact hypothesis, since the regions that experienced an influx of 
outsiders show the lower level of ethnic tension. However, this interpretation is only partly true 
since many non-Russian regions in the late-Soviet period exhibited decreasing ethnic diversity 
caused by mass out-migration of ethnic Russians. As we saw in the previous section, these 
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regions include Transcaucasia where the most frequent violent incidents were observed. In 
other words, the negative correlation between diversity and violence is not only driven by the 
regions experiencing an increase in diversity but also driven by the regions experiencing 
decreasing diversity. In the latter regions, the probability of ethnic violence increased because 
they became more homogenous. This is related to nationalist mobilisation in the regions where 
ethnic unmixing occurred due to ethnic Russians’ out-migration. The nationalist elites were 
made easier to mobilise indigenous population where their share increased, and it led to more 
protests and riots256.  
One concern with the negative coefficient of ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚7989 is its endogeneity arising 
from reverse causality. That is, it might not be that increasing diversity makes the probability of 
conflicts low, but the conflicts encourage people to leave the regions and thus lower the 
diversity level. This issue can be somewhat significant as the period of FRAC changes (79-89) 
overlaps the period of ethnic violence (88-92) for about a year. Even if the periods are not 
overlapping, the tensions among ethnic groups can be a push factor driving their members away 
before the actual conflicts are realised.  
Table 4-10. The effect of ethnic diversity on violence, baseline model 
Dependent variable: 
 # uprisings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Ethnic All Ethnic All Ethnic 
FRAC79 
1.15** 1.87***   -5.13** -5.43*   
(2.55) (2.87)   (-2.25) (-1.65)    
POLAR79   
0.67* 1.29**                  
  (1.71) (2.27)                  
FRAC792   
  8.23*** 9.56**  
    (2.79) (2.24)    
∆FRACnm7989 
-4.75*** -6.82*** -4.68*** -6.78*** -5.55*** -7.96*** 
(-5.63) (-5.26) (-5.49) (-5.20) (-6.07) (-5.62)    
Log(population89) 
1.00*** 1.09*** 0.97*** 1.04*** 1.17*** 1.31*** 
(7.94) (5.96) (7.59) (5.60) (8.45) (6.42)    
No. Obs. 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Note: Results from negative binomial regressions; z-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01.  
                                                             
256 Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization, pp.76-9  
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There is no direct way to control this issue in the cross-sectional estimation when there is 
no proper instrument, but I can indirectly see the extent to which this issue is a serious concern 
by trying alternative specifications. I do the same regressions on the sample of Russian oblasts 
(n = 73) and the sample excluding Transcaucasia and Central Asia (n = 103). These two samples 
are less affected by the mass out-migration of ethnic Russians which lowers the regional ethnic 
diversity, therefore not subject to reverse causality problem too much. The result, though not 
reported in this chapter, still reports negative coefficients on ∆𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑛𝑚7989  in both 
specifications. However, the significance of the variable lowers slightly, meaning that there 
might be the reverse causality issue existing in the full sample.  
Column (3) and (4) report the results when ethnic polarisation is replaced with FRAC. 
The sign remains the same but the significance lowers, leaving POLAR becomes significant at 5% 
level for the ethnic protest sample. POLAR has been regarded to explain conflict better in the 
previous literature as discussed before. However, it was not the case in the Soviet context. In 
fact, coefficients on POLAR turned out to lose significance when included with other control 
variables later and removed in the specifications. This is because the high polarisation is 
observed when ethnic Russians are prevalent in a place where another titular group exist. 
However, the conflict in the late-Soviet period often occurred between non-Russian ethnic 
groups. When there are three or more equal-size groups reside in one region, polarisation level 
tends to go down by definition while fractionalisation level goes up. A potential alternative for 
normal POLAR can be the polarisation index revised to exclude ethnic Russians, which was 
suggested in the previous section. POLAR without ethnic Russians may be bigger when two non-
Russian ethnic groups are dominant in a region and conflicting with each other, therefore may 
capture the effect of polarisation better. In practice, however, this revised index did not turn out 
to be significant, because first, there is not much variation in this variable for the Russian 
regions where Russians account for 80-90 percent of the population, and second, the presence 
of Russians had different impact between Baltic, Transcaucasia and Central Asia regions which 
cannot be generalised by the results of econometric specifications. Therefore, the results from 
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the specifications using POLAR and POLAR excluding Russians were not presented and the 
discussion in this chapter will focus on the effect of FRAC.  
When the quadratic term is introduced in Column (5) and (6), the results do not seem to 
support the arguments of the previous literature. Unlike what the theory suggests, the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and violence is U-shape. The chance of having violent 
incidents initially decreases as the region becomes more diverse, but it increases after the 
diversity level reaches a certain point.  
The results not consistent with the theory can be partly explained in the Soviet context. 
The highly homogenous region, again, is where the ethnic elites can most easily mobilise 
indigenous people and organise nationalist protests in the Soviet period257. Armenia and 
Nakhichevan ASSR are two good examples of the regions with low ethnic diversity experiencing 
ethnic tensions258.  Violence observed in the regions with very high ethnic diversity can also be 
understood as a Soviet specific phenomenon. Looking at the list of the regions experienced 
major ethnic conflicts259, those conflicts often occurred between two non-Russian nationalities 
who occupied one region. For example, in Abkhazia, the tension between Georgians and 
Abkhazians, who were supported by Armenian and Russian governments, escalated to the point 
of war breaking out in 1992260. The shares of Georgians, Abkhazians, Armenians and Russians in 
Abkhaz ASSR in 1979 were 0.44, 0.17, 0.15, and 0.16, respectively, which makes its FRAC 0.717, 
amongst the highest in the Soviet regions. Also, Chechen-Ingush ASSR, which was subject to two 
major civil wars between Chechens and ethnic Russians and between Ossetians and the Ingush, 
had very high ethnic diversity with the FRAC of 0.622 in 1979261. Therefore, the U-shape 
relationship between ethnic diversity and conflicts may not be what is surprising in the Soviet 
context.   
                                                             
257 Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization, pp.76-9 
258 FRACs of Armenia and Nakhichevan ASSR were 0.191 and 0.085, respectively, in 1979. Table 4-7. 
259 The list can be found in Section II 
260 Petersen, A., ‘The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict’, Caucasian Review of International 
Affairs vol. 2 no. 4 (2008), pp.187-199 
261 The share of Chechens, the Ingush and ethnic Russians were 0.52, 0.12 and 0.29, respectively in 1979 
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Table 4-11. The effect of ethnic diversity on violence, controls added 
Dependent 
variable: 
 # uprisings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic All All 
FRAC 
2.46*** 1.43* 0.74 -6.37** -7.03** -5.34 0.49 -4.91**  
(3.40) (1.95) (0.92) (-2.00) (-2.30) (-1.53) (0.87) (-2.03) 
FRAC2 
   11.58*** 11.01*** 8.05*  7.19**  
   (2.82) (2.84) (1.78)  (2.28) 
∆FRACnm 
-6.40*** -6.00*** -5.89*** -7.70*** -7.41*** -7.10*** -4.12*** -4.87*** 
(-5.56) (-4.93) (-4.71) (-6.23) (-5.57) (-5.00) (-4.90) (-5.40) 
Population 
0.94*** 1.15*** 1.02*** 1.14*** 1.30*** 1.17*** 0.89*** 1.00*** 
(5.43) (5.95) (5.21) (6.16) (6.97) (5.54) (6.24) (6.84) 
Food 
Consumption 
2.22** 4.62*** 3.26*** 2.17** 4.61*** 3.59*** 1.52* 1.93**  
(2.41) (4.50) (3.02) (2.47) (4.74) (3.35) (1.95) (2.48) 
Urbanisation 
 -1.29 -0.35  -1.02 -0.57 0.63 0.58    
 (-1.21) (-0.32)  (-1.04) (-0.54) (0.73) (0.71) 
Education 
 0.02*** 0.02***  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01*   
 (3.56) (3.64)  (3.72) (3.86) (1.60) (1.80) 
Transport 
  0.85   1.07 -0.37 -0.30    
  (1.11)   (1.40) (-0.79) (-0.65) 
Weather 
  -0.06***   -0.04** -0.05*** -0.03**  
  (-3.34)   (-1.97) (-3.41) (-2.00) 
No. Obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Note: Results from negative binomial regressions; z-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01.  
 
Table 4-11 reports the results when including control variables. The addition of controls 
does not change the result from the baseline regression much, though FRAC seems to lose its 
significance when more controls are added (Column (3)). However, the square of FRAC keeps 
showing positive and significant coefficient, confirming the U-shape relationship between 
fractionalization and violence. This relationship is visually presented in Figure 4-4, depicting the 
scatter plot of the number of predicted violent incidents and FRAC79, and the quadratic fitted 
curve obtained from the baseline and control added specifications. Though the curvature got 
slightly flat when the control variables are added, the fitted curve clearly shows U-shape with 
the highest number of uprisings at two extremes. The probability of conflicts decreases until the 
FRAC reached around 0.38 and increases afterwards. It can be also understood that when the 
FRAC is lower than the tipping point, the decreasing ethnic diversity would raise the frequency 
of ethnic violence.   
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Figure 4-4. Non-linear relationship between FRAC and the number of uprisings 
 
 Note: Regions with over 250 demonstrations are omitted in the graph but included in the regressions for 
the prediction. Shaded part is 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Looking at other control variables, food consumption, as a proxy for income level, turns 
out to be positively correlated with violence. Though it is argued in the previous literature that 
the high-income regions are less prone to civil wars262,  this is not the case in the Soviet sample. 
This may be related to the fact that the dependent variable is the number of protests organized 
in the regions. If people have income below subsistence level, it would not be easier to 
participate in protests and demonstrations. Assuming the non-monotonic relationship between 
income and protest participants, the coefficient of income variable can be positive in the low-
income sample. Related to this, the regions with more education experience more frequent 
protests and riots, as education can be used as a tool for ethnic mobilization. Weather, on the 
other hand, has a negative effect as it would be difficult for people to gather when the weather 
conditions are adverse.  
                                                             
262 Alesina and La Ferrara, ‘Ethnic diversity’, p.770 
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d. Alternative models: Size of violent incidents and Civil wars 
I have examined the effect of ethnic diversity on the number of uprisings so far. However, not all 
uprisings have the same number of participants. Some events draw more attention than others, 
so it is important to take the size of the event into account. Also, it will be useful to see if the 
ethnic diversity affects the major conflicts and civil wars involving military actions. In this 
section, I will first see the effect of diversity on the size of violent incidents, then on the outbreak 
of the civil wars.  
Beissinger’s dataset identifies the number of participants in the protests263. This time I 
use the number of protest participants as a dependent variable, again separating those who 
involved in the protests with nationalist demand. When only the protests, excluding riots, are 
considered, especially for the nationalism-related sample, the specification may be subject to an 
excessive zero problem264. Following Suesse (forthcoming), I adopted a zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression model using protest repression to predict zero realization265. The number 
of arrests in protest is used as a proxy for repression, and the first stage logit regression shows 
that the protest is less likely to occur where there is a higher chance for the protestors to be 
arrested. The result from the Vuong test shows that the zero-inflated model is preferred to 
standard negative binomial at 1% significance level.  
 The results from zero-inflated negative binomial regression are reported in Table 4-12. 
The coefficients of FRAC variables are significant only when the quadratic term is introduced, 
whereas ∆FRACnm has strong effect throughout. The sign and significance of the coefficients on 
other control variables are not too different from the results of the previous specification. This 
confirms that ethnic diversity affects the size of violent incidents, as well as their frequency. 
  
                                                             
263 Data of riot participants is not complete.  
264 About 35% of the regions did not see any protest related to nationalist demand.  
265 Suesse, ‘Adjusting the size’, pp.9-10 
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Table 4-12. The effect of ethnic diversity on protest participants 
Dep. var:  
Protest 
participants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic All All 
FRAC79 
0.11 1.58 -1.67 -14.18*** -19.03*** -17.00*** -0.15 -4.72 
(0.13) (1.33) (-1.12) (-2.63) (-3.74) (-3.02) (-0.20) (-1.58) 
FRAC792 
   19.28** 28.61*** 21.47***  6.18 
   (2.57) (4.00) (2.68)  (1.56) 
∆FRACnm7989 
-7.75*** -7.55*** -5.42** -9.74*** -11.27*** -9.01*** -4.34*** -5.00*** 
(-3.75) (-4.62) (-2.39) (-4.06) (-6.15) (-3.68) (-3.87) (-4.10) 
Population 
1.63*** 1.96*** 0.96*** 2.16*** 2.10*** 1.31*** 1.14*** 1.18*** 
(5.04) (5.35) (2.88) (5.98) (7.12) (3.48) (6.07) (6.44) 
Food 
Consumption 
 4.15** 3.40**  5.07*** 5.39*** 1.54* 1.86** 
 (2.36) (2.25)  (3.01) (3.53) (1.67) (1.99) 
Urbanisation 
 -4.84*** -0.15  -3.56** -0.50 1.22 1.30 
 (-2.81) (-0.09)  (-2.44) (-0.33) (1.19) (1.32) 
Education 
  0.03***   0.03*** 0.01* 0.01* 
  (2.92)   (3.23) (1.90) (1.83) 
Transport 
  -1.06   -0.36 0.35 0.45 
  (-0.90)   (-0.28) (0.54) (0.71) 
Weather 
  -0.16***   -0.10** -0.04** -0.03* 
  (-5.11)   (-2.38) (-2.21) (-1.71) 
No. Obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
 Note: Results from zero-inflated negative binomial regressions; z-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
Lastly, I attempt to document the effect of ethnic diversity on the outbreak of civil wars. 
The late 80s and early 90s saw the major armed conflict in many Russian and non-Russian 
regions, besides protests and riots. Tishkov (1999) classified these violent incidents in to three 
categories: (1) six violent conflicts of considerable duration, with organized front lines, the 
participation of regular troops and paramilitary formations, and the use of heavy weapons 
(Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Chechnya), (2) four 
violent clashes (or riots) of short duration and with non-organized parties and mob violence 
(Sumgait and Baku, Fergana, Osh, Ingush-Ossetian), and (3) ten nonviolent conflicts with 
political, ethnic, religious, and clan tensions and confrontations (Yakutia, Tatarstan, Tuva, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachevo-Cherkessia, Daghestan in Russia; Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan; 
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Crimea in Ukraine; Gagauzia in Moldova; Dushanbe in Tajikistan)266.  
I use this list of major conflicts to produce a conflict dummy, coding 1 for the regions 
which experienced any conflicts and 0 otherwise, then regress this on the FRAC and other 
control variables. Since the dependent variable is a dummy with 1 and 0, I conducted Probit 
regressions instead of OLS. Non-linear relationship is not considered here as Probit regression 
would not be appropriate to see the effect of quadratic terms.  
The results in Table 4-13 reports that the FRAC has positive and significant effects on 
the chance of civil war occurring, confirming the importance of ethnic diversity in explaining 
ethnic conflict. This result does not change when the control variables are included in the last 
three columns. Changing ethnic diversity still shows a negative effect, but the significance is not 
as high as in the protest/riot specification. Other controls, not reported in the table, do not give 
much information as most of them turn out to be insignificant.  
 
 
Table 4-13. The effect of ethnic diversity on military conflicts 
Dep. var:  
Conflict (0,1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic 
FRAC79 
2.46***  2.63*** 2.43***  2.54*** 
(3.35)  (3.35) (2.73)  (2.77) 
∆FRACnm7989 
 -2.29* -2.47*  -2.29* -2.44* 
 (-1.82) (-1.92)  (-1.74) (-1.85) 
Population89 
0.43** 0.23 0.42* 0.30 0.22 0.33 
(1.98) (1.17) (1.91) (1.18) (0.93) (1.28) 
Food  
Consumption 
-1.31 -1.67** -1.19 -0.04 -0.03 0.16 
(-1.50) (-1.97) (-1.33) (-0.03) (-0.03) (0.13) 
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Note: Results from Probit regressions. t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
                                                             
266 Tishkov, V., "Ethnic Conflicts in the Former Ussr: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data." Journal of 
Peace Research vol. 36 no. 5 (1999), p.576 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the changing ethnic diversity trend in the Soviet period and its 
impact on ethnic violence occurred just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
contributions of the results presented in this chapter can be three-fold.  
Firstly, I review the ethnic diversity of the USSR, not at the country level but at the 
regional level. Country-level ethnic fractionalisation has some mathematical problems when 
two distinctive ethnic groups are concentrated in two different regions267. This issue has been 
addressed in my regional fractionalisation data. The average of regional ethnic diversity in the 
Soviet Union was 0.354 in 1989, having risen from 0.345 in 1959. This is far lower than 0.670, 
which is the figure obtained from Taylor and Hudson (1972) and often cited by the literature as 
the ethnic fractionalisation index of the Soviet Union268. This discrepancy is due to the regional 
concentration of different ethnic groups, usually in their national territory, lowering the local-
level FRACs relative to state-level FRACs.  
 Secondly, it is shown that the channel through which the regional ethnic diversity was 
shaped is migration in the direction of ethnic mixing during the late-Soviet period. A 
counterfactual ethnic diversity level was estimated using data constructed in the previous 
chapters. As a result, the contribution of migration in all the Soviet raions, except Transcaucasia 
and Moldavia, was positive and raised the regional ethnic diversity levels during the last decade 
of the Soviet period. In contrast, ethnic unmixing was clearly seen during the post-Soviet period. 
The change in FRAC due to migration was negative in all regions with no exception in the period 
between 1989 and 2000, meaning that ethnic migration after the collapse contributed to the 
homogenisation of post-Soviet states.  
Lastly, this chapter reveals the relationship between the diversity and violence in the 
Soviet context, adding confirmation to the literature arguing the negative effect of ethnic 
                                                             
267 Bleaney and Dimico, ‘Ethnic diversity’, p.366 
268 Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook, p.272 
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diversity on social outcomes. To be specific, the coefficients of ethnic diversity variables were 
positive and significant in explaining the frequency and the size of the violent incidents as well 
as raising the probability of civil wars. However, the change in ethnic diversity may have 
different implications, as the increase in FRAC turns out to have a negative impact on ethnic 
violence. This can be partly explained by ‘contact hypothesis’, which argues that interethnic 
interactions reduce conflict, but also related to the ethnic mobilisation in the regions where 
ethnic Russians left. In addition, the non-linear relationship between diversity and conflict is 
derived from quadratic specifications. Unlike the prediction of the previous literature, however, 
the chance of conflicts outbreaking was highest when the regions are very homogenous and 
very fragmented, resulting in a U-shape relationship. This can be understood in the Soviet 
context as discussed in Section III.  
Returning to the question posed early in this chapter, it is not clear whether the ethnic 
migration planted the seed for its own destruction. The trend of migration is confirmed to have 
changed from ethnic mixing to unmixing in the post-Soviet transition period. However, the 
ethnic diversity which had increased due to the migration in the direction of ethnic mixing did 
not cause the ethnic violence at the end of the Soviet period, but the effect was actually the 
opposite. What is clearly seen in this chapter, however, is that the regions with the high initial 
level of ethnic diversity are prone to the outbreak of ethnic conflicts.  
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Chapter 5. Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
In this thesis, I have studied the migration patterns shown among the members of various 
ethnic groups residing in the Soviet and post-Soviet space during the transition period. For the 
first time in the literature, I constructed a database as to the regional net migration of the Soviet 
national groups and investigated how migration, ethnic diversity, and violent incidents in the 
Soviet Union have influenced one another. To be specific, the regional migration was 
significantly affected by the presence of co-ethnics in the potential destinations and it became a 
crucial factor in shaping the ethnic diversity of the sending and receiving regions. I argued that 
the increasing ethnic fractionalisation contributed to the outbreaks of ethnic conflicts and 
nationalist movements and, in turn, to the independence of the union republics.  
 Despite the novel contributions of the main chapters of this thesis, several limitations 
seem necessary to be addressed. These limitations, undoubtedly, will be the sources for the 
further research. In this last chapter, I will point out the major limitations which may weaken 
the conclusions of this thesis and discuss how these can be overcome in the future studies.  
 Firstly, room for improvement remains in the data construction process of Chapter 2. I 
used aggregate data on self-reported ethnicity from census statistics to calculate net migration. 
As discussed in Section II, however, the accuracy of net migration data derived by a residual 
method will be compromised if respondents do not report their ethnicity consistently in two 
consecutive censuses. If one changes their reported ethnic identity from Kazakhs to Russians 
between two censuses, the population of Russians will increase even if no Russian was born or 
moved to the region. This phenomenon is called ethnic re-identification by Anderson and Silver 
(1986), who suggested that around 60,000 ethnic minorities are Russified, i.e. changed their 
ethnic identity to Russian, between 1959 and 70269. The margin of error should not be very large 
for the Soviet dataset, however, since Russification was mostly among non-titular minorities 
                                                             
269 Anderson and Silver, ‘Estimating Russification (1983)’, pp.461 
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and its extent was small relative to the whole Russian population. I also suggested that the 
institutionalisation of nationalities made it hard for Soviet people to change their national 
identity at their will.  
For the post-Soviet period, the issue of ethnic re-identification can be more problematic 
since people may have more incentives to change their nationality when facing discrimination 
against non-titular groups after the independence of FSU states. Even though some authors like 
Rapawy (1997) 270, Heleniak (2004)271 and Duncan (2010)272 discussed the extent of post-Soviet 
ethnic re-identification for ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, there is little information as to the 
actual numbers. It is impossible to determine the extent of re-identification with aggregate level 
data, since self-reported ethnic identity is not verified against supporting documentation273.  
This may possibly remain as a pitfall of my database and correction of this issue will be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Ethnic unmixing, which was the main implications of the 
migration in the post-Soviet decade, might have been the result of people re-identifying 
themselves as the titular nationality of the state where they currently live in the absence of 
actual moving. Having said that, changing ethnic identity, as well as migration to homelands, 
will emphasise the importance of ethnic affinity determining the welfare of people and affecting 
their behaviours. People respond to lowering living standards in the place they currently stay 
either by moving out of it or changing their self-reported ethnic identity as it pleases.  
Future studies will be able to address this issue in several ways. The most obvious 
channel of changing one’s ethnicity is interethnic marriages. According to Arutyunyan and 
Bromley (1986), around 12 per cent of total Soviet families were ethnically mixed and their 
children choose either of their parents’ nationalities at the age of 16274. Kaiser (1994) also 
                                                             
270 Rapawy, S., ‘Ethnic reidentification in Ukraine’, US Bureau of the Census IPC Staff paper no. 90 (1997) 
271 Heleniak, T., ‘Migration of the Russian diaspora after the breakup of the Soviet Union’, Journal of 
International Affairs vol. 57 no. 2 (2004), pp. 99-117 
272 Arel, D., and Ruble, B., Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine. (Washington DC. 
2006) 
273 Heleniak, ‘Migration of Russian diaspora (2004)’, p.114 
274 Recited from Gorenburg, ‘Rethinking Interethnic Marriage’, p.147 
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discusses the effect of intermarriage on the choice of nationality in the Soviet period275. 
Likewise, examining the extent of intermarriage during the post-Soviet transition period can 
hint the extent of ethnic re-identification as the FSU censuses contain some information as to 
the proportion of families with mixed nationalities. There are no statistics which reveal the 
ethnicity of mixed marriage couples in aggregate level data and microdata is not available for 
the Soviet and Russian censuses, either276. Instead, one can look at the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) which Higher School of Economics, Moscow, has conducted since 
1994 on the sample of around 3,500 households. Since the respondents are required to reveal 
their ethnic identity, it is possible to check if he or she reports their ethnicity consistently over a 
period, as well as to see if married couples have the same ethnicity. As there is no research 
investigating the extent of ethnic re-identification found from the list of publications using 
RLMS277, it is open to the future study.  
Secondly, while the main analyses of this thesis focus on the general trend of migration 
and ethnic diversity in the whole area of the USSR and FSU states, in-depth analysis about each 
ethnic group in each region would be necessary to capture the different implications of ethnicity 
in regions with different environments. For example, Section IV of Chapter 3 shows that the 
ethnic groups included in the sample respond to economic and ethnic factors differently. 
However, it was not possible in this thesis to look at each of the 35 titular ethnic groups and 
major ethnic minorities separately. Related to this, I have focused on the usefulness of the Soviet 
dataset in answering common questions of the migration and ethnic diversity literature and 
consequently, the context of the Soviet Union or other FSU states were sometimes disregarded. 
In fact, not many Russian or FSU republic studies were referred to in this thesis other than 
primary sources and a few studies quoted in the Western research. Admittedly, this may leave 
the interpretations of the results of this thesis inapplicable to specific regions or ethnic groups 
                                                             
275 Kaiser, Geography of Nationalism, pp.317-314 
276 IPUMS international, however, provides microdata for some FSU countries, such as Belarus (1999), Ukraine 
(2001) and Kyrgyz Republic (1999, 2000). 
277 The list can be found on the following link: https://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse/publications 
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without further investigation.  
To investigate the case studies of 15 different states which use different languages will be 
a challenge even to the researchers with the background of Russia or any FSU states. However, 
the database constructed in this thesis can be easily expanded towards other groups who 
settled in the former Soviet Union states and will be available to the local researchers who are 
interested in finding quantitative evidence of late- and post-Soviet migration patterns of their 
respective ethnic groups.  
Lastly, the scope of this thesis is confined to the investigation of the Soviet and post-Soviet 
space, even though the relationship between migration and ethnic diversity could be 
understood in the broader context of globalisation. Therefore, it is possible to conduct 
comparative analyses investigating the unique and universal characteristics of Soviet migration 
with regard to other ethnically heterogeneous countries or communities, such as the US or the 
EU. It would be an interesting subject to see the difference in attitudes of the authorities 
towards immigrants or non-natives between the US and the USSR since these two had very 
different views on the nationality problem. Also, in a historical context, other multi-ethnic 
empires, such as Hapsburg Monarchy, can be an interesting subject of comparison.  
The comparative analysis can be done regarding the population redistribution under the 
totalitarian regimes. For example, it is possible to delve into the similarities and differences 
between the Soviet and South African migration history. The history of segregating ethnic 
groups and forcing/inducing its people to migrate based on ethnicity is what the Soviet Union 
and South Africa have in common. Segregation of Jews under the Nazis and their repatriation 
afterwards can be compared to the Soviet experience. 
As the literature about the two-way relationship between ethnicity and migration has 
been growing recently, the Soviet and post-Soviet cases explored in this thesis will be a valuable 
addition when compared to well-studied cases of other countries.   
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Appendix 2.1 The List of Soviet Oblasts/Krais/ASSRs 
No. Union Republics Economic Regions (Raion) Oblast/Kray/ASSRs 
1 Russian SFSR Northern Raion  Arkhangelsk Oblast 
2 Vologda Oblast 
3 Murmansk Oblast 
4 Karelian ASSR 
5 Komi ASSR 
6 North Western Raion Leningrad Oblast 
7 Novgorod Oblast 
8 Pskov Oblast 
9 Central Raion  Bryansk Oblast 
10 Vladimir Oblast 
11 Ivanovo Oblast 
12 Kalinin Oblast 
13 Kaluga Oblast 
14 Kostroma Oblast 
15 Moscow Oblast 
16 Orel Oblast 
17 Ryazan Oblast 
18 Smolensk Oblast 
19 Tula Oblast 
20 Yaroslavl Oblast 
21 Volga Vyatka Raion Kirov Oblast 
22 Gorky (Nizhny-Novgorod) Oblast 
23 Mari ASSR 
24 Mordovia ASSR 
25 Chuvash ASSR 
26 Central Black Earth Raion  Belgorod Oblast 
27 Voronezh Oblast 
28 Kursk Oblast 
29 Lipetsk Oblast 
30 Tambov Oblast 
31 Volga Raion Astrakhan Oblast 
32 Volgograd Oblast 
33 Kuibyshev Oblast 
34 Penza Oblast 
35 Saratov Oblast 
36 Ulyanovsk Oblast 
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37 Kalmyk ASSR 
38 Tatar ASSR 
39 North Caucasian Raion  Krasnodar Kray 
40 Stavropol Kray 
41 Rostov Oblast 
42 Dagestan ASSR 
43 Kabardino-Balkar ASSR 
44 North Ossetian ASSR 
45 Chechen-Ingush ASSR 
46 Ural Raion Kurgan Oblast 
47 Orenburg Oblast 
48 Perm Kray 
49 Sverdlovsk Oblast 
50 Chelyabinsk Oblast 
51 Bashkir ASSR 
52 Udmurt ASSR 
53 West Siberian Raion  Altai Kray 
54 Kemerovo Oblast 
55 Novosibirsk Oblast 
56 Omsk Oblast 
57 Tomsk Oblast 
58 Tyumen Oblast 
59 East Siberian Raion  Krasnoyarsk Kray 
60 Irkutsk Oblast 
61 Chita Oblast 
62 Buryat ASSR 
63 Tuvan ASSR 
64 Far Eastern Raion Primorsky Kray 
65 Khabarovsk Kray 
66 Amur Oblast 
67 Kamchatka Kray 
68 Magadan Oblast 
69 Sakhalin Oblast 
70 Yakut ASSR 
71 Ukrainian SSR Dnieper-Donetsk Raion Lugansk Oblast 
72 Dnipropetrovska Oblast 
73 Donetsk Oblast 
74 Zaporozhye Oblast 
75 Kirovograd Oblast 
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76 Poltava Oblast 
77 Sumy Oblast 
78 Kharkiv Oblast 
79 South West Raion Vinnytsia Oblast 
80 Volyn Oblast 
81 Zhytomyr Oblast 
82 Transcarpathian Oblast 
83 Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast 
84 Kyiv Oblast 
85 Lviv Oblast 
86 Rivne Oblast 
87 Ternopil Oblast 
88 Khmelnytsky Oblast 
89 Cherkasy Oblast 
90 Chernihiv Oblast 
91 Chernivtsi Oblast 
92 Southern Raion Crimean Oblast 
93 Mykolaiv Oblast 
94 Odessa Oblast 
95 Kherson Oblast 
96 Lithuanian SSR Baltic Raion Litovskaia SSR 
97 Latvian SSR Latvian SSR 
98 Estonian SSR Estonian SSR 
99 Russian SFSR Kaliningrad Oblast 
100 Georgian SSSR Transcacuasian Raion Tbilisi and others 
101 Abkhazian ASSR 
102 Adjara ASSR 
103 Azerbaijanian SSR Baku and others 
104 Nakhichevanskaia ASSR 
105 Armenian SSR Armenian SSR 
106 Uzbek SSR  Central Asian Raion Andijan Oblast 
107 Bukhara Oblast 
108 Kashkadarya Oblast 
109 Namangan Oblast 
110 Samarkand Oblast 
111 Surkhandarya Oblast 
112 Syrdarya Oblast 
113 Tashkent Oblast 
114 Ferghana Oblast 
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115 Khorezm Oblast 
116 Karakalpak ASSR 
117 Kirghiz SSR Issyk-Kul Oblast 
118 Osh Oblast 
119 Frunze and others 
120 Tajik SSR Dushanbe and others 
121 Leninabad Oblast 
122 Khalton Oblast 
123 Turkmen SSR Ashkabad and others 
124 Mari Oblasts 
125 Tashauz province 
126 Chardjou Oblasts 
127 Kazakh SSR Kazakh Raion  Aktobe Oblast 
128 Almaty Oblast 
129 Chimkent Oblast 
130 Dzhambul Oblasts 
131 Dzhezkazgan Oblasts 
132 Guryev Oblast 
133 Karaganda Oblast 
134 Kokchetav Oblast 
135 Kustanai Oblast 
136 Kyzyl-Orda Oblast 
137 Pavlodar Oblast 
138 Semipalatinsk Oblast 
139 North-Kazakhstan Oblast 
140 Taldy-Kurgan Oblast 
141 Tselinograd Oblast 
142 Ural Oblast 
143 East Kazakhstan Oblast 
144 Byelorussian SSR Byelorussian Raion Brest Oblast 
145 Vitebsk Oblast 
146 Gomel Oblast 
147 Grodno Oblast 
148 Minsk Oblast 
149 Mogilev Oblast 
150 Moldavian SSR Moldavian Raion Moldavian SSR 
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Appendix 3.1. Data and sources  
 
Data Unit Sources 
Net migration persons per 1000 Author’s calculation 
Share of an ethnic group % 
1979, 1989 USSR census, 2000 round 
censuses of FSU states 
Population persons 
1979, 1989 USSR census, 2000 round 
censuses of FSU states 
Real Wages at current dollars Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Employment % Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Conflicts 1 or 0  Author 
Ethnic fractionalization ELF = 1- ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖  Author’s calculation from census data 
Ethnic polarisation RQ = 1- ∑ (
1/2−𝑠𝑖
1/2
)2𝑖 𝑠𝑖  Author’s calculation from census data 
Food consumption Kg Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Meat consumption Kg Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Distance to Moscow Km 
Regiony Rossii 2002 
freemaptools.com/measure-distance 
Urbanization rate % Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Dummy for ports 1 or 0 Author 
Students in secondary 
education 
# per 1,000 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Students in higher 
education 
# per 1,000 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Number of doctors # per 1,000 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Hospital beds # per 1,000 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Crime rates # Per 1,000 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Housing space per person M2 Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
Passenger distance by bus 
per capita 
passenger kilometer Regiony Rossii 2002, CISstat 2008 
mean temperature, 
January 
ºC 
Regiony Rossii 2002 
www.weatherbase.com 
mean temperature, July ºC 
Regiony Rossii 2002 
www.weatherbase.com 
